Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Full Protection and Security in International Investment Law pp 165–196Cite as

Subjective Scope of Application of the Customary Standard of ‘Full Protection and Security’

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 603 Accesses

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 8))

Abstract

Two elements define the subjective scope of application of the FPS standard in customary international law. The first element corresponds to the beneficiary of the security obligation. As an institution of the law of aliens, the FPS standard entails a foreignness requirement and thus protects only foreign natural and juristic persons. The second element refers to the provider of security. As a rule, the security obligation is imposed upon the state exercising territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals. The FPS standard is however also applicable in respect of non-state entities, provided they are accountable under international law and exercise actual territorial control (e.g. de facto regimes).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The concept of nationality requires a short clarification. There has been some controversy as to whether nationality is a legal relationship between a state and an individual (Rechtsverhältnis), or whether it is a status implicating certain rights and obligations (rechtliche Eigenschaft). The latter theory is based on the observation that the bond of nationality, if taken as a state-individual legal relationship, always presupposes that the individual fulfills the conditions for acquiring nationality. In other words, he or she must have the legal condition or status of a national. The implication is subtle: nationality is not a legal relationship with the home state. Such relationship would be, at best, an implication of nationality. In this line of thought, nationality could be described as a legal status (Zustand). Some authors (e.g. Alexander Makarov) preferred to take the best of both worlds, considering nationality to be at the same time a legal relationship and a legal status (so-called vermittlende Theorie). For a detailed, critical presentation of these theories: Alexander Makarov, Allgemeine Lehren des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts (W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Heidelberg 1962) 19-29; Bernhard Dubois, Die Frage der völkerrechtlichen Schranken landesrechtlicher Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit (Verlag Stämpfli & Cie., Bern 1955) 1-4; Eduard Goldstein, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Person (Junge & Sohn, Erlangen 1912) 13.

  2. 2.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “die Staatsangehörigkeit bildet den Durchgangspunkt, den das Individuum erreicht haben muß, um in das Licht völkerrechtlicher Betrachtung zu gelangen.” Felix Stoerk, ‘Staatsunterthanen und Fremde’ in Franz von Holtzendorff (ed), Handbuch des Völkerrechts auf Grundlage europäischer Staatspraxis (Volume 2: Verlag von F. F. Richter, Hamburg 1887) 582, 589.

  3. 3.

    Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 497. For a similar remark see: Eduard Otto von Waldkirch, Das Völkerrecht in seinen Grundzügen dargestellt (Verlag von Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel 1926) 247.

  4. 4.

    See generally: Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 497.

  5. 5.

    Some of these issues will be considered in Sect. 7.2.1, in particular connection with the protection of stateless people.

  6. 6.

    Section 6.3 provides an overview of the subjective elements of the security relationship, from a general theoretical perspective (i.e. ‘secured agent’ and ‘provider of security’). For a similar observation regarding the role of the home state see: Emanuel von Ullmann, Völkerrecht (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen 1908) 360 (referring to the law of aliens in general).

  7. 7.

    Cf. Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 497.

  8. 8.

    See: Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 19-29.

  9. 9.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 9-11 and 38 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Schon im völkerrechtlichen Vertragsrecht ist es durchaus nicht mehr ungewöhnlich, daß ein Staat sich gegenüber einem anderen Staat, einer Staatengruppe oder der Staatengemeinschaft verpflichtet, nicht nur fremden, sondern auch eigenen Staatsangehörigen bestimmte Rechte einzuräumen; verletzt der Staat in diesem Falle völkerrechtlich garantierte Rechte durch Verhalten gegenüber eigenen Staatsangehörigen, so ist damit gleichzeitig eine Regel des Fremdenrechts im weitesten Sinne mißachtet; denn der fremde Staat kann in diesem Falle die Rechte eines für ihn fremden Staatsangehörigen geltend machen. Es wäre also das Fremdenrecht verletzt, obwohl der verletzende Akt selbst in keiner Beziehung zu einem für das betroffene Individuum fremden Territorium steht. Die Fremdenrechtsbeziehung besteht hier zwischen einem Individuum und einem fremden Staat nur deswegen, weil dieser Staat Inhaber eines zu Gunsten des Individuums eingeräumten völkerrechtlichen Anspruchs ist.” Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 23-4.

  11. 11.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Fremdenrecht ist die Gesamtheit der Sätze, welche die Aus- oder Inländereigenschaft einer Person als Tatbestandsmerkmal verwenden.” Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 4. In support of his definition, Isay also provided a detailed analysis of the term Fremdenrecht (‘law of aliens’) (at pp. 1-24).

  12. 12.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 25. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the fact that, while Doehring was referring exclusively to the international law of aliens, Isay referred to the law of aliens in general (including domestic rules pertaining to the treatment of foreigners). Cf. Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 1-24.

  13. 13.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 25.

  14. 14.

    Doehring discussed some of Isay’s remarks on this particular subject at other instances of his treatise. See: Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 32 et seq.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 1-4.

  16. 16.

    Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 1-4.

  17. 17.

    Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 1-3.

  18. 18.

    Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 1.

  19. 19.

    See: Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 2.

  20. 20.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “sie besagen nur, daß eine bestimmte Tatsache (nämlich die Ausländereigenschaft einer Person) keine Rechtswirkung habe.” Ernst Isay, Das deutsche Fremdenrecht. Ausländer und Polizei (Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin 1923) 2.

  21. 21.

    See also the discussion of the ‘human rights approach’ to the minimum standard of treatment in Sect. 5.3.

  22. 22.

    For a detailed analysis of the protection of minorities in international law see: Sarah Pritchard, Der völkerrechtliche Minderheitenschutz. Historische und neuere Entwicklungen (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2001). See particularly pp. 49-50 (providing some general remarks about the purpose of the protection of minority groups in international law).

  23. 23.

    Emphasis added. Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “[Für die Belange der hier vorgenommenen Untersuchung soll die Definition des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts lauten:] Jede Rechtsbeziehung, in welcher ein Staat zu Individuen steht, die nicht seine Staatsangehörigen sind und jede Rechtsbeziehung zwischen Staaten, die Rechte oder rechtlich geschützte Interessen von Individuen zum Gegenstand haben.” Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 29.

  24. 24.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 23 et seq.

