Abstract
HLA Hart famously denied that the international legal order could be considered as a legal system, arguing that it lacked a necessary distinction between primary and secondary rules, the latter being sustained in place through the practices of a distinct class of legal official. Despite this conclusion, international lawyers have tended to try to disprove Hart’s conclusion to this effect, rather than challenging his theory on its own terms. This is problematic, I will claim, as the factual response to Hart ends up proving his underlying point, insofar as international law will inevitably appear deficient or otherwise problematic by reference to a paradigm of legality that is fundamentally wedded to explaining the social ordering function of state law. Indeed, the ‘practice theory of rules’ that Hart championed and the kind of analytical method he advocated, which still form the bedrock of the most influential legal positivist approaches today, undeniably (and, it seems, quite self-consciously) privilege the domestic law-state as the paradigm explanator for conceptual enquiry. In this chapter, then, my aim is to demonstrate how and why the factual response to Hart fails, and thereafter set out certain methodological shortcomings of the kind of descriptive-explanatory method that Hart championed and which has, despite subsequent challenge and refinement, subsisted still as the dominant approach to legal-conceptual enquiry. Instead, I will advocate a more normative approach to conceptual analysis—essentially, what has been called a ‘normative positivist’ account—which I believe allows legal theorists to justify a more abstract systematicity for law as a beneficial model of legality in whatever its form—national, global, trans- or inter-national—but which avoids the kind of essentialist overreach that strays too far into the conceptual realm of state theory more broadly.
Parts of this chapter are based upon revised versions of claims made in Chapters 3 and 5 of Collins, Richard. 2016. The institutional problem in modern international law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, as well as in Collins, Richard. 2017. In pursuit of method in pluralist jurisprudence: What exactly is wrong with ‘non-pluralist jurisprudence’? Transnational Legal Theory 8(4): 407–414.
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- 1.
See generally Collins (2014a).
- 2.
- 3.
Austin arrived at the notion of ‘positive international morality’ as he thought it impossible that a state could will an obligation into existence and retain its sovereignty: “The so called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current among nations generally. It therefore is not law properly so called.” See Austin (1873), p. 188.
- 4.
This famous observation comes from Henkin (1979), p. 47.
- 5.
Hart (2012), pp. 88–91.
- 6.
- 7.
See discussion of David (2010), pp. 27–33.
- 8.
d’Aspremont (2011), p. 114.
- 9.
- 10.
Collins (2016).
- 11.
Somek (2011).
- 12.
Collins (2014b).
- 13.
Hart (2012), pp. 19–24.
- 14.
Hart (2012), p. 98.
- 15.
Hart (2012), pp. 88–91, and specifically in relation to international law, at pp. 217–220, 227, 231, and 235.
- 16.
Hart (2012), pp. 213–216 and 232–234.
- 17.
Hart (2012), pp. 94–97.
- 18.
Hart (2012), p. 116.
- 19.
Hart (2012), pp. 100–106.
- 20.
Hart (2012), p. 223.
- 21.
- 22.
Hart (2012), p. 214.
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
See e.g. Schachter (1983), p. 763.
- 27.
Abi-Saab (1987), pp. 122–126; Franck (1990), pp. 184–185. However, one has to be careful not to exaggerate the influence of Hart on the adoption of this kind of terminology in official reports of bodies such as the International Law Commission, amongst others. As Gourgourinis recognises, Hart was not the first to adopt this terminology and distinction and it may well be that Hart’s usage carries with it a certain functional presumption not intended by its usage in international law. See Gourgourinis (2011), pp. 1016–1017. For a discussion on some of the ambiguities involved in the use of the primary-secondary distinction, see also Thirlway (1972), pp. 39–42, and on the technical and somewhat artificial nature of this distinction in international law, see also David (2010), pp. 27–33.
- 28.
- 29.
See Lefkowitz (2017), p. 261.
- 30.
Lefkowitz (2017), pp. 260–261.
- 31.
See also on this point, MacCormick (2008), pp. 31–34.
- 32.
Hart (2012), pp. 91–96.
- 33.
- 34.
Hart (2012), p. 92.
- 35.
Lefkowitz (2017), p. 264.
- 36.
Lefkowitz (2017), p. 260 & passim.
- 37.
- 38.
Lefkowitz (2017), p. 274.
- 39.
Prost (2012), pp. 84–85 ff.
- 40.
Prost (2012), p. 85.
