New International Legal Positivism: Formalism by Another Name?

Nicholson, Matthew

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-24705-8_4

Matthew Nicholson²⁰

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 131))

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Abstract

This chapter explores the work of Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Aspremont. Through a review of Kammerhofer’s Kelsenian approach to international law and d’Aspremont’s HLA Hart-inspired theory of the sources of international law and the nature of international law more generally, it questions the distinctiveness of the positivism they advocate and contests the contemporary value of a positivistic approach to international law.

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Notes

1.
The term is used by d’Aspremont, in d’Aspremont (2014b), p. 130, referring to “a possible agenda for a new international legal positivism,” and by Telman (2014), pp. 241–242.
2.
See Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont (2014), p. 14:

“International legal positivism” does not need to be defined in this volume. Although revolving around a few recurring “theses” (for example, Hartian positivism, the separation, autonomy and social or conventional theses) and paradigms (for example, the necessity for formal law-ascertainment, the political and creative character of interpretation, the idea of autonomy or the possibility of a critique of law), the meaning of international legal positivism is not fixed and purposely left in flux for the sake of the reflexive exercise attempted here.
3.
See Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont (2014), pp. 4–7.
4.
Kammerhofer (2012).
5.
d’Aspremont (2011, 2012, 2014a, b).
6.
d’Aspremont (2018).
7.
Koskenniemi (2001), pp. 500–509.
8.
I have previously noted the connection between Koskenniemi’s and d’Aspremont’s work—see Nicholson (2016), p. 104, noting “a late-twentieth century [approach to international law as a] professional language which, despite its critical origins [in Koskenniemi’s work, and the early work of David Kennedy], is now cautiously embraced in a return to the positivist tradition,” citing d’Aspremont (2011) as an example of this “return.”
9.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 2. The book was first published in 2011 and issued in paperback in 2012. References in this chapter are to the 2012 paperback edition.
10.
Kammerhofer (2012) chapter 2 (pp. 5–56) and chapter 3 (pp. 59–85).
11.
Kammerhofer (2012), chapter 6 (pp. 195–239).
12.
See García-Salmones Rovira (2015), p. 545:

Neither in the very thin introduction (four pages) nor in the subsequent references to the notion made throughout the book, in which the Pure Theory is alternately viewed as both augmenting and diminishing uncertainty, does Kammerhofer engage in theoretical explanation or provide a definition of what “uncertainty” means now, in the 21st century, in relation to international law.

And ibid., p. 547: “[t]he author’s standpoint of taking Kelsen’s work and persona as a given means that Kelsen himself remains elusive in these pages and presupposes too much specialized knowledge of Kelsen’s legal theory on the part of the reader.”
13.
García-Salmones Rovira (2015), p. 547.
14.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 86, quoting Kelsen (Emphasis in original).
15.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 85.
16.
Koskenniemi (2005).
17.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 87.
18.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 59.
19.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 59. Parts of these quotations from Koskenniemi are included by Kammerhofer (2014) at p. 87. See Mark D. Retter’s chapter in this book for an exploration of “ascending” and “descending” perspectives on peremptory norms in international law.
20.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 88.
21.
Paulson (1992), p. 324.
22.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 88.
23.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 92.
24.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 93.
25.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 246 (quoting Kelsen): “[T]his is the genius of Kelsen’s Grundnorm: it is self-referential … In cognising norms as norms, in cognising norms as a normative order, we act as if the norm or normative order were valid. ‘On the precondition [assumption] that it is valid, the whole legal order under it is valid’” (square brackets around ‘assumption’ in Kammerhofer’s text).
26.
d’Aspremont (2014a), in particular at p. 113.
27.
“as if”—see quotation from Kammerhofer in note 25.
28.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 242.
29.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 242.
30.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 242.
31.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 85. (Emphasis in original).
32.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 260.
33.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
34.
See Paulson (1992), pp. 326–329 on the position of “the sceptic.”
35.
Paulson (1992), p. 332.
36.
Paulson (1992), p. 332. (Emphasis in original).
37.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 242 (also quoted above at note 28).
38.
Paulson (1992), p. 324.
39.
Paulson (1992), pp. 322–323.
40.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
41.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
42.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
43.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
44.
Paulson (1996), p. 808.
45.
Paulson (1992), p. 329.
46.
Paulson (1992), pp. 329–330 (on the position of “the sceptic”).
47.
Paulson (1996), p. 804.
48.
Paulson (1992), pp. 328–329 (quoting Kelsen).
49.
Paulson (1992), p. 330 (quoting Hermann Cohen).
50.
Paulson (1992), p. 326.
51.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 87.
52.
Kammerhofer (2012), pp. 260–261.
53.
Adorno (2007), p. 314.
54.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 242 (also quoted above at notes 28 and 37).
55.
Paulson (1992), p. 324.
56.
Paulson (1992), p. 332. (Emphasis in original).
57.
Kammerhofer (2012), p. 260 (quoting Kelsen).
58.
See Luca Siliquini-Cinelli’s chapter in this book on questions of “temporality” and “social fact”-based theories of legal positivism.
59.
Paulson (2008), p. 35.
60.
Paulson (2008), p. 35.
61.
Paulson (2008), p. 35 (quoting Kelsen).
62.
Paulson (2008), p. 35 (quoting Kelsen).
63.
Paulson (2008), p. 36.
64.
Paulson (2008), p. 36.
65.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 53–54.
66.
Paulson (2008), p. 37.
67.
Koskenniemi (2005), see in particular pp. 17–23. For my analysis of Koskenniemi’s oeuvre see Nicholson (2017).
68.
Koskenniemi (2001), p. 249. (Emphasis in original).
69.
Kammerhofer (2014), pp. 99–100.
70.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 101.
71.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 101.
72.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 101 (footnote 92).
73.
See quotation in text to note 52 above. (Emphasis – “does” – here added). See also, making a similar point, García-Salmones Rovira (2014), p. 804:

