Abstract
Michael T. Oswald and John D. Robertson introduce the broader impact of partisan polarization in contemporary American politics and lay the foundation for the remaining chapters of this volume. They offer some contextual perspective on the important interactive effect of affective partisan polarization and the impact polarization has on constructing pathways to opening conflict between opposing partisan interests. The literature and empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter compel the conclusion that it is these pathways that fuel and propel not a constitutional crisis but rather the persistent and common strategy of norm derogation in the American political system.
“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”
—H. L. Mencken
“I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters.”
—Donald J. Trump
“When the President does it that means that it is not illegal.”
—Richard Nixon
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Notes
- 1.
For a comprehensive overview of the social psychological explanations of the forces supporting democracy and constitutional order, see Sullivan, John L., and John E. Transue. The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. Annual Review of Psychology 50, no. 1 (1999): 625–650.
- 2.
Norm derogation cannot be removed from the broader cultural and political contest of rising political incivility within the American electorate, making the search for common ground among sharply contending ideological camps more difficult. For insights on this, see Mutz, Diana C. In-your-face politics: The consequences of uncivil media. Princeton University Press, 2015; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Bruce Hardy. What is civil engaged argument and why does aspiring to it matter? PS: Political Science & Politics 45, no. 3 (2012): 412–415; Gervais, Bryan T. Incivility online: Affective and behavioral reactions to uncivil political posts in a web-based experiment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics 12, no. 2 (2015): 167–185; Brooks, Deborah Jordan, and John G. Geer. Beyond negativity: The effects of incivility on the electorate. American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 1–16; Coe, Kevin, Kate Kenski, and Stephen A. Rains. Online and uncivil? Patterns and determinants of incivility in newspaper website comments. Journal of Communication 64, no. 4 (2014): 658–679; and Papacharissi, Zizi. Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential of online political discussion groups. New media & society 6, no. 2 (2004): 259–283.
- 3.
Literature exploring the extent of polarization and its proper definition within the context of elites, the general public, and its nature include James A. Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, eds. American Gridlock. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, Gary C. Jacobson, Polarization, Gridlock, and Presidential Campaign Politics in 2016. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667:1 (2016): 226–246.; Andrew Wroe, The Culture War: Is America Polarizing, in John Dumbrell, ed., Issues in American Politics: Polarized Politics in the Age of Obama, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 83; Pew Center for Research, Political Polarization inn the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Apathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, June 12, 2014; Morris P. Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, New York: Pearson Longman; and Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth? Journal of Politics, 70(2008), pp. 542–555.
- 4.
To construct the measure of affective polarized partisanship, we have relied upon four questions (variables) within the ANES Cumulative Time Series data file from December 2018. The first is the ANES 7-point scaled survey item asking respondents to state which option best describes themselves: Republican, Democrat, or other (item VCF0301). Those who identify themselves as being either (a) strong Democrat, (b) weak Democrat, or (c) independent Democrat are coded as “Democrat.” Those responding they see themselves as (a) strong Republican, (b) weak Republican, or (c) independent-Republican are coded as “Republican.” The second variable is the 7-point Liberal-Conservative Scale (VCF0803). Those respondents who self-identify as either (a) extremely liberal, (b) liberal, or (c) slightly liberal are coded as “liberal”; those who self-identify as (a) extremely conservative, (b) conservative, or (c) slightly conservative are coded as “conservative.” The third and fourth variables are the respective thermometer scale measures of a respondent’s feelings toward Democrats (VCF0201) and Republicans (VCF0202), respectively. The thermometer scale ranges from 0 to 97–100 in value. Those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 51 to 97–100 for Democrats are coded as having a positive affect toward Democrats. Those scoring 0–49 are coded as having a negative affect toward Democrats. This is repeated with respect to a respondent’s assessment of the Republicans. Those respondents who are Democrat, liberal, warm toward Democrats, and cold toward Republicans are “Democrat affective polarized partisans”; those who are Republican, conservative, warm toward Republicans, and cold toward Democrats are “Republican affective polarized partisans.” Data file available at https://electionstudies.org/data-center/
- 5.
To construct the measure of “hard core” affective polarized partisanship, we have merely modified the measures previously constructed for “Democrat affective polarized partisans” and “Republican affective polarized partisans.” Using the same four variables from the ANES Cumulative Time Series data file from December 2018 to construct affective polarized partisans, we code “Democrats” as those who identify themselves as being either (a) strong Democrat or (b) weak Democrat; and “Republicans” as those who respond either (a) strong Republican or (b) weak Republican. “Liberals” are those respondents who self-identify as either (a) extremely liberal or (b) liberal; “conservatives” are those who self-identify as (a) extremely conservative or (b) conservative. Those respondents expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward Democrats are coded as having a positive affect toward Democrats; those scoring 0–30 are coded as having a negative affect toward Democrats. This is repeated with respect to a respondent’s assessment of the Republicans. Those respondents who are Democrat, liberal, warm toward Democrats, and cold toward Republicans according to the modified coding of partisanship are coded as “hard core Democrat affective polarized partisans”; those who are Republican, conservative, warm toward Republicans and cold toward Democrats according to the modified coding are “hard core Republican affective polarized partisans.” Data file available at https://electionstudies.org/data-center/
- 6.
