Abstract
This chapter underlines the main trends in the number of preferences cast and the intraparty dynamics. The share of preference votes can be determined as the ratio between the total number of preferences expressed and the total number of preferences possible. An important question related to preferential voting systems is linked to their effect on the internal party electoral competition and how to measure it. In addition, we can measure two dimensions of competition: the influence and the weight of the head of the list or the most-voted-for candidate. In this chapter, the author reports data for 19 countries in terms of preference cast at the general elections, and in some cases also for European elections. The focus is on the effects of the preferential voting on the incumbents’ MPs electoral fate. The different sources of turnover are analysed and described for all the PLPR sub-types.
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Notes
- 1.
In countries where it is not possible to cast other than a personal vote that is pooled to the party too, following other examples, I calculate the share of preferences indicated by counting all those given to other candidates than the head of the list.
- 2.
- 3.
Electronic voting machines were introduced in Brazilian federal elections in 2002. This has somehow affected the trend changes in preference voting as suggested by Hidalgo (2012). That is, invalid voting rates went down when the voting moved from paper to machine, and less knowledgeable voters, who were likelier to give only a party vote, were less likely to spoil their ballots on the machine.
- 4.
It must be noticed—as indicated in the methodological part of the book—that the share of preferences is calculated as the ratio between the total preferences over the total votes and the maximum preferences allowed.
- 5.
Regarding incumbents, it must be clarified that the turnover is important even soon after the elections. Therefore, as for other countries and to ensure methodological consistency, I calculate the data after the results have been made official. For example, during the 2003–2007 parliamentary term, there were several dozen MPs who either left office or were ministers, and so on. That means that just as many “alternatives” were appointed from the parties’ original candidate lists, and many of them also ran for “re-election” in 2007. Therefore, if one looks simply at who was listed as an MP in the 2007 election lists, the total number of “incumbents” (thanks to these alternatives) was 118, thereby surpassing even the number of MPs in the Parliament itself (which is 101).
- 6.
In 2012, Greece held two early elections in a row, the first in May and the second in June. However, for the latter case, data are not available.
- 7.
In districts with a magnitude up to 15, 3 preferences can be indicated, and 4 preferences when 16 or more deputies are selected in the district.
- 8.
For local elections, voters can also cast a preference vote. In 2012, the male/female vote of preference alternation was also introduced in cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants.
- 9.
Although data from the 2007 elections are not available, it would have been interesting to see any difference in the share of preference votes cast. In fact, any significant variation could have been related to changes in the electoral law rather than in voters’ behaviour per se. In fact, these data could have been misleading. As the proportion of preference votes cast is calculated as the ratio between the preferences expressed and the valid votes multiplied by the number of preference votes allowed, then it is crucial to refer to the change in the latter. As seen, in 2017, 10 preference votes were allowed, while, in 2010 and 2014, this number decreased to exactly half. Therefore, although the values are perfectly comparable and meaningful, it is important to determine whether there have been important changes over time in terms of the total amount of preferences expressed. These data would in fact tell us more about the effective and real weights of the personal votes over time. The raw number of preferences expressed could help us in detecting whether their electoral influence and importance have grown between two elections or, vice versa, whether the percentage increase is only due to the change in the number of votes allowed. In the first case, Kosovo would have been facing an electoral event with potential relevant political consequences (no relevant change in valid vote terms and a big increase in terms of preferences), while, in the second, the importance of preferences would be only marginal (no changes in both variables).
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Passarelli, G. (2020). Consequences of Preferential Voting. In: Preferential Voting Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25286-1_4
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