Abstract
This chapter frames the research method, the hypotheses, and the data used. As voters can or must cast at least one preference vote, PLPR should affect party lists with different levels of intensity. In particular, the electoral system’s features in the cases examined help us to detect different outcomes. The author focuses on the share of preference votes cast (voters’ side) and the effects on MPs (turnover), on the party system (ENP and volatility), and on political parties (factions and turnover). The study includes an important level of variation and differentiation between countries. The analysis of data on preferential voting follows a two-step path. After a theoretical introduction, there are two empirical sections. The first includes a descriptive presentation of data, while the second includes a focus on individual countries and a comparative perspective.
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Notes
- 1.
Ortega Villodres (2004) claims to compare 16 “preferential” systems. However, the book includes SNTV, STV, AV, PLPR, and panachage; thus, the analysis focuses on lower chambers and upper houses alike. Moreover, the author covers a short time span of about ten years per country on average.
- 2.
Except when data at the precinct level are available or for in-depth case studies.
- 3.
It should also lessen the partisanship in such systems (Renwick and Pilet 2016).
- 4.
Of course, this last situation can also indirectly affect the balance of power within the party.
- 5.
The district magnitude and the preference votes. Although it is an independent variable that is different from the electoral system’s features, it is important, as it can affect the share of preference votes cast (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Farrell 2011). The new focus on M is put forth by Carey and Shugart, whose study emphasizes M’s role in influencing voting behaviour as well as candidates’ approaches to elections. In particular, Carey and Shugart clearly state that “M has the unusual […] property that it affects the value of personal reputation in opposite manners, depending on the value of ballot. In all systems where there is intraparty competition, as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418).
- 6.
Karvonen (2004) tries to measure this relationship by also considering the district magnitude. However, here I only deal with the national results.
- 7.
There some other variables that could be included in the research. However, as the relationship is not always clear, they could be considered as control variables or be subject to an in-depth case study. The extent to which voters engage in preferential voting should inform us whether the party is unified or stratified into factions that compete for preference votes. Additionally, examining the rate of expressed votes of preference should help to detect differences between parties from different ideological families. Voters’ behaviour and characteristics may vary depending on the party that they prefer and support (i.e. left-wing voters may engage in higher/lower levels of preferential voting than right-wing voters). Moreover, preferential voting is often debated regarding its potential consequences for spending, electoral campaign costs, and financial control. Preferential voting leads to individual campaigning and, consequently, personal campaign finance. This makes it more difficult for parties’ central leadership and the government to control and regulate party finance (Katz 1980: 90–91; Petersson et al. 1999: 140–142). Moreover, on the party side, it is argued that preferential voting leads to less party cohesion. Individual legislators will feel pressured to demonstrate their independence on questions of great importance to their voters, as their political future lies primarily in the hands of the voters in their constituencies (Katz 1980: 34; Blais 1991: 250; cf. Sánchez de Dios 1999: 159).
Another hypothesis is related to the socio-economic conditions of a given context. In a few countries, the use of preferential voting is viewed as an expression of the “traditional” political culture, while, in other cases, it is considered as a cause of corruption. There are many contrasting views on the types of linkages that preferential voting creates between voters and candidates. Those who allege that preferential voting is correlated with corruption argue that it disposes voters to cast their votes for a specific person in exchange for particularized benefits rather than political, ideological, or public interests. The Italian general elections represent a strong example of this view, and abundant data cement such interpretations. In particular, Parisi and Pasquino (1977) refer to the concept of “votes of exchange” to indicate a particular agreement between a candidate and (some of) his or her voters. Generally speaking, there is some empirical evidence of a correlation between increased electoral campaign costs and preferential voting in Italy as well as of a disincentive to go to the polls when the “exchange” is not clear (a referendum, etc.). However, it is still unclear whether such a relationship between casting a preference vote and a kind of elector exists (Cartocci 1985; Pasquino 1993; Piattoni 2007).
- 8.
Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy. After the Second World War, the majority system was replaced with a proportional one. Together with Luxembourg and Switzerland, it is one of the countries where a free-list system is used; that is, the voters can vote for candidates from different candidate lists. The grand duchy—the constitutional monarchy—of Luxembourg represents one of the most “open” PR systems with preferential voting. The power and the opportunities for voters are, in fact, quite relevant both in terms of electoral choice and the ability to affect the lists of candidates elected and in terms of modifying the party leadership decision on the rank order. Luxembourg is one of the countries where a free-list system is used. The system was introduced in 1919. Voters have as many preferential votes as there are candidates to be elected in a given electoral district and are free to distribute their votes as they wish; they can cast all of their votes for one candidate or distribute them to different candidates, even those from different lists. In fact, in Luxembourg, voters have many opportunities and alternatives in the electoral process that merit consideration—together with the Swiss case (see infra)—as one of the most flexible PR “open” ballots (Farrell 2001: 87; Shugart 2005; Lutz 2010). In particular, voters can cast as many votes as the number of seats in a given district. Further, they can choose among three options: (1) cast a vote for a party, a vote for the list that automatically implies giving a vote to each candidate of the chosen party; (2) give two personal votes to one candidate (“cumulation”); or (3) use the panachage, that is, cast a vote for candidates from more than one party list (Marsh 1985: 369). Luxembourg elects six members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional representation. Luxembourg comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The Droop/D’Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold for candidacy. Luxembourg is the only EU member country where the lists are open and voters can choose among all the candidates from different party lists and cast as many votes as there are seats to be distributed.
- 9.
In each model, the time is assumed to be invariant, so this is a pooled regression model. I prefer to use this kind of model instead of a time series analysis regression because the time is not a strategic element, although, in a few cases only, the electoral system’s features have been modified slightly.
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Passarelli, G. (2020). Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology. In: Preferential Voting Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25286-1_2
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