  25. 25.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 23 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 24.

  27. 27.

    For an example of this ‘traditional’ conception of the law of aliens see: Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 497.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 23-9 and 68-121.

  29. 29.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 68-121. This point requires some elaboration. Doehring advanced the proposition that the material content of the law of aliens is twofold (so-called ‘Zweiteilung des Fremdenrechts’) (at pp. 108 and 110). On the one hand, there are certain institutions of the law of aliens which primarily concern the home state’s own rights (e.g. non-discrimination, expulsion and extradition) (at pp. 56-68; see also pp. 119-20). On the other hand, the law of aliens additionally provides a set of individual rights (Individualrechte), which Doehring identified with the notion of the minimum standard of treatment (at pp. 68-118; see also pp. 119-20). From a substantive standpoint, it is the minimum standard and not the whole of the law of aliens what Doehring linked to the notion of human rights (at pp. 70-6). This approach leads to a distinction between three possible factual settings, which Doehring described in the following terms: “In respect of the responsibility of the state under the law of aliens a distinction shall be drawn between the following cases: 1. [State] conduct towards an alien [that] violates the rights of his or her home state only; 2. [State] conduct [that] violates the foreigner’s individual rights (minimum standard) and unu actu the rights of the home state; 3. [State] conduct [that] solely violates the individual rights of an alien (minimum standard), e.g. where the home state has consented [to such conduct] or in the case of stateless people.” Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Bei der Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten im Fremdenrecht sind also folgende Fälle zu unterscheiden: 1. Das Verhalten gegenüber einem Fremden verletzt nur die Rechte seines Heimatstaates; 2. Das Verhalten verletzt subjektive Rechte des Fremden (Mindeststandard) und unu actu Rechte seines Heimatstaates; 3. Das Verhalten verletzt nur subjektive Rechte des Fremden (Mindeststandard), z.B. bei Einwilligung des Heimatstaates oder bei Staatenlosen.” (at p. 113).

  30. 30.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Schwierigkeiten bereitet immer wieder die Abgrenzung von Regeln des Fremdenrechts zu solchen der allgemeinen völkerrechtlichen Menschenrechte.” Karl Doehring, Völkerrecht. Ein Lehrbuch (C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2004) 374.

  31. 31.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “[Das völkerrechtliche Fremdenrecht betrifft] alle Rechtsbeziehungen, die zwischen einem Staat und natürlichen oder juristischen Personen bestehen, die nicht die Staatsangehörigkeit dieses Staates innehaben.” Karl Doehring, Völkerrecht. Ein Lehrbuch (C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2004) 374.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 29.

  33. 33.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 19-20 and 26-9.

  34. 34.

    On this triangular relationship see: Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 497 (discussed in Sect. 7.1).

  35. 35.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 19-20.

  36. 36.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 19-20.

  37. 37.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 19-20 and 26-9.

  38. 38.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 9-12 and 28.

  39. 39.

    Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 28. For another author advocating for the extension of the law of aliens to stateless people see: Hans Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (IMP F.A.A. Sijhoff, The Hague 1949) 35 (arguing, on the one hand, that the law of aliens concerns ‘general international law’ rather than reciprocal obligations between particular states and, on the other hand, that stateless people ‘would be absolutely at the mercy of their State of residence, if international law did not intervene in their favour’).

  40. 40.

    At this point, Doehring observed that the exercise of diplomatic protection in cases involving individual rights (as opposed to rights of the home state, properly so-called) could be characterized as a ‘representative action’ (Prozeßstandschaft), i.e. an action in which the plaintiff advances another person’s right but still acts in his or her own name. See: Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 112-3.

  41. 41.

    For a historical account of the minimum standard of treatment see Chap. 4.

  42. 42.

    Cf. Lassa Francis Laurence Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise (Volume 1: Longmans, Green & Co., London 1905) 366 [312].

  43. 43.

    Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 505.

  44. 44.

    For some indicative examples see: Emanuel von Ullmann, Völkerrecht (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen 1908) 360; Paul Heilborn, Das System des Völkerrechts entwickelt aus den völkerrechtlichen Begriffen (Verlag von Julius Springer, Berlin 1896) 77 and 81.

  45. 45.

    Cf. Lassa Francis Laurence Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise (Volume 1: Longmans, Green & Co., London 1905) 366 [312]; Dickson Car Wheel Co. v Mexico (July 1931) IV RIAA 669, 678. Cf. also: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 35-6 [1] (also citing the Dickson Car Wheel Co. case in this connection).

  46. 46.

    Dickson Car Wheel Co. v Mexico (July 1931) IV RIAA 669.

  47. 47.

    Dickson Car Wheel Co. v Mexico (July 1931) IV RIAA 669, 678. For a critical assessment of this statement see: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 35-6 [1] (commenting on the Dickson Car Wheel Co. case).

  48. 48.

    Lassa Francis Laurence Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise (Volume 1: Longmans, Green & Co., London 1905) 366 [312]. For the use of Oppenheim’s opinion in the Dickson Car Wheel Co. case see: Dickson Car Wheel Co. v Mexico (July 1931) IV RIAA 669, 678.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 64-5.

  50. 50.

    Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 64.

  51. 51.

    Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 12.

  52. 52.

    Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 64.

  53. 53.

    Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 64.

  54. 54.

    Richard Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984) 64.

  55. 55.

    Interestingly, in a study on the status of foreigners in Germany published in 1974, Karl Doehring emphasized the role of reciprocity as a shaping factor of international obligations concerning the treatment of aliens. See: Karl Doehring, ‘Der Status des Fremden im Verfassungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter Gesichtspunkt der normativen Verschränkung von Völkerrecht und Verfassungsrecht’ in Karl Doehring and Josef Isensee (eds), Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vertrauensschutz im Verwaltungsrecht (De Gruyter, Berlin 1974) 7, 17-8. Doehring also discussed reciprocity at some instances of his 1963 treatise. See: Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 32 and 64-8.

  56. 56.

    Doehring analyzed some of these features of the law of aliens in his 1963 monograph. Cf. Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 31-2.

  57. 57.

    Doehring acknowledged that this prohibition is a well-established principle of the law of aliens. See: Karl Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfassungsrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1963) 31.

  58. 58.

    ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 35 art. 8.

  59. 59.

    ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 36 [2-4]. In its commentaries, the ILC itself emphasized the lege ferenda character of the provision in question (at p. 36 paras 2 and 4, and n. 88). In this vein, the Commission described article 8 as ‘an exercise in progressive development of the law’, which ‘departs from traditional rule that only nationals may benefit from the exercise of diplomatic protection’ and constitutes ‘an exceptional measure introduced de lege ferenda’ (at p. 36 paras 2 and 4). Several governments made similar remarks in their comments to the ILC Draft. See: ILC, ‘Documents of the Fifty-Eighth Session – Comments and Observations received from Governments on Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(1) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 34, 46 (statement of Morocco, noting that ‘[d]raft article 8 is not part of customary international law or codified international law, but rather represents progressive development of the law’) and 47 (statement of the United Kingdom expressing the following view: “[i]n relation to article 8, the protection of stateless persons and refugees is not a matter which the United Kingdom regards as falling within the scope of the concept of diplomatic protection as that is understood in current international law. The United Kingdom considers that the provisions of draft article 8 are lex ferenda. Whether the United Kingdom would exceptionally, for example on humanitarian grounds, be prepared to make representations or take other action on behalf of stateless persons or refugees would depend on the circumstances of the case and would be in its own discretion, but it would not strictu sensu be an exercise of diplomatic protection”).

  60. 60.

    Al Rawi et al. v Foreign Secretary [2006] EWCA Civ 1219, 1265 [118]. See also: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 36 [2] n. 88 (quoting the Al Rawi decision).

  61. 61.

    For a classical example of the exercise of diplomatic protection in connection with FPS claims see: Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15, 66-7 [111].

  62. 62.

    Cf. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 35-6 [1] (recognizing that ‘[c]ontemporary international law reflects a concern for the status of [stateless people]’).

  63. 63.

    ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 35-6 [1].

  64. 64.

    Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (adopted 28 September 1954, entered into force 6 June 1960) 360 UNTS 117; Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 30 August 1961, entered into force 13 December 1975) 989 UNTS 175. See also: ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 36 [1].

  65. 65.

    See: William Conklin, Statelessness. The Enigma of an International Community (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014) 58-63 and 235-301. The issue of statelessness has also been discussed in the context of international human rights law; for a detailed survey of the human rights dimension of statelessness see: Manuela Sissy Kraus, Menschenrechtliche Aspekte der Staatenlosigkeit (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin 2013) 174-262.

  66. 66.

    Chapter 3 provides a general account of the historical origins of the FPS standard.

  67. 67.

    Cf. William Conklin, Statelessness. The Enigma of an International Community (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014) 58-63 and 235-301 (analyzing the rationale of international obligations in respect of stateless people in general). Conklin discussed at several instances the notion of ‘obligations erga omnes’ suggested by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction (see particularly Conklin’s comments at pp. 38, 53-5 and 274-5).

  68. 68.

    Cf. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32 [33] and [35] (“an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes […] Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the same category. It cannot be held, when one such obligation in particular is in question, in a specific case, that all States have a legal interest in its observance. In order to bring a claim in respect of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to do so.” – emphasis added). Cf. also: William Conklin, Statelessness. The Enigma of an International Community (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2014) 273-4 (discussing this particular passage of the Barcelona Traction decision).

  69. 69.

    See Sect. 7.2.1.

  70. 70.

    See Sect. 7.2.1.

  71. 71.

    For a statement of the current state of the law see: Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32 [33] (discussed later in this section).

  72. 72.

    This section presents the historical debate in detail, particularly focusing on postwar FCN treaty practice.

  73. 73.

    For a defense of the extension of the concept of nationality to juristic persons see: Ernst Isay, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Personen (Mohr, Tübingen 1907) 64 et seq.; Paul Ruegger, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Personen. Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen (Schweizerische Vereinigung für Internationales Recht, Zürich 1918) 15. For a rejection of the extension of the concept of nationality to corporate entities see: Eduard Goldstein, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Person (Junge & Sohn, Erlangen 1912) 14 et seq. and 58. See also: Max Seydel, Commentar zur Verfassungs-Urkunde für das Deutsche Reich (A. Stuber’s Buchhandlung, Würzburg 1873) 52-3. For an overview of the debate see: Eduard Otto von Waldkirch, Das Völkerrecht in seinen Grundzügen dargestellt (Verlag von Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel 1926) 247-8.

  74. 74.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Das öffentlich-rechtliche Verhältnis zwischen Person und Staat, welches die Staatsangehörigkeit ausmacht, ist daher begrifflich ein anderes, wenn es sich um physische und wenn es sich um juristische Personen handelt.” Paul Ruegger, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Personen. Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen (Schweizerische Vereinigung für Internationales Recht, Zürich 1918) 15. It should however be noted that Ruegger believed that the term Nationalität could also be employed in relation to corporate entities (at p. 15).

  75. 75.

    Edward Hilton Young, ‘The Nationality of a Juristic Person’ (1908) 22(1) Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2.

  76. 76.

    Edward Hilton Young, ‘The Nationality of a Juristic Person’ (1908) 22(1) Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2.

  77. 77.

    Edward Hilton Young, ‘The Nationality of a Juristic Person’ (1908) 22(1) Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2.

  78. 78.

    Edward Hilton Young, ‘The Nationality of a Juristic Person’ (1908) 22(1) Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2. For a similar, though not identical, approach see: Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg tr., Lawbook Exchange, Clark NJ 2009) 240.

  79. 79.

    For some indicative examples see: Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Völkerrecht. Begründet von Georg Dahm (Volume 1: De Gruyter, Berlin 2002) 100-3; Florian Becker, ‘Gebiets- und Personalhoheit des Staates’ in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts (Volume 9: C. F. Müller 2013) 193, 234-5.

  80. 80.

    For an indicative example see: Paul Ruegger, Die Staatsangehörigkeit der juristischen Personen. Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen (Schweizerische Vereinigung für Internationales Recht, Zürich 1918) 15 et seq.

  81. 81.

    See Sects. 3.3 and 3.4.

  82. 82.

    Examples are provided, particularly, in Sect. 8.3.1.

  83. 83.

    Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 373-80.

  84. 84.

    Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 373 and 378 (referring in this connection to article VII of the US-Japan FCN Agreement of 1911).

  85. 85.

    Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 380 (stating that this policy was ‘inaugurated with the China treaty of 1946’). Cf. also: Lucas Bastin, State Responsibility for Omissions: Establishing a Breach of the Full Protection and Security Obligation by Omissions (Oxford University, Oxford 2016) [D.Phil. Thesis] 94-6.

  86. 86.

    ‘Statement of Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State’ (9 May 1952) Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, 2nd Session on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece (Government Printing Office, Washington 1952) 2, 4. On this aspect of the postwar U.S. FCN program see: Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 373-93 (also quoting Lindman at p. 373); Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 389-90 (quoting Lindman at p. 389). See also: Herman Walker, ‘Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice’ (1956) Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 232 et seq.

  87. 87.

    Cf. Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 389-90.

  88. 88.

    Emphasis added. Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 377-8.

  89. 89.

    John Mervyn Jones, ‘Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who are Shareholders in Foreign Companies’ (1949) 26 BYIL 225, 225.

  90. 90.

    John Mervyn Jones, ‘Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who are Shareholders in Foreign Companies’ (1949) 26 BYIL 225, 225-6.

  91. 91.

    Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 413-4 (analyzing the changes in the formulation of the ‘most constant protection and security’ standard in U.S. treaties after World War II, and providing multiple examples of American treaty practice in this specific area). See also: Robert Renbert Wilson, United States Commercial Treaties and International Law (The Houser Press, New Orleans LA 1960) 119-21 (also providing examples and detailed analysis of U.S. treaty practice, particularly at pp. 119 et seq.).

  92. 92.

    Emphasis added. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Israel (adopted 23 August 1951, entered into force 3 April 1954) 219 UNTS 237, art. III(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Denmark (adopted 1 October 1951, entered into force 30 July 1961) 421 UNTS 105, art. III(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Japan (adopted 2 April 1953, entered into force 30 October 1953) 206 UNTS 191, art. II(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (adopted 28 November 1956, entered into force 7 November 1957) 302 UNTS 281, art. III(1); Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States of America and Pakistan (adopted 12 November 1959, entered into force 12 February 1961) 404 UNTS 259, art. III(1). It should be noted that the adjective ‘unlawful’ only appears in the treaties concluded with Israel, Denmark and Japan.

  93. 93.

    Emphasis added. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Israel (adopted 23 August 1951, entered into force 3 April 1954) 219 UNTS 237, art. VI(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Denmark (adopted 1 October 1951, entered into force 30 July 1961) 421 UNTS 105, art. VI(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Japan (adopted 2 April 1953, entered into force 30 October 1953) 206 UNTS 191, art. VI(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (adopted 28 November 1956, entered into force 7 November 1957) 302 UNTS 281, art. VI(1); Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States of America and Pakistan (adopted 12 November 1959, entered into force 12 February 1961) 404 UNTS 259, art. VI(1).

  94. 94.

    Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany (adopted 29 October 1954, entered into force 14 July 1956) 273 UNTS 3, arts. III(1) and V(1); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America (adopted 27 March 1956, entered into force 5 December 1957) 285 UNTS 231, arts. III(1) and VI(1).

  95. 95.

    Cf. Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 414-5.

  96. 96.

    On this concern see: Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 414-5 (providing references to multiple internal State Department documents from that period).

  97. 97.

    Emphasis added. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and Ireland (adopted 21 January 1950, entered into force 14 September 1950) 206 UNTS 269, art. VIII(2). For a short discussion of this wording see: Kenneth Vandevelde, The First Bilateral Investment Treaties: U.S. Postwar Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (Oxford University Press, New York 2017) 413-5 (specifically referring to the US-Ireland FCN Agreement).

  98. 98.

    Emphasis added. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Italian Republic (adopted 2 February 1948, entered into force 26 July 1949) Charles Bevans (ed), Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776—1949 (Volume 9: U.S. Department of State Publication, Washington 1971) 261, 264-5 arts. V(1) and (3).

  99. 99.

    In the ELSI case, the Government of the United States alleged that Italy had violated its obligations under the 1948 FCN Agreement ‘by reason of its acts and omissions in relation to, and its treatment of, two United States corporations, the Raytheon Company (“Raytheon”) and the Machlett Laboratories Incorporated (“Machlett”), in relation to the Italian corporation Raytheon-Elsi S.p.A.’. Emphasis added. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15, 12 [12]. The Court’s analysis of the FPS standard appears at 63-5 [102-8].

  100. 100.

    In fact, article 9 of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006) reads as follows: “For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a corporation, the State of nationality means the State under whose law the corporation was incorporated. However, when the corporation is controlled by nationals of another State or States and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, and the seat of management and the financial control of the corporation are both located in another State, that State shall be regarded as the State of nationality.” ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session – Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2006 23, 37 art. 9. In its official commentary to this provision, the ILC noted that ‘[d]raft article 9 recognizes that diplomatic protection may be extended to corporations’ (at p. 37 para 1). The ILC defined corporations as ‘profit-making enterprises with limited liability whose capital is generally represented by shares’ (at p. 37 para 2). Article 13 of the Draft Articles deals with the protection of legal persons other than corporations (at pp. 43-4).

  101. 101.

    Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep 582, 605 [61].

  102. 102.

    The general rule in this regard continues to be the one drawn by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case. On that occasion, the Court held: “In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, international law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the nationality of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by long practice and by numerous international instruments. This notwithstanding, further or different links are at times said to be required in order that a right of diplomatic protection should exist. Indeed, it has been the practice of some States to give a company incorporated under their law diplomatic protection solely when it has its seat (siège social) or management or centre of control in their territory, or when a majority or a substantial proportion of the shares has been owned by nationals of the State concerned. Only then, it has been held, does there exist between the corporation and the State in question a genuine connection of the kind familiar from other branches of international law. However, in the practical field of the diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute text of the ‘genuine connection’ had found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied are of a relative nature, and sometimes links with one state had to be weighted against those with another.” Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 42 [70]. For an overview of the diplomatic protection of juristic persons see: Markus Krajewski, Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht (C. H. Müller, Heidelberg 2009) 29-30.

  103. 103.

    Emphasis added. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32 [33].

  104. 104.

