Quine’s Empiricist Justificatory Monism



In this chapter, I show how Quine’s empiricist justificatory monism, his claim that the only fundamental way to verify any claim is through empirical evidence, is based on his verification holism, which in turn presupposes his holophrastic conception of empirical data. I then point out that the problems outlined in my discussion of Quine’s naturalized epistemology threaten to undermine his empiricist justificatory monism. Finally, I argue that Quine’s explication of empirical-scientific justification itself cannot be justified in the sense that it itself specifies. Given justificatory monism, this means that the explication is unjustified.


Empiricist justificatory monism Verification holism Empirical data Carnap, Rudolf Quine, W.V.O Underdetermination Naturalism 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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