Abstract
In this chapter, I apply the conceptual apparatus introduced in previous chapters to study the (re)construction of North Korea’s deviant image in global nuclear politics during the second nuclear crisis in the North Korean Peninsula (2002–2018). I use this framework to analytically unpack the North Korean case in five sections, which correspond to five distinct dimensions of stigma politics: (1) stigma nexus, (2) stigma imposition, (3) stigma management, (4) stigma reversal, and (5) stigma power. In turn, I discuss the implications of these processes for the dynamics of the normative structure of the nonproliferation game.
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Notes
- 1.
See the Appendix for the chronological account of the North Korean case from 1985 until 2018.
- 2.
Scholars and experts frequently call the events following the 2002 revelations the “second nuclear crisis” on the Korean Peninsula. For more detailed empirical accounts of the first and the second nuclear crisis, see, for example, Sigal (1998), Pollack (2003), Ness (2003), Bleiker (2003), Liu (2003), Lee and Moon (2003), Samore (2003), Kang (2003), Park (2004), Wit et al. (2004), Dukmin (2005), Rozman (2007), Pritchard (2007), Chinoy (2010), Pollack (2011), Rozman (2011), Grzelczyk (2012), Choi (2015), Kwak (2016), or Grzelczyk (2019).
- 3.
Those six parties in the Six-Party Talks include the United States, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea (for literature on Six-Party talks, see, for example, Park 2005; Kwak 2008; Grzelczyk 2009; Buszynski 2013; Ness 2005; Moon 2005; Choo 2005; Shulong and Xinzhu 2008).
- 4.
North Korea did participate in the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. However, Pyongyang withdrew from the conference proceedings after a mere week of debates, noting the “biased” approach of the conference toward itself as the reason for withdrawal. See Rauf and Johnson (1995, p. 40).
- 5.
On the shift of economic ties toward these states in response to the imposition of the UNSC sanctions, see Haggard and Noland (2009, p. 3).
- 6.
Whereas it is clear today that North Korea indeed took steps to the uranium enrichment capability under the Agreed Framework, the state of North Korea’s uranium program in 2002 and the nature of North Korean admittance in October 2002 (which Pyongyang subsequently denied) have been subject to controversy in the literature (cf. Mukhopadhayay and Wolfstahl 2003; Kerr 2003; Kahn and Chira 2003; Hecker 2004; Harrison 2005; Gusterson 2008; Zhang 2009a; Hecker 2010b).
- 7.
Under the Agreed Framework, KEDO was responsible for building of two light-water reactors in North Korea. See Wit (1999).
- 8.
Notably, even Asian US allies like South Korea sometimes argued against counterproductivity of labeling, suggesting that “what we don’t need are statements like ‘he’s the bad guy’ or these categorizations of the regime. What we need is an answer aimed at the problem and not a giving into anger” (ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min Soon, cited in Faiola and Sakamaki 2005).
- 9.
Some states and institutions also used the instrument of bilateral sanctions toward North Korea, including the United States (e.g., The White House 2008, 2011), Japan (The Japan Times 2015), or the EU (Council of the EU 2017). For the analysis of proliferation-related sanction against North Korea, see Haggard and Noland (2009).
- 10.
The detailed report explaining and justifying North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT is available at KCNA (2003a).
- 11.
North Korea has been primarily referring to the conclusions of the US Nuclear Posture Reviews in 2001 (under Bush administration) and 2010 (under Obama administration). Both documents acknowledged the possibility of nuclear first-use against North Korea (DoD 2002, p. 16; DoD 2010, pp. 3, 15–16).
- 12.
China expressed its sympathies for the PSI’s “nonproliferation objective” but also noted its concern that some of PSI’s activities might be “outside the domain of international law” (China’s Foreign Ministry, cited in Glaser 2009, p. 3).
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Smetana, M. (2020). North Korea and the Crossing of Nuclear Rubicon. In: Nuclear Deviance. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24225-1_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24225-1_6
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