I cannot fail to point to the limitations, not to say narrowness, of their [Kelsen’s and Kammerhofer’s] method. In particular, the method used in the exposition of their arguments misleadingly denies that jurisprudence, especially international jurisprudence, has an impact on reality, and that like any other science it contributes to explaining reality.
74.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 104.
75.
Jameson (2009), pp. 26–27:

The dialectic proceeds by standing outside a specific thought – that is to say a conceptual conclusion about a problem (which might range from object to subject, from ethics or politics to philosophy, from the pragmatic to the epistemological, art to science, etc., etc.) – in order to show that the alleged conclusions in fact harbour the working of unstable categorical oppositions. The paradoxes, antinomies, and ultimately contradictions which then historicize the previous moment of ‘conclusion’ and enable a new dialectical ‘solution’ then in some sense reincorporate this lack back into ‘philosophy’ or ‘system’ and come as a new – more properly dialectical – conclusion in their own right.

See also Adorno (2007), p. 5:

The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction... indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived... Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint … What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity: as long as its demand for totality will be its measure for whatever is not identical with it.

On the value and potential of non-identity thinking see Nicholson (2016).
76.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 104.
77.
Kammerhofer (2014), p. 104.
78.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 5.
79.
On Hart and international law in general see Richard Collins’ chapter in this book.
80.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 5:

