Abstract
We begin our express voyage into ethical theory with an examination of first order ethical principles as set out by this author. As mentioned earlier, there are two forms of metaethics: first and second order. In the first order the author sets out intellectual presuppositions that are necessary in order to structure some normative theory. These principles can apply to any of the realistic, naturalistic theories that are set out in the subsequent chapters: virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology.
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Notes
- 1.
A prominent proponent of this position is John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
- 2.
I have written about this in more detail in: “Justification in Morality and the Law” in Ethical Rationalism and the Law, ed. Patrick Capps and Shaun Pattinson (London: Hart Publishing, 2016): 73–90.
- 3.
Compare to Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” in The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1931): 228–240.
- 4.
Michael Boylan, Basic Ethics (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2009):, n 78, 10–11, I cite the case of Wolf Sullowald, a former butcher who enters into a con-tract (consent) with an Austrian to be killed on an Internet site, butchered, and eaten. By all accounts the arrangement was agreeable to both sides—and there were witnesses. This is an extreme example of the defects in contractarianism as the foundation of ethical theory since it conflates consent with Consent.
- 5.
This is what I call the rationality incompleteness conjecture: See Michael Boylan, The Good, The True, and The Beautiful (London: Bloomsbury, 2008): 210.
- 6.
A prominent advocate of this position is G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). Moore argues that “good” a key concept in ethics is a non-natural property.
- 7.
For a more complete survey see my monographs: Michael Boylan, A Just Society (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) and Natural Human Rights: A Theory (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- 8.
Since the affective goodwill comes from the completeness condition of the Personal Worldview Imperative, the conditions of the imperative also apply to this sort of philosophical love that I have set out. Some detractors think that you cannot order love (as I have done). I give a response to this argument in Michael Boylan, “Duties to Children” in Michael Boylan, ed. The Morality and Global Justice Reader (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011): 385–404.
- 9.
This is particularly true of some feminist ethicists. See Rosemarie Tong, “A Feminist Personal Worldview Imperative” in Morality and Justice: Reading Boylan’s A Just Society, ed. John-Stewart Gordon (Lanham, MD and Oxford: Lexington/Rowman and Littlefield, 2009): 29–38.
- 10.
The phrase “sure loss contract” comes from the notion of betting houses. Say you were betting on the finals of the World Cup: Brazil v. Germany. If you gave 5-1 positive odds for each team, then your betting house will go out of business. A positive assessment of one team requires a complementary negative assessment of the other: failure to observe this rule results in a sure loss contract.
- 11.
Other aspects of the good can include commitments to aesthetics and to religion.
- 12.
My take on the various real and anti-real theories is generally set out in my text, Basic Ethics 2009: Part Two.
- 13.
Michael Boylan (2004): 115–116.
- 14.
For a lighthearted take on this serious problem see: Michael Mann and Tom Toles, The Madhouse Effect: How Climate Change Denial is Threatening our Planet, Destroying our Politics, and Driving us Crazy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
- 15.
Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): Chaps. 1–2.
- 16.
Michael Boylan, Morality and Global Justice: Justifications and Applications (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011): 25–27, cf. Chap. 7.
- 17.
See the first of the nine sections of the Aristotelian primary text pieces.
- 18.
The Ethical Egoist believes that acting ethically is really the path that is in our long term best interests. This is the principal argument of the Republic: even if we possess the Ring of Gyges we should act ethically. It is in our long term best interest.
- 19.
Levels two and three of secondary goods are to be considered after the more embedded levels have been realized.
- 20.
The 2007 Human Development Report (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2007): 27.
- 21.
Many of the key distinctions I draw on liberty can be found in Isiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- 22.
By support systems, I am referring to the major systems of the body such as the circulatory, nervous, and digestive systems. These systems allow the conditions for voluntary positive liberty.
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Boylan, M. (2019). First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics and Personhood Theory. In: Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24872-7_1
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