    For a representative example see: Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia (adopted 22 November 2006, entered into force 15 May 2012) art. 10.5(1) (FPS clause including a express reference to ‘treatment in accordance with customary international law’) and art. 10.28 (broad definition of ‘investor of a Party’). See also Sect. 14.2.1. For a detailed presentation of the protection of juristic persons under contemporary IIAs as well as of the notion of corporate nationality see: Markus Burgstaller, ‘Nationality of Corporate Investors and International Claims against the Investor’s Own State’ (2006) 7 J. World Investment & Trade 857, 860-3; Markus Perkams, ‘Protection of Legal Persons’ in Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe and August Reinisch (eds), International Investment Law (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2015) 638, 638-52.

  105. 105.

    Section 5.2 discusses the use of investment treaties as evidence of customary international law.

  106. 106.

    Herman Walker, ‘Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties’ (1956) 50(2) AJIL 373, 393.

  107. 107.

    For a list of investment arbitration cases involving FPS claims see Chap. 1. In most of the cases, the claimant was a juristic person.

  108. 108.

    Some of these cases are discussed in Sect. 14.2.

  109. 109.

    See Sect. 7.2.

  110. 110.

    This section uses the expression ‘internationally accountable entity’ to refer to any body that is subject of rights and duties under international law, regardless of whether it is a state, properly so-called; using a Kelsenian terminology, the entities in question would be all those falling within the ‘personal sphere of validity of international law’. See: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Clark NJ 2007) 96-190 (particularly at pp. 96-100 and 158 et seq.) [first edition: 1952].

  111. 111.

    See Sects. 3.3 and 3.4.

  112. 112.

    Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32 [33] (placing the origin of the protection obligation in the act of admitting foreigners or their investments).

  113. 113.

    Georg Friedrich von Martens, Einleitung in das positive Europäische Völkerrecht auf Verträge und Herkommen gegründet (Johann Christian Dieterich, Göttingen 1796) 94-5. Martens observed that, in spite of having the right of admission, European sovereigns had usually granted some freedom of entry and establishment to each other’s subjects (at pp. 94-5). For a detailed presentation of Martens’ views see Sect. 3.5.2.

  114. 114.

    See Sect. 3.5.2.

  115. 115.

    Emphasis added. Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “Das europäische Fremdenrecht ist das allgemeine christliche Völkerrechtsgesetz für die Rechte, Rechtsgeschäfte und –verhältnisse der Unterthanen des einen Staates im Gebiete des andern.” Karl Theodor Pütter, Das praktische europäische Fremdenrecht (J. C. Hinrichs’schen Buchhandlung, Leipzig 1845) 11.

  116. 116.

    Author’s translation. The original German text reads: “[Im ganzen] ergibt sich eine Konkurrenz der heimatlichen und der fremden Staatsgewalt, wobei zwar die rechtliche Verbindung mit dem Heimatstaat (die Staatsangehörigkeit) in der letzten Reihe entscheidende Bedeutung behält, die faktische Subjektion unter die Territorialhoheit des Aufenthaltsstaats aber doch die Wirksamkeit der Personalhoheit des Heimatstaats einschränkt und modifiziert, also eine parallele Wirksamkeit der beiden konkurrierenden Gewalten nicht durchführbar ist.” Emanuel von Ullmann, Völkerrecht (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen 1908) 360. For a similar observation see: Paul Heilborn, Das System des Völkerrechts entwickelt aus den völkerrechtlichen Begriffen (Verlag von Julius Springer, Berlin 1896) 77 and 81. For an analysis of the historical origins and significance of the interplay between the principles of territoriality and personal jurisdiction see: Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 50-77.

  117. 117.

    Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 515.

  118. 118.

    Edwin Borchard, ‘Basic Elements of Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad’ (1913) 7(3) AJIL 497, 518. For similar statements see: Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (Klaus Reprint, New York 1970) 78 [first edition: 1928]; Hans Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law Applied to Aliens (IMP F.A.A. Sijhoff, The Hague 1949) 34.

  119. 119.

    Cf. Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (Klaus Reprint, New York 1970) 78 [first edition: 1928] (particularly referring to state responsibility for private violence).

  120. 120.

    Emphasis added. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1890) 56.

  121. 121.

    Emphasis added. Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (Klaus Reprint, New York 1970) 78 [first edition: 1928] (also quoting Hall in support of the argument).

  122. 122.

    The George H. Bowley award provides a clear example in this regard. In that case, private individuals had stolen American property in the vicinity of San Juan del Sur shortly before Costa Rican troops assumed control over the area. In his decision on the case, Umpire Bertinatti stated: “The troops of Costa Rica had that day arrived before the town, but occupied it only the next morning […] As a matter of course, the police of a town belongs to the local authorities, and they alone are responsible for neglect in that duty. A military occupant may claim to exercise the police, but no responsibility can be conceived to fall upon him before he makes such a claims and enters upon such duty. General Cañas, who commanded the Costaricans, immediately upon entering in that town gave orders to punish the authors of that crime and protect the person and property of citizens of the United States. It was all that could be reasonably expected of him.” Emphasis added. George H. Bowley & Co. v Costa Rica (21 December 1862) 3 Moore’s Arb. 3032-3.

  123. 123.