While not being construed as a tool to delineate the whole phenomenon of law... or a theory to describe the operation of international law, formalism is solely championed here for its virtues in terms of distinguishing law from non-law and ascertaining international legal rules.
81.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 8.
82.
d’Aspremont (2012), p. 368.
83.
d’Aspremont (2014b), p. 115.
84.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 7: “the so-called source and social theses have been the lynchpins of my argument.”
85.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 13.
86.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 48–49.
87.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 49.
88.
On “as if” see discussion above in text to notes 24–27, and note in particular Kammerhofer quotation in note 25.
89.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 51.
90.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 50.
91.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 53–54.
92.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 195: “[T]he source thesis [as presented in the relevant chapter of d’Aspremont’s book, chapter 7] can itself be rooted in the social practice of law-applying authorities (the social thesis).”
93.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 186.
94.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 171 (discussing the example of “[g]eneral principles of law”).
95.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 162–163.
96.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 178–182; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1946 UNTS 3.
97.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 192.
98.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 192.
99.
Koskenniemi (2005). For a summary of Koskenniemi’s opposition of apology and utopia see text to note 67 above.
100.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 194.
101.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 193.
102.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 201.
103.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 201. (Emphasis in original).
104.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 201.
105.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 201.
106.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 201.
107.
“Culture of formalism”—see Koskenniemi (2001), pp. 500–509.
108.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 205.
109.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 206–207.
110.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 207.
111.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 209.
112.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 209.
113.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 210.
114.
d’Aspremont (2011), pp. 210–211.
115.
d’Aspremont (2014a).
116.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 103.
117.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 115.
118.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 116.
119.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 122.
120.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 128.
121.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 128.
122.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 29.
123.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 218.
124.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 223.
125.
See Nicholson (2017).
126.
For a more comprehensive review see Nicholson (2017).
127.
See Koskenniemi (2001).
128.
For a more comprehensive analysis of this May 1966 debate see Nicholson (2017).
129.
Koskenniemi (2001). pp. 497–498.
130.
Koskenniemi (2001), p. 501.
131.
Koskenniemi (2001), p. 499 (quoting Friedmann).
132.
Koskenniemi (2001), p. 7.
133.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 568 and p. 11.
134.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 123.
135.
d’Aspremont (2014a), p. 123 (footnote 117).
136.
d’Aspremont (2018).
137.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. xii.
138.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. xii.
139.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 6.
140.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 4.
141.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 7.
142.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 4, footnote 8: “Ideology does not really capture what I have in mind because of the risk of being equated with grand ideologies, that is, an entire system of thoughts and values.”
143.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 5.
144.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 3.
145.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 3.
146.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 45.
147.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 31.
148.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 46.
149.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 46.
150.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 17.
151.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 104.
152.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 17–18.
153.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 21–22.
154.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 120–121.
155.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 121.
156.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 106.
157.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 106.
158.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 112.
159.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 115.
160.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 123.
161.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 118–119.
162.
Koskenniemi (2016), p. 734. For a more comprehensive analysis of From Apology see Nicholson (2017), noting that this quotation from Koskenniemi is included (at footnote 241) in that article.
163.
Koskenniemi (2005), p. 561.
164.
For a fuller development of this analysis of Koskenniemi’s work, with a focus on the concept of hegemony, see Nicholson (2017).
165.
See Nicholson (2017), in particular at pp. 465–470 and pp. 476–486.
166.
Laclau and Mouffe (2001), p. 8; see Nicholson (2017), pp. 465–470 for a fuller development of this analysis.
167.
See Nicholson (2017), pp. 466–467.
168.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 22.
169.
Laclau (2007).
170.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 109–110 (and see his footnote 19 at p. 110).
171.
d’Aspremont (2018), pp. 118–119.
172.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 119 (footnote 10, quoting Laclau).
173.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 118 (the relevant footnote on that page, containing the quotation from Mouffe, is footnote 9).
174.
See text to note 150 above.
175.
See text between n 135 and n 136.
176.
See Nicholson (2016), in particular at p. 104: “The more international law is confronted with a complex and fragmented reality of competing values and complex choices the more it retreats into conservative self-reassurance.”
177.
Koskenniemi (2001), p. 249, also quoted in text to note 68 above. (Emphasis in original).
178.
Somek (2011), p. 738.
179.
Somek (2011), p. 749.
180.
Somek (2011), p. 748.
181.
Kammerhofer (2012), pp. 260–261. (Emphasis added).
182.
See text to note 116 above.
183.
d’Aspremont (2018), p. 1.
184.
I am grateful to Dr. Ruth Houghton (Newcastle) for helping me to frame this aspect of my argument.
185.
Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), p. 16.
186.
Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), p. 16.
187.
See, for example, George (2018).
188.
See Rayes et al. (2018).
189.
See Crist (2018).
190.
See Nicholson (2017).
191.
See Nicholson (2016, 2017).
192.
Nicholson (2017), p. 508.
193.
Somek (2011), pp. 755–756.

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Acknowledgements

With thanks to Dr. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Dr. Ruth Houghton (Newcastle), Dr. Gleider Hernandez (Durham), Prof. Aoife O’Donoghue (Durham) and Prof. William Lucy (Durham) for helpful conversations and exchanges. All errors and inadequacies are my fault.

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Matthew Nicholson

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Nicholson, M. (2019). New International Legal Positivism: Formalism by Another Name?. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (eds) Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 131. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24705-8_4

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