Abstract
Based on the externality theory and game model of hybrid strategy, this paper analyzes the external driving factors of corporate social responsibility from the perspective of government supervision. According to the principal-agent theory, the paper discusses the internal motivation of social responsibility from the perspective of managers’ compensation incentives. Fulfill social responsibility will increase costs in the short term and decline performance in business. However, corporate social responsibility conducive development of the company in the long-term, which promote the improvement of the welfare in the whole societies. Strengthen public and government supervision become the external driving force for corporate social responsibility, thereby enhancing the company’s consciousness of fulfilling its social responsibilities.
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by Tianjin Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project “An Empirical Study on the Evaluation of Corporate Social Responsibility and Relative Performance in the Context of ‘New Age’” (TJGLQN18-010).
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Zhao, X., Zhao, H. (2020). Game Analysis on Enterprise Performing Social Responsibility. In: Abawajy, J., Choo, KK., Islam, R., Xu, Z., Atiquzzaman, M. (eds) International Conference on Applications and Techniques in Cyber Intelligence ATCI 2019. ATCI 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1017. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25128-4_42
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25128-4_42
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