    The ILC has indicated that ‘[m]aterial impossibility of performance giving rise to force majeure may be due to a natural or physical event […] or to human intervention (e.g. loss of control over a portion of the State’s territory as a result of an insurrection or devastation of an area by military operations carried out by a third state), or some combination of the two’. ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 76 art. 23 (Commentary) [3]. For some indicative examples of the use of the force majeure exception in connection with omissions in the protection of foreigners see: Frederick Wipperman v United States of Venezuela (10 July 1890) United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission. Opinions Delivered by the Commissioners in the Principal Cases (Gibson Bros., Washington 1890) 132, 136-7 (non-responsibility for the depredation of a vessel by ‘savage tribes’ in Venezuela; the decision was largely based on implicit considerations of force majeure); Naomi Russell v Mexico (24 April 1931) IV RIAA 805, 855-6 (murder of an American citizen by Mexican rebels; the Commissioners recognized force majeure as a possible circumstance precluding a finding of responsibility); James Crossman v Venezuela (1903) IX RIAA 356, 356 and 360 [interlocutory opinion by Umpire Plumley] (failure to prevent the theft of valuable objects in a city under rebel control; the respondent government alleged force majeure); Charles de Lemos and Guillermina Dalton de Lemos v Venezuela (1903) IX RIAA 360, 364 (damage to the property of British subjects and consular agents during the Bombardment of Ciudad Bolívar, Venezuela, which had been taken over by insurgents; Commissioner Grisanti qualified the event as a case of force majeure); Sambiaggio Case (1903) X RIAA 499, 513 and 516 (case concerning revolutionary damages; Umpire Ralston noted that ‘the very existence of a flagrant revolution presupposes that a certain set of men have gone temporarily or permanently beyond the power of the authorities’, later quoting a handful of authorities on the force majeure exception and further characterizing some forms of civil strife as ‘a fortuitous case for which no responsibility exists’). More recent examples can be found in several decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. See: Gould Marketing Inc. v Ministry of National Defense, Award, Case No. 49 (17 July 1983) 3 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 147, 153 (“By December 1978, strikes, riots and other civil strife in the course of the Islamic Revolution had created classic force majeure conditions at least in Iran’s major cities. By force majeure we mean social and economic forces beyond the power of the state to control through the exercise of due diligence. Injuries caused by the operation at such forces are therefore not attributable to the state for purposes of its responding for damages”). Cf. also: International Technical Products Corp. v Iran, Award, Case No. 302 (19 August 1985) 9 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 10, 23-5; Sylvania Technical Systems Inc. v Iran, Award, Case No. 64 (28 June 1985) 8 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 308-10. For an overview of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s case law in this area see: Anaconda Iran Inc. v Iran, Award, Case No. 167 (10 December 1986) 13 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 212-3 [47-8] (quoting these and other relevant decisions). For investment cases involving some allegation of force majeure in connection with civil disorders, terrorism and their like see: Ampal-American Israel Corp., Egi-Fund (08-10) Investors LLC, Egi-Series Investments LLC and BSS-EMG Investors LLC v Egypt, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11 (21 February 2017) [237 et seq., 255, 271 et seq. and 330] (allegation of force majeure in relation to a contractual claim regarding the operation of a pipeline, which had been the target of several terrorist attacks; the ICSID award referred in this vein to the findings of a previous ICC tribunal); Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela C.A. v Venezuela, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5 (23 September 2003) [107-29] (allegation that civil disorders constituted a force majeure event which, according to the respondent state, justified the decision not to grant a toll increase under a concession agreement); Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v Lebanon, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12 (11 September 2009) [165-8] (acknowledging civil unrest as a possible justification for delays in local court proceedings, but not expressly referring to the force majeure exception); RSM Production Corp. v Central African Republic, Décision sur la compétence et la responsabilité, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/2 (7 December 2010) [143-213] (holding that a civil unrest leading to a coup d’état was a force majeure event; the case referred to a contract claim and involved a contractual definition of force majeure). It should also be noted that force majeure is not a one-way street. In some cases foreign investors have successfully invoked force majeure as a means to avoid responsibility for contractual breaches. For an indicative example see: Gujarat State Petroleum Corp. Ltd., Alkor Petroo Ltd. and Western Drilling Contractors Private Ltd. v Republic of Yemen and The Yemen Ministry of Oil and Minerals, ICC Case No. 19299/MCP, Final Award (10 July 2015) [211-24] (concerning the applicability of a contractual force majeure clause in the context of the Yemeni revolution of 2011; see particularly paras 202 and 212-3).

  124. 124.

    Resort to the force majeure exception in the context of civil unrest has not been without controversy. In a report presented to the Institut de Droit International in 1898, Emilio Brusa famously argued that the foreigner suffering a revolutionary damage sacrifices his individual interest for the benefit of a foreign national community (so-called ‘theory of expropriation’). Consequently, Brusa said, the foreigner shall be indemnified irrespective of whether the host state’s actions or omissions appear to be justified on grounds of force majeure or otherwise. See: Emilio Brusa, ‘Responsabilité des États à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute ou de guerre civile’ (1898) 17 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 96, 97 et seq., 106-9 and 134-7. Brusa’s theories were the subject of sharp criticism. For a critical assessment of the subject see: Carl Ludwig von Bar, ‘A raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas de troubles, d’émeute ou de guerre civile’ (1899) 31 (1) RDILC 464, 466-70; Luis A. Podestá Costa, ‘La responsabilidad del Estado por daños irrogados a la persona o a los bienes de extranjeros en luchas civiles’ (1938) 67/8 Revista de Derecho Internacional 5, 49-52.

  125. 125.

    Section 13.4.1 addresses this aspect of the notion of due diligence in detail.

  126. 126.

    Cf. ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 49 art. 9.

  127. 127.

    Emphasis added. ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 49 art. 9.

  128. 128.

    ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 49 art. 9 (Commentary) [1-2].

  129. 129.

    James Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013) 169 (also citing the case Yeager v Iran).

  130. 130.

    Cf. James Crawford, State Responsibility. The General Part (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013) 169.

  131. 131.

    Cf. Kenneth P. Yeager v Iran, Award, Case No. 10199 (2 November 1987) 17 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 97 [23] and 102 et seq. [39 et seq.]

  132. 132.

    See: Kenneth P. Yeager v Iran, Award, Case No. 10199 (2 November 1987) 17 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 103 [42] (quoting articles 8(a) and (b) of the then-available version of the ILC Draft Articles, which envisaged a rule similar to present-day article 9). See also: ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 49 art. 9 (Commentary) [2] (quoting the Yeager case as an example).

  133. 133.

    It must be noted, however, that the Yeager case was not specifically concerned with a want of diligence in the protection of foreign citizens; the case referred to the expulsion of a foreign citizen from Iranian territory. See: Kenneth P. Yeager v Iran, Award, Case No. 10199 (2 November 1987) 17 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 92, 94-6 [12-6]. Nonetheless, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal acknowledged that the Komitehs played a major role in different areas, including ‘the maintenance of public security’ (at p. 105 para 45). See also the Tribunal’s remarks at pp. 97 para 23 and pp. 102 et seq. paras 39 et seq. For another decision addressing state responsibility in cases where neither the titular government nor an insurgent movement exercises effective territorial control see: Alfred L. Short v Iran, Award, Case No. 11135 (14 July 1987) 16 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 76, 84-5 [33-4] (concerning the attribution of acts committed by private supporters of the Islamic revolution). Cf. also: Alfred L. Short v Iran, Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brower, Case No. 11135 (14 July 1987) 16 Iran – US Cl. Trib. Rep. 86, 84-5 [33-4] and 93-5 [13-6].

