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Before and After Legal Positivity: Peremptory Norms from Global and Transnational Social Practice

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Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 131))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the difficulties legal positivism faces explaining the formation and content of peremptory norms. On the one hand, these norms have a universal, peremptory and non-derogable character, based on the importance of their content, which appears to be in tension with the positivist vision of international law as an artificial creation, grounded on state sovereignty and consent. On the other hand, there is the seemingly paradoxical claim that peremptory norms arise from state practice, requiring acceptance and recognition by the international community as a whole. Unravelling this paradox, requires an explanation that reaches beyond the formal sources of international law, to the normative social foundations for international legal order and obligation. The chapter argues that this requires an enquiry into the social foundations for legal obligation as such, which runs counter to the methodological underpinnings of legal positivism, and touches upon the necessary moral foundations to any legal system. An adequate justification of peremptory norms in any legal order requires the setting aside of mistaken understandings of the relationship between social practice, reasons and rules within the positivist tradition; and the recovery of an account of norms constitutive of social cooperation to achieve common ends. With that recovery, the chapter explores some workable foundations for understanding peremptory norms, as ethical foundations to legal order and evaluative criteria for the integration of global, transnational and national legal orders.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Orakhelashvili (2006), p. 32.

  2. 2.

    Sztucki (1974), p. 64; Weil (1983); Koskenniemi (2005a), pp. 309–325.

  3. 3.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 53.

  4. 4.

    Hall (2001), pp. 269–284; Rommen (1998), pp. 62–138.

  5. 5.

    Lotus Case, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, 18.

  6. 6.

    Weil (1983), p. 421.

  7. 7.

    Lotus Case, 18.

  8. 8.

    Weil (1983), pp. 420–423.

  9. 9.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations, 21 March 1986 (not yet in force).

  10. 10.

    ILC, Draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries [2001] Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II, Part Two.

  11. 11.

    Kolb (2015), p. 2.

  12. 12.

    Kolb (2015), ch 1.

  13. 13.

    Finnis (2011a), ch 1; Finnis (2000).

  14. 14.

    Tasioulas (2016), pp. 107–108.

  15. 15.

    Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited [1970] ICJ Rep. 3, p. 32. See also: Byers (1997) and De Wet (2013).

  16. 16.

    ILC (1966), p. 248.

  17. 17.

    Janis (1988), pp. 362–363; Kolb (2015), chs 1 and 4.

  18. 18.

    O’Connell (2014), pp. 84–85.

  19. 19.

    American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), §102, comment k; §702, illustration 11.

  20. 20.

    ILC (2006), p. 189.

  21. 21.

    Kolb (2015), chs 5 and 6.

  22. 22.

    See e.g. Retter (2011), pp. 540–548; Criddle and Fox-Decent (2009), pp. 339–342.

  23. 23.

    Weil (1983), p. 427.

  24. 24.

    Shaw (2008), pp. 126–127.

  25. 25.

    Criddle and Fox-Decent (2009), pp. 339–340.

  26. 26.

    Hall (2001), pp. 289–291.

  27. 27.

    Lesaffer (2009), pp. 437–438.

  28. 28.

    For discussion on the conceptual coherence of a relative understanding of sovereignty (as opposed to absolute) see Jorge Emilio Núñez’s chapter in this book. Whether relative or absolute, the question still remains as to why prior acts of state can bind subsequent acts.

  29. 29.

    Triepel (1899). See also: Nussbaum (1954), pp. 234–236; Hall (2001), pp. 283–284; Lev (2011), pp. 137–138.

  30. 30.

    MacGibbon (1954).

  31. 31.

    Brierly (1963), pp. 51–52.

  32. 32.

    Santos (1987), pp. 297–298; Santos (2002), p. 437; Twining (2000), pp. 229–231.

  33. 33.

    Kelsen (1949), pp. 1–40; Rigaux (1998), pp. 329–341.

  34. 34.

    Kelsen (1949), pp. 111 and 116–117.

  35. 35.

    Kelsen (1949), p. 33; Kelsen (1967), p. 119.

  36. 36.

    Kelsen (1949), p. 115.

  37. 37.

    Kelsen (1949), p. 351; Hart (1983), pp. 317–321.

  38. 38.

    Kelsen (1949), p. 369; Kelsen (1952), pp. 417–418.

  39. 39.

    Kelsen (1949), pp. 325–327 and 363–388.

  40. 40.

    Rigaux (1998).

  41. 41.

    Hart (1983), Twining (2009), ch 15.4.

  42. 42.

