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Interpretations, Comparisons and Philosophical Issues

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Semantics and Truth

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 45))

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Abstract

The last chapter mostly discusses philosophical aspects. According to my general view on STT, I elaborate its various aspects and defend this theory against some philosophical objections. The list of the discussed problems is as follows: STT as a correspondence theory of truth, the status of T-equivalences, truth and meaning, the relative of absolute character of truth as semantically defined, truth and science, comparison of STT with minimalism and coherentism, truth and realism, and applications of STT to the Gettier problem and determinism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jagiellonian University (prof. emeritus), Kraków, Poland

    Jan Woleński

  2. University of Information, Technology and Management, Rzeszow, Poland

    Jan Woleński

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Woleński, J. (2019). Interpretations, Comparisons and Philosophical Issues. In: Semantics and Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 45. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24536-8_9

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