  134. 134.

    It is worth underscoring that the rule of attribution set forth in article 9 of the ILC Articles is applicable in respect of both actions and omissions. Cf. ILC, ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. General Commentary’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 2001 31, 34 art. 2 and 49 art. 9.

  135. 135.

    An indicative example may be found in a diplomatic note sent by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Tokyo in 1911, in the early aftermath of the annexation of the Korean peninsula to the Japanese Empire. On that occasion, the Japanese Minister promised that ‘it will be the constant and sincere aim of the Imperial Government to afford to all legitimate interests, foreign as well as national, in all parts of the Empire, full protection and security’. ‘The [Japanese] Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador’ (6 October 1911) Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President (Government Printing Office, Washington 1911) 323, 324. For the related discussion of the applicability of FPS treaty clauses in cases of foreign occupation cf. Petr Stejskal, ‘War: Foreign Investments in Danger – Can International Humanitarian Law or Full Protection and Security Always Save It?’ (2017) 8 CYIL 529, 537 et seq. (also referring the possible use of the force majeure defense at p. 538).

  136. 136.

    ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, ‘Second Report by Mr. Tim Stephens (Rapporteur) and Mr. Duncan French (Chair)’ (20 July 2016) 42 (without specific reference to the FPS standard).

  137. 137.

    The use of the expression ‘de facto government’ has been somewhat inconsistent in legal literature and state practice; the term could therefore convey different meanings. See generally: Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law. With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998) 60. For another author analyzing the meaning of the term see: Antoine Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens (Larose & Forcel, Paris 1903) 483-8.

  138. 138.

    Insurgent or revolutionary movements that have gained control over a given area and recognition as a ‘belligerent power’ have been traditionally considered as subjects of international law, being sometimes characterized as ‘statelike communities’. See: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Clark NJ 2007) 161 [first edition: 1952]. Cf. also: Roberto Ago, ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility – The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility (Continued) (A/CN.4/264)’ (20 June 1972 and 9 April 1973) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission – 1972 71, 129-30 (“the [insurrectional] movement is essentially a “provisional” subject of international law. The duration of its existence coincides with the duration of its fight against the pre-existing State or its Government”); Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York 2003) 219-20 (classifying these groups as a ‘special case’ of international legal subjectivity). On the protection of investments in territories under insurgent control cf. also Petr Stejskal, ‘War: Foreign Investments in Danger – Can International Humanitarian Law or Full Protection and Security Always Save It?’ (2017) 8 CYIL 529, 542-3 and 547 (arguing that FPS imposes no obligations on insurgents as such, but focusing on the application of FPS treaty clauses rather than the customary FPS standard).

  139. 139.

    Specifically on the international responsibility of de facto regimes under the customary law of aliens see: Daoud L. Khairallah, Insurrection under International Law with Emphasis on the Rights and Duties of Insurgents (Lebanese University, Beirut 1973) 270-1 (“Notwithstanding the restrictions which may be imposed as a consequence of the exceptional circumstances generated by civil strife, both the lawful government and the insurgents have an interest in respecting the aliens’ rights and in guaranteeing their safety. The lawful government is under a legal obligation to protect the rights of aliens in the fighting against insurgents and in all other situations. The insurgents, however, come under the same responsibility, as soon as they establish an effective de facto authority over part of the state territory and they claim representing the state” – emphasis added). See also: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Das de facto-Regime im Völkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Rechtsstellung nichtanerkannter Staaten und ähnlicher Gebilde (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1968) 86-93 (particularly at 89-90); Ulrich Erdmann, Nichtanerkannte Staaten und Regierungen (Institut für Völkerrecht der Universität Göttingen, Göttingen 1966) 29-38.

  140. 140.

    Salvador Prats v United States (undated) 3 Moore’s Arb. 2886, 2890.

  141. 141.

    Institut de Droit International, ‘Règlement sur la responsabilité des États à raison des dommages soufferts par les étrangers en cas d’émeute, d’insurrection ou de guerre civile’ (1900) 18(I) Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 254, 254-5 art. 2 (“Tant que ce dernier [le gouvernement insurrectionnel] est considèré par le gouvernement de la personne soi-disant lésée comme Puissance belligérante, les demandes ne pourront être adressées […] qu’au gouvernement insurrectionnel et non au gouvernement légitime”).

  142. 142.

    ‘Earl Russel to Mr. Adams’ (26 November 1861) in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 1: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 209.

  143. 143.

    For a description of the facts see: John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 7: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 346-54. The Greytown incident will also be discussed in Sect. 8.3.2.2.

  144. 144.

    ‘Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Count Sartiges, French min.’ (26 February 1857) in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 6: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 927, 928.

  145. 145.

    Emphasis added. ‘Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Count Sartiges, French min.’ (26 February 1857) in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 6: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 927, 928.

  146. 146.

    ‘Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Count Sartiges, French min.’ (26 February 1857) in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 6: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 927, 928. For the purposes of state responsibility, Greytown could be characterized as a de facto government not recognized by the United States; on the status of Greytown under international law see: Jochen Abr. Frowein, Das de facto-Regime im Völkerrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur Rechtsstellung nichtanerkannter Staaten und ähnlicher Gebilde (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1968) 73.

  147. 147.

    ‘Mr. Hay to Mr. Bridgman’ (14 March 1899) Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President (Government Printing Office, Washington 1899) 105, 105.

  148. 148.

    Emphasis added. ‘Mr. Hay to Mr. Bridgman’ (14 March 1899) Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President (Government Printing Office, Washington 1899) 105, 105.

  149. 149.