    Weatherall (2015), Hanna (2018). See e.g. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2001), Merits, App. No. 35763/97, [2001] ECHR 761; Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (1992); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility [2006] ICJ Rep. 6; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep. 99.

  43. 43.

    Lujpen (1967), pp. 28–35.

  44. 44.

    Hart (1994), p. 236.

  45. 45.

    Hart (1994), p. 234.

  46. 46.

    For further discussion of the problem of the relationship between Kelsen’s system of norm and legal practice see Matthew Nicholson’s chapter in this book.

  47. 47.

    Kant (1996), p. 17.

  48. 48.

    Kelsen (1949), p. 437.

  49. 49.

    Hart (1994), pp. 84–91 and 100–110.

  50. 50.

    Finnis (2011b), pp. 104–109.

  51. 51.

    Hart (1994), pp. 193–200.

  52. 52.

    For discussion on Hart’s views on the legal character of international law see Richard Collins’ chapter in this book.

  53. 53.

    Hart (1994), pp. 289, 297; McCormick (1978), pp. 278–279; Rodriguez-Blanco (2007).

  54. 54.

    Winch (1990), pp. 71–88. See also: MacIntyre (1971).

  55. 55.

    Winch (1990), ch 2.

  56. 56.

    Winch (1990), pp. 42–61.

  57. 57.

    Hart (1994), pp. 9–10 and 89.

  58. 58.

    McCormick (1978), p. 284.

  59. 59.

    Hart (1994), p. 89.

  60. 60.

    Rodriguez-Blanco (2007), pp. 456–460.

  61. 61.

    Hart (1994), p. 57.

  62. 62.

    Hart (1994), p. 86.

  63. 63.

    McCormick (1978), pp. 284–292. See also: Hart (1994), pp. 255–259; Hart (1982), pp. 255–261.

  64. 64.

    Hart (1994), p. 94.

  65. 65.

    Hart (1983), pp. 339–342; Hart (1994), pp. 292–293.

  66. 66.

    Hart (1994), p. 256.

  67. 67.

    Hart (1994), pp. 112–117; Hart (1982), pp. 262–268.

  68. 68.

    Rodriguez-Blanco (2007).

  69. 69.

    Finnis (2011c).

  70. 70.

    MacIntyre (1971), pp. 217–222.

  71. 71.

    Hart (1982), p. 262.

  72. 72.

    Anscombe (1981), Finnis (2011a), pp. 245–252; Finnis (2000), pp. 1607–1611; Rodriguez-Blanco (2014), ch 8.

  73. 73.

    Hart (1982), p. 265.

  74. 74.

    Hart (1994), p. 193.

  75. 75.

    Hart (1994), pp. 193–200.

  76. 76.

    Hart (1994), p. 192.

  77. 77.

    Hart (1994), p. 193.

  78. 78.

    Hart (1994), p. 192.

  79. 79.

    Hart (1958), pp. 622–623; Hart (1994), pp. 188–191.

  80. 80.

    Finnis (2011c), p. 256; Finnis (2011d), pp. 262–265; MacIntyre (1998c), pp. 241–243; Simon (1980), pp. 23–31.

  81. 81.

    Finnis (2011b), p. 112.

  82. 82.

    Finnis (2011a), pp. 141–156.

  83. 83.

    MacIntyre (1997), pp. 98–99.

  84. 84.

    MacIntyre (1998a), p. 123.

  85. 85.

    MacIntyre (1998a), p. 123.

  86. 86.

    MacIntyre (2007), pp. 187–191.

  87. 87.

    Dupré (1993), p. 687.

  88. 88.

    MacIntyre (2007), pp. 190–191; MacIntyre (1990), pp. 61–63.

  89. 89.

    MacIntyre (2007), pp. 194–195.

  90. 90.

    MacIntyre (2007), p. 190; MacIntyre (1978), pp. 28–30.

  91. 91.

    MacIntyre (2007), pp. 204–225; MacIntyre (2016), pp. 231–242.

  92. 92.

    MacIntyre (1999).

  93. 93.

    MacIntyre (1998c) and MacIntyre (1999), pp. 113–146.

  94. 94.

    MacIntyre (1988), pp. 198–202; MacIntyre (1999), pp. 109–111.

  95. 95.

    MacIntyre (2009), p. 23. See also: MacIntyre (1990), pp. 133–137; MacIntyre (2016), pp. 88–89.

  96. 96.

    Finnis (2011a), ch IX; Simon (1980), pp. 31–50.

  97. 97.

    Finnis (2011a), pp. 354–362; Finnis (2000).

  98. 98.

    Retter (2015), pp. 9–19.

  99. 99.