- 41.
Prost (2012), p. 87 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
- 42.
An observation also endorsed recently by Lefkowitz (2017).
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
- 46.
Kramer (1988).
- 47.
MacCormick (1994), pp. 9–12.
- 48.
- 49.
See e.g. MacCormick (1978), p. 55.
- 50.
See Collins (2015), pp. 612–614.
- 51.
- 52.
Coleman (2001), p. 76.
- 53.
- 54.
See Dworkin (1986), ch 2.
- 55.
Collins (2018).
- 56.
See Collins (2016).
- 57.
Somek (2011).
- 58.
This argument is considered (and also critiqued) by Lefkowitz (2017), pp. 268–269.
- 59.
Payandeh (2011), p. 981 (Emphasis in original); and see his attempt to account for these functions in detail, at pp. 982–993.
- 60.
Kelsen (1942), pp. 54–55.
- 61.
Oppenheim (1920), p. 11.
- 62.
See e.g. Scelle (1934), pp. 10–12 & passim.
- 63.
See generally, Collins (2016).
- 64.
See on this point in particular, Waldron (2013), pp. 213–218.
- 65.
This view is no better articulated than by Besson and Tasioulas (2010), p. 10:
While such a reductive view of international law may have been factually correct in 1961, it no longer is. General international law has internal rules that determine its own validity and may therefore be deemed an autonomous legal order, and this is true of international conventional law as much as of customary law.
- 66.
Payandeh (2011), pp. 982–993.
- 67.
Lefkowitz (2017), pp. 268–270.
- 68.
Hart (2012), pp. 92–93.
- 69.
Hart (2012), p. 232.
- 70.
The most seminal study in this regard of recent years is probably Fitzmaurice (2002).
- 71.
See also Charney (1993), pp. 547–549.
- 72.
- 73.
Indeed, this seems to be the conclusion of the International Law Association in its study on the topic of the formation of customary international law. See International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (2000), pp. 31–32; available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376 (accessed 27 June 2016).
- 74.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at inter alia 99–100.
- 75.
- 76.
See Boyle and Chinkin (2007), pp. 225–229.
- 77.
Waldron (2013), pp. 217–218 (footnote omitted).
- 78.
Waldron (2013), p. 216.
- 79.
See Collins (2016), chs 7 and 8.
- 80.
- 81.
Lefkowitz (2017), p. 278.
- 82.
As Postema (1986), p. 35, explains, the analysis of law “requires that legal theorists frame their accounts of the nature of law in terms that take... participant beliefs into account and make them intelligible.”
- 83.
Lefkowitz (2017), pp. 277–279.
- 84.
In the Postscript to The Concept of Law, in response to Dworkin, Hart argues that it is “quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such conduct.” Hart (2012), p. 249.
- 85.
Hart (2012), p. 202.
- 86.
Waldron (1994), pp. 429–431.
- 87.
For a useful summary, see Dickson (2001).
- 88.
See, e.g. Chapter Two of Dworkin (1978).
- 89.
Hart (2012), pp. 239–244.
- 90.
- 91.
See e.g. contributions to Roughan and Halpin (2018).
- 92.
See generally Finnis (2011), ch 1.
- 93.
- 94.
See e.g. Ehrenberg (2011).
- 95.
Hart (2012), p. 117.
- 96.
Finnis (2011), p. 14 (emphasis added).
- 97.
- 98.
Coleman (2001).
- 99.
See Shapiro (2011), particularly pp. 154–192.
- 100.
See e.g. Perry (1994).
- 101.
Raz (2018).
- 102.
Raz (2018), p. 137.
- 103.
Raz (2018), pp. 137 and 145.
- 104.
Raz (2009), pp. 116–119.
- 105.
Raz (2018), p. 145.
- 106.
On Raz’s seemingly changed position, see also Tamanaha (2015).
- 107.
See more extensively, Collins (2016), Part II.
- 108.
See inter alia Culver and Giudice (2010), ch 2.
- 109.
See Collins (2016).
- 110.
Koskenniemi (2005), particularly at pp. 591–592.
- 111.
Finnis (2011), pp. 231–233.
- 112.
See Mark D. Retter’s chapter in this book.
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Collins, R. (2019). Taking Legal Positivism Beyond the State: Finding Secondary Rules?. In: Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (eds) Legal Positivism in a Global and Transnational Age. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 131. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24705-8_3
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