    ‘The Secretary of State to the American Minister’ (20 January 1911) Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President (Government Printing Office, Washington 1911) 649, 649 (“On October 11, 1909, Gen. Juan J. Estrada, governor of one of the eastern Provinces of Nicaragua […] issued a manifesto reciting the evils of the Zelaya administration, proclaimed himself the provision president of the Republic, and solicited the recognition of the United States. The Department, following its usual practice in such cases, made no response to his request, but shortly thereafter notified the leaders of the revolution, as it did the representative of Zelaya, that the Government of the United States would hold strictly accountable for the protection of American life and property the factions de facto control in control of the eastern and western portions, respectively, of the Republic of Nicaragua” – emphasis added).

  150. 150.

    See: ‘Message from Secretary of State Rusk to Chairman of the Ad Hoc Commission of the Congo Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta’ (16 November 1964) Jules Davids (ed), Documents on American Foreign Relations – 1964 (Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1965) 345, 345.

  151. 151.

    ‘Message from Secretary of State Rusk to Chairman of the Ad Hoc Commission of the Congo Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta’ (16 November 1964) Jules Davids (ed), Documents on American Foreign Relations – 1964 (Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1965) 345, 346.

  152. 152.

    ‘Message from Secretary of State Rusk to Chairman of the Ad Hoc Commission of the Congo Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta’ (16 November 1964) Jules Davids (ed), Documents on American Foreign Relations – 1964 (Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1965) 345, 346.

  153. 153.

    Nina Caspersen, ‘Making Peace with De Facto States’ in Martin Riegl and Bohumil Doboš (eds), Unrecognized States and Secession in the 21st Century (Springer, Cham 2017) 13.

  154. 154.

    See generally: Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (Klaus Reprint, New York 1970) 147 [first edition: 1928].

  155. 155.

    Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (Klaus Reprint, New York 1970) 147 [first edition: 1928].

  156. 156.

    See, for example: Alf Ross, A Textbook of International Law. General Part (Longmans, Green and Co., London 1947) 166; Antoine Pillet, Les lois actuelles de la guerre (Rousseau, Paris 1901) 29; Arnold Duncan McNair (First Baron McNair), International Law Opinions (Volume 2: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1956) 245; Edwin Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (The Banks Law Publishing Co., New York 1916) 235; Edwin Borchard, ‘The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners. Comments to the Draft Convention’ (April 1929) 23 AJIL 140, 195 art. 13; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook Exchange, Clark NJ 2007) 291-2 [first edition: 1952]; Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations. State Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983) 177. Even some of the most consistent advocates for a far-reaching responsibility of the host state for the acts of rebels and insurrects, such as Carlos Wiesse and Emilio Brusa, recognized this principle. Wiesse, while submitting that states are generally responsible for injuries received by aliens within their territories, believed the rule not to be applicable in respect of portions of the territory where social order has not yet been established; in later publications, Wiesse went on to concede that recognition of an insurrectionary movement as a belligerent power relieves the host state from responsibility for damages occurred within areas subject to rebel control. See: Carlos Wiesse, Le droit international apliqué aux guerres civiles (B. Benda Libraire-Éditeur, Lausanne 1898) 44-5; Carlos Wiesse, Reglas de derecho internacional aplicables á las guerras civiles (Imp. Torres Aguirre, Lima 1905) 82-3. For his part, Brusa expressed in 1898 the view that the host state is generally responsible for revolutionary damages to aliens. However, in a subsequent document presented to the Institut de Droit International in 1900, he acknowledged that, whenever a belligerent power has gained control over a portion of the host state’s territory, it had been the practice of some states to direct their claims to the insurrectionary government and not to the titular government. See: Emilio Brusa, ‘Responsabilité des États à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute ou de guerre civile’ (1898) 17 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 96, 97 et seq., 106-9 and 134-7; Emilio Brusa, ‘Responsabilité des États à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers en cas d’émeute ou de guerre civile. Nouvelles thèses présentées par MM. Brusa, rapporteur, et L. de Bar’ (1900) 18 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 47, 47-8.

  157. 157.

    For a clear example of state practice in support of the principle see: ‘Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dayton, min. to France’ (12 January 1864) in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Volume 6: Government Printing Office, Washington 1906) 957 (“France, by recognizing the insurgents as belligerents, may be expected to have accepted all the responsibility of that measure, and to be content to regard her subjects domiciled in belligerent territory as identified with belligerent themselves”).

  158. 158.

    Institut de Droit International, ‘Règlement sur la responsabilité des États à raison des dommages soufferts par les étrangers en cas d’émeute, d’insurrection ou de guerre civile’ (1900) 18(I) Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 254, 254-5 art. 2 (“Cependant, certaines demandes d’indemnité peuvent être écartées, quand elles se rapportent à des faits qui se sont produits après que le gouvernement de l’Etat auquel appartient la personne lésée a reconnu le gouvernement insurrectionnel comme Puissance belligérante, et quand la personne lésée a continué de garder son domicile ou son habitation sur le territoire du gouvernement insurrectionnel”).

  159. 159.

    Institut de Droit International, ‘Résolutions votées par l’Institut au cours de sa XXXI Ve Session – Responsabilité internationale des États à raison des dommages causés sur leur territoire à la personne ou aux biens des étrangers (XIIIe Commission)’ (1927) 33(II) Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 330, 332 art. 7 (“La responsabilité de l’Etat en raison d’actes commis par des insurgés, cesse lorsqu’il a reconnu ces derniers comme partie belligérante, et, en tous cas, à l’égard des Etats qui les ont reconnus comme tels”). See also: Leo Strisower, ‘Responsabilité internationale des États à raison des dommages causés sur leur territoire à la personne ou aux biens des étrangers’ (1927) 33(I) Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 455, 484.

  160. 160.

    On the legal effects of recognition see generally: Malcolm Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, New York 2003) 393 et seq. (noting at p. 393 that recognition ‘is a legal acknowledgement of a factual state of affairs’). On belligerency see also pp. 1040 et seq.

  161. 161.

    Cf. n. 155, 156 and 157 above.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bonn, Germany

    Sebastián Mantilla Blanco

Authors
  1. Sebastián Mantilla Blanco
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Mantilla Blanco, S. (2019). Subjective Scope of Application of the Customary Standard of ‘Full Protection and Security’. In: Full Protection and Security in International Investment Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24838-3_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24838-3_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-24837-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-24838-3

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation