Abstract
Elections are crucial in politics. However, the extent to which this is true depends greatly on the electoral system in question. Although the comparative research on electoral systems represents a well-established and mature field, challenges remain. In particular, the “within-parties” dimension is still relatively undeveloped. Although some research and case study contributions have emerged, a lack of basic comparative data on the intraparty dimension limits the testing of theory. This chapter furnishes a definition of preferential voting, and a discussion of the concept. Moreover, the text analyses the electoral and partisan dynamics related to the intraparty competition. What are the expected results in terms of parliamentary turnover and the PLPR variables that can affect this process and other electoral outcomes, such as the ENP, the volatility, and the turnover? On this line, the chapter also provides an index of preferential voting measuring voters’ power.
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Notes
- 1.
Thus, if it is true, as Katz and Bardi state, that “preferential voting has received less attention from scholars, less than it deserves” (1979: 94) and that, until now, only a few scholars have devoted meticulous empirical research to the topic, this book ambitiously attempts to fill that gap. Of course, in the twenty years since Katz and Bardi’s analysis, research has been conducted on preferential voting in different countries and by various scholars (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004, 2011; Ortega 2004; Shugart 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Bergman et al. 2013; Wauters et al. 2018). Nevertheless, even though well-conducted analyses and in-depth case studies exist, a general research project that compares countries that adopt preferential list proportional representation (PLPR) is still lacking, at least to my knowledge.
- 2.
As described in Chapter 2, I also include other variables—such as the party systems—for the effects of preferential voting.
- 3.
The Brazilian system closely approximates this configuration, in which, once a politician is elected under a party label, he or she cannot be denied access to the party list in subsequent elections (Mainwaring 1991). The law was the n. 9.504 of 30 September 1997. The Tribunal Special Electoral has dropped its efficacy on April 24 2002.
- 4.
When pooled votes count for the party too, they affect the distribution of seats among both parties and candidates.
- 5.
Presidential cases are reported in Chapter 3.
- 6.
Countries like Italy, even though they no longer utilize a preferential voting system, are included in the research due to their relevant theoretical and empirical influence on the category. Incidentally, Italy, as reported in the paragraph on the case, has approved a new electoral law that reinstates preferential voting (Passarelli 2018).
- 7.
The small number of cases suggested dropping the analysis of political parties. The latter study can be conducted at the national level.
- 8.
For whom and for what? The variables to consider are several and sometimes they differ in outcomes and are not truly comparable. Parties, voters, candidates, accountability, turnover, and turnout are only a few aspects of electoral systems.
- 9.
In addition, this is the case for some plurality/majority systems, such as block vote and PBV, and some other systems, such as limited vote and SNTV. Among the historical cases, I would also mention the Italian Senate (1948–1993), which had a dual formula. It functioned as an SSD system whenever a candidate obtained 65 per cent of the votes; seats not filled in the SSD were instead allocated at the regional level via the D’Hondt method (Passarelli 2018: 867) or the system used since the 2012 elections in Romania in which only those candidates who win over 50 per cent of the votes in single-member constituencies are automatically elected. The remaining seats are distributed among the political parties first at the county level (using the Hare quota) and then at the national level (according to the D’Hondt method), provided that they pass the 5 per cent threshold.
- 10.
In a recent work, Shugart and Taagepera (2017) introduce innovative theoretical and empirical tools to deduce the number of parties when just knowing the number of seats in a representative assembly and the magnitude. Taagepera (2007) focuses on the revisions to introduce into the electoral systems to obtain the desired change in the average number of parties and cabinet duration.
- 11.
- 12.
From this perspective, the single transferable ballot, as well as the open ballot or “panachage” used in Switzerland, can be considered extreme cases, beyond the opportunities supplied by open lists or double voting, since they permit candidates to be selected from different parties and thus promote very high (intraparty) individual competition (Colomer 2004: 52).
- 13.
Except in cases in which voting is mandatory, although voters always have the practical ability to abstain regardless of the implied legal consequences.
- 14.
In Sri Lanka, the president is elected with an instant-runoff system. Similarly, Uruguay “was the one national level example of the use of a PL system in a single-seat district. Presidential elections were conducted by competing party slates, which usually contained more than one candidate. Voters voted for a candidate, but the winner was defined as the candidate with the most votes within the party with the most votes” (Shugart 2005: 39–40).
- 15.
Panachage is not included (see Sect. 1.6).
- 16.
A “personal vote” refers to “that portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 9).
- 17.
We need a standard definition. The fact that voters choose, and thereby indicate “a preference”, does not imply that all systems can be labelled as “preferential voting systems”. PLPR, STV, and AV follow different logics for seat allocation.
- 18.
In this passage, it seems as if Shugart includes panachage among the preferential voting systems; however, he then clearly distinguishes between PLPR and panachage.
- 19.
As Cox reports, “in some systems, voters are allowed to alter the order of names on the ballot; I include this possibility under the general rubric of ‘preference votes’” (1997: 61, fn 17). However, I would argue that it is better to refer explicitly to a particular case or electoral system. Therefore, I consider all the system’s characteristics to avoid misunderstanding. Again, if the system allows this change in the same party’s list in a PR system (otherwise it is a case of panachage), then I include this case among PLPR without a doubt. The crucial distinction is between open and flexible systems to avoid the “general rubric” of preference votes.
- 20.
I owe this definition to Matthew Shugart with which I have discussed an early classification of this sub-type.
- 21.
- 22.
As reported in Chapter 2, authors adopt different approaches to classifying the “preferential” vote systems: ordinal vs. cardinal; open vs. closed; the importance and the structure of the ballot; the determinants or the consequences; and grouping together majoritarian and proportional systems alike, just to mention a few (Rae 1967; Katz 1980, 1986; Marsh 1985; Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005).
- 23.
Voters may very well use a criterion other than a candidate’s personality when deciding how to cast a preference vote: other criteria could include the candidate’s allegiance to a faction or ideological grouping within the party, the candidate’s interest group affiliations, the candidate’s views on a particular issue that cuts across party lines, and the candidate’s socio-demographic characteristics. It remains that PLPR systems are candidate-centred electoral systems in which the personality of the candidate matters.
- 24.
Of course, there are different contexts, but the point to retain here is that PLPR systems are systems in which the role of candidates is generally more important. In fact, in different countries and political parties, the party leadership may not necessarily select candidates in closed-list systems.
- 25.
Although he does not measure the impact of the preferences on this perspective.
- 26.
Moreover, as stated, the adoption of PLPR, and in particular of OLPR, has regularly been coupled with a political and academic discussion of its pros and the cons. In particular, the focus has been on voters’ power and satisfaction, the parties’ decision making, the electoral accountability, the representation of specific socio-demographic groups, the voter–candidate bargaining, and the personal vote.
- 27.
For a few exceptions, see Shugart (2005: 38, fn 11).
- 28.
The authors distinguish between the LR and the D’Hondt formula, as they affect the intraparty allocation of seats (ibidem: 15).
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Passarelli, G. (2020). Preferential Voting: Theoretical Approach and Empirical Consequences. In: Preferential Voting Systems. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25286-1_1
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