    O’Connell (2014), p. 97; Uhlmann (1998), pp. 122–127.

  100. 100.

    O’Connell (2014), pp. 90–93 and p. 98.

  101. 101.

    Criddle and Fox-Decent (2009) and Benvenisti (2013).

  102. 102.

    Aristotle (2009), I:2, 1252b27-31; Finnis (2011a), pp. 149–150; Tasioulas (1996), pp. 116–123; Simon (1993), pp. 63–68.

  103. 103.

    Weil (1983), pp. 418–419; Tasioulas (1996).

  104. 104.

    Retter (2011), pp. 561–566; Domingo (2012).

  105. 105.

    Schmidt (2016), p. 278.

  106. 106.

    Twining (2010), p. 504. See also: Held et al. (1999), Twining (2004), Tamahana (2008), pp. 386–390; Domingo (2010), pp. 55–57.

  107. 107.

    Santos (1987), pp. 297–298.

  108. 108.

    MacIntyre (1999), p. 160; MacIntyre (2009), p. 24.

  109. 109.

    MacIntyre (1999), pp. 124–126 and 158–159.

  110. 110.

    See e.g. Sztucki (1974), p. 64; Shelton (2015), p. 34; Guan (2017), pp. 469–470.

  111. 111.

    Tasioulas (1996), p. 120; Retter (2011), pp. 569–571.

  112. 112.

    Orakhelashvili (2006); Retter (2011), pp. 566–568.

  113. 113.

    Lauterpacht (1970), p. 358.

  114. 114.

    D’Amato (1990), Shelton (2015), pp. 34–48; Guan (2017).

  115. 115.

    Verdross (1966), Radbruch (2006), Rommen (1959). See also: O’Connell (2014), p. 88.

  116. 116.

    O’Connell (2014), pp. 79 and 93–97.

  117. 117.

    MacIntyre (2006, 2009).

  118. 118.

    O’Connell (2014), pp. 80–81 and 93–97.

  119. 119.

    See e.g. Weil (1983), pp. 424–429, 440–441; Saul (2014), Shelton (2015) and Guan (2017).

  120. 120.

    MacIntyre (2009), pp. 22–27; MacIntyre (1998b), pp. 142–144; MacIntyre (1990), pp. 133–137; MacIntyre (1988), pp. 193–196; Simon (1991).

  121. 121.

    Weil (1983), p. 426.

  122. 122.

    Simon (1980), pp. 47–60; MacIntyre (1998c), pp. 240–241; MacIntyre (2009), pp. 12–15; Finnis (2011a), pp. 144–147 and 154–156.

  123. 123.

    Twining (2011), p. 368. See also: Griffiths (1986), Cotterrell (1998), Berman (2007), pp. 1159–1164; Tamahana (2008), pp. 375–390; Twining (2010) and Michaels (2013).

  124. 124.

    By ‘appropriately’ I refer to principles of procedural morality for governance by law: Fuller (1977), Finnis (2011a), pp. 270–276.

  125. 125.

    Aristotle (2009), I:2, 1252b27-31; Finnis (2011a), pp. 147–156; Domingo (2010), pp. 102–106; Domingo (2012); Simon (1993), pp. 63–68.

  126. 126.

    Twining (2010), pp. 482–484.

  127. 127.

    See e.g. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004) and Barzilai (2008).

  128. 128.

    Aquinas (1947), I–II, Q.94; Rommen (1998), pp. 195–203; MacIntyre (1984, 1998b), pp. 142–144.

  129. 129.

    O’Connell (2014), p. 88.

  130. 130.

    See e.g. Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 (1879), p. 166.

  131. 131.

    See e.g. Standen (2009).

  132. 132.

    See e.g. TransLex Principles, Principle No. IV.7.1.

  133. 133.

    See e.g. UN Global Compact, Principle 4; Responsible Business Alliance Code of Conduct, A.1.

  134. 134.

    See e.g. Bell (2013), pp. 187 and 190–193; Kastner (2012).

  135. 135.

    Weil (1983), p. 441.

  136. 136.

    Schmidt (2016), p. 283.

  137. 137.

    See e.g. Koskenniemi (2005a), pp. 324–325; Koskenniemi (2005b), p. 197; Bianchi (2008), Shelton (2015) and Guan (2017).

  138. 138.

    D’Aspremont (2015).

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  1. Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    Mark D. Retter

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  1. School of Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK

    Luca Siliquini-Cinelli

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Retter, M.D. (2019). Before and After Legal Positivity: Peremptory Norms from Global and Transnational Social Practice. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (eds) Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 131. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24705-8_7

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