Abstract
In this chapter, I critically assess the two so-called no-miracle arguments which Psillos proposes in support of scientific realism (I call them NMA and Meta-NMA). After pointing out that leveling the charge of vicious circularity against any of the two arguments comes at an unaffordably high price, I urge that the conclusion of Meta-NMA is false. Concerning NMA, I detail that it faces a formidable objection, the so-called pessimistic meta-induction, and I discuss Psillos’ response to this objection. Finally, I show that the conclusion of the second IBE of NMA—scientific realism with regard to a given scientific theory—falls clearly short of the standards for scientific theories that Psillos himself erects in the course of his response to the pessimistic meta-induction. I argue that this is a general problem of such holistic approaches, and I further corroborate this result by applying it on the arguments for scientific realism developed by Howard Sankey.
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- 1.
- 2.
To actually draw the abductive inference, both (4) and (5) should be supplemented with a line explicitly stating the conclusion of the inference. However, since this is not in the passage quoted, and since this does not constitute a severe problem for the argument, the reconstruction respects Psillos’ actual phrasing of the argument.
- 3.
In fact, Psillos only claims that these theories are relevantly approximately true. For a discussion of Psillos’ notion of relevant and approximate truth, see below, Sect. 8.2.2. I ignore this qualification at this point, since it only becomes relevant in Psillos’ response to the so-called pessimistic meta-induction.
- 4.
The schema used in this overview largely coincides with the proposal by Josephson (1994, p. 5), which is also employed by Busch (2008) and by Psillos (2007, pp. 442–443). What is called explanandum here is referred to as a set of data (facts, observations, givens) by Josephson (ibid.). The explanans is Josephson’s hypothesis that would explain the data, if it were true. The emphasis on the need for the explanans to be the best explanation of course raises a number of issues. In particular, if the best is taken in an epistemic way, that is, to be read as: the best explanation available to the researchers of a given time and place, it raises the problem of unconceived, but better alternative explanations, as suggested by Stanford (2006).
- 5.
Compare Fitzpatrick (2013, p. 149) for a very similar reading of the second IBE of NMA and of Meta-NMA.
- 6.
Additionally, Newman (2010) has argued that such an externalist reading of NMA faces the so-called Generality-Problem, which occurs in many reliabilist contexts.
- 7.
In contrast, in the dialectic situation delineated above (Sect. 7.1), the target audience of a defense of J1, say proponents of J2, can avoid any use of J1. Hence, this target audience can level the charge of vicious circularity against a defense of J1 that itself observes J1 at no such cost.
- 8.
A very similar observation leads Stanford (2006, pp. 27–37) to raise the problem of unconceived alternatives. Stanford argues that the abductive argument for scientific realism would be valid only if scientists considered all possible explanations for a given explanandum. Since they cannot possibly do that, the argument is not valid.
- 9.
This point was urged by Marco Toscano.
- 10.
As nothing in my discussion of Psillos’ arguments depends on this qualification, I do not make this restriction explicit in the following—it should be understood, however, that Psillos always only claims approximate and relevant correspondence truth of the theory in question.
- 11.
As many arms races bring with them, as a side effect, technological progress and substantial scientific insight, the arms race between proponents of NMA and anti-realists has produced significant insight into the history of science as a side effect. The history of science, whose relevance for scientific realism was evinced by the pioneering work of Kuhn (1996 [1962]), has flourished as a consequence of the boldly realist claims embodied in NMA. The main insight provided by this race of arms is that science, conceived as a historical phenomenon, is extremely multi-faceted and diverse. As a consequence, it becomes very difficult to maintain a simple narrative of linear progress. Put slightly polemically, this narrative goes as follows for the science of physics. Isaac Newton invented modern physics. There was no serious physics before Newton. His mechanics carved nature almost at its joints. Subsequent developments in physics—in particular Einstein’s theory of general relativity—mostly just improved on the accuracy and the scope of Newton’s mechanics. According to this narrative, as science progresses, its theories depict the true forms of nature ever more accurately, improving on the preceding theories, but not overthrowing their ontological claims at root.
The debate of the simple inference at the core of NMA—that we are justified to assume that empirically successful scientific theories are mostly accurate descriptions of the world itself—has produced a wealth of historical evidence that evinces this narrative as much too simplistic (and arguably as entirely misguided).
- 12.
The expression ‘scientific self-doubts’ is due to Quine (1974, p. 3).
- 13.
As a matter of physical fact, general relativity is already contradicted by non-local quantum phenomena. Informally, non-locality on the quantum level can occur when two particles in a superposition are separated from each other. Regardless of the distance between the two particles, a measurement on one of them has instantaneous effects on the other particle. General relativity does not allow such effects to happen instantaneously: no cause can have a distal effect that takes place faster than it would take light to travel between cause and effect. For a lucid introduction, compare Albert (1992, pp. 61–72).
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Gubelmann, R. (2019). Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos’ Holistic Approach. In: A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5_8
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