Abstract
In this work we want to extend the EGT models by introducing the concept of individual state. We analyze a particular simple case, in which we associate a state to each player, and we suppose that this state determines the set of available actions. We consider deterministic stationary policies and we suppose that the choice of a policy determines the fitness of the player and it impacts the evolution of the state.
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Brunetti, I., Hayel, Y., Altman, E. (2019). Coupled State Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games. In: Altman, E., Avrachenkov, K., De Pellegrini, F., El-Azouzi, R., Wang, H. (eds) Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_5
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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Online ISBN: 978-3-030-24455-2
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