The literature connecting partisan-motivated reasoning, polarized affect, and partisanship and examples of the behavioral consequences that follow is extensive. See Jost, John T. “Asymmetries abound: Ideological differences in emotion, partisanship, motivated reasoning, social network structure, and political trust.” Journal of Consumer Psychology 27, no. 4 (2017): 546–553; Schildkraut, Deborah J. “Boundaries of American identity: evolving understandings of ‘Us’.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 441–460; Rogowski, Jon C., and Joseph L. Sutherland. “How ideology fuels affective polarization.” Political Behavior 38, no. 2 (2016): 485–508; Mason, Lilliana. “Losing Common Ground: Social Sorting and Polarization.” In The Forum, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 47–66. De Gruyter, 2018; Granberg, Donald, and Thad A. Brown. “On affect and cognition in politics.” Social Psychology Quarterly (1989); Doherty, David. “Perceived motives in the political arena.” American Politics Research 43, no. 3 (2015): 363–393; Stanley, Matthew L., Paul Henne, Brenda W. Yang, and Felipe De Brigard. “Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization.” Political Behavior (2019): 1–23; Kraft, Patrick W., Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber. “Why people “don’t trust the evidence” motivated reasoning and scientific beliefs.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 658, no. 1 (2015): 121–133.
- 7.
The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) to as a representation of populist/non-populist disposition are (1) “Trust” (VCF0604, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right.”). Those expressing all or most of time are reported in Table 1.3. (2) “Elections Matter” (VCF0624, “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think, a good deal, some or not much?”) Those expressing “good deal of time” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Government Cares” (VCF0609 “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.”). Those who say they “agree” with this position are reported in Table 1.3. (4) “Government by Few Interests” (VCF0605 “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people.”). Those who say “few big interests” are reported in Table 1.3.
- 8.
The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of tolerance and adaptability disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Moralism” (VCF0852, “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (2) “Traditionalism” (VCF0853, “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Society Breakdown” (VCF0851 “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3. (4) “Tolerance” (VCF0854 “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”). Those respondents who “agree” are reported in Table 1.3.
- 9.
The single survey item drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of “partisan motivation” in the American political culture is “Best Party” (VCF9012, “Which political party do you think would be most likely to get the government to do a better job in dealing with [most important problem]—the Republicans, the Democrats, or wouldn’t there be much difference between them?”). Those respondents who specify Democrats or Republicans are reported respectively in Table 1.3.
- 10.
The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of egalitarianism and opportunity disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Equal Chance” (VCF9016, “It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table 1.3. (2) “Equal Opportunity” (VCF9013, “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Fewer Problems” (VCF9018, “If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.”). Those respondents who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” are reported in Table 1.3.
- 11.
The survey items drawn from the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (December 2018) as a representation of remediation affect disposition in the American political culture are (1) “Affect Toward Poor People” (VCF0223, thermometer scale for poor people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward poor people are coded as having a positive affect toward poor people and are reported in Table 1.3.). (2) Government Services (VCF0839, “Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?”). Those respondents choosing options 1 or 2 (government should provide fewer services) are reported in Table 1.3. (3) “Affect Toward Blacks” (VCF0206, thermometer scale for black people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward black people are coded as having a positive affect toward black people and are reported in Table 1.3.). (4) “Affect Toward Whites” (VCF0207, thermometer scale for white people; those respondent’s expressing a thermometer feeling of 70 to 97–100 toward white people are coded as having a positive affect toward white people and are reported in Table 1.3.).
- 12.
The variables (items) employed from the American National Election Survey Cumulative Time Series Data File (November 2018) are: (1) Sex, a person’s gender (VCF0104), (2) Age (VCF0101), (3) Education (VCF0110), (4) Race (VCF0105b), and (5) Ideology (VCF0212).
- 13.
American National Election Survey. 2016 Time Series Study. American National Elections Studies University of Michigan and Stanford University May 2, 2017. The survey items drawn from the American National Election Survey 2016 Time Series Study (May 2017) reported in Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 are: (1) a respondent’s attitude toward compromise (V162259, “Compromise in politics is selling out on one’s principles”; Table reports both those who “agree” and “disagree”; Table 1.6 reports only those who “disagree.”) (2) Welfare Spending (V161209, “Federal spending on welfare programs”; those respondents indicated they prefer “increased” spending are reported in Table 1.6.) (3); “Equal Opportunity” (v162243, “Society should make sure everyone has equal opportunity”; those respondents who indicated they “agree” are reported in Table 1.6.) (4) “Tolerance for Moral Standards” (V162209, “Agree/disagree: be more tolerant of other moral standards”; those who “agree” are reported in Table 1.6.) (5) “Preserve Family Values” (V162209, “Agree/disagree: be more tolerant of other moral standards”; those who “agree” are reported in Table 1.6).
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Oswald, M.T., Robertson, J.D. (2020). Constitutional Crisis, Norm Derogation, and the Broader Impact of Partisan Polarization in Contemporary American Politics. In: Oswald, M.T. (eds) Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24792-8_1
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