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Introduction

Chapter
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Abstract

This chapter introduces the theme of the book, epistemological naturalism, explains central concepts and gives an overview on the book’s contents. In particular, I introduce my understanding of epistemological naturalism as consisting of two elements, namely naturalized epistemology and justificatory monism. Briefly, naturalized epistemology is the project of pursuing epistemology in a strictly scientific manner. Justificatory monism claims that there is only one fundamental way to justify any claim whatsoever, namely through empirical-scientific evidence. Furthermore, I discuss basic Quinean terminology, as Quine’s work is a central point of orientation throughout the book.

Keywords

Epistemological naturalism Naturalized epistemology Justificatory monism Naturalism Maddy Quine 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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