Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

The UN Security Council and International Criminal Tribunals: Procedure Matters pp 65–83Cite as

The Argument: Three Procedural Steps

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 197 Accesses

Part of the book series: Studies in Global Justice ((JUST,volume 20))

Abstract

To understand why the UNSC has created only a few atrocities investigations, this Chapter focuses on the role of the UNSC procedure in decision-making. A decision by the UNSC is a committee process, which can only be concluded if the UNSC members overcome significant uncertainty and apprehension over each other’s preferences, and coordinate or cooperate towards a common outcome. The UNSC members are able to overcome these difficulties through the UNSC procedural rules, which allow the UNSC members to coordinate and cooperate, and thereby create an atrocities investigation. This Chapter explains how the UNSC’s procedure contributes to the creation of atrocities investigations, specifies the boundaries of this argument and presents the research design for the following chapters.

The representative of the USSR agreed that the part of the resolution relating to the maintenance on the Council’s agenda of the Spanish question was procedural, but other parts of the resolution were matters of substance. If the resolution was voted upon as a whole, then he would vote against its adoption.

He added that if there was any objection to his interpretation of the case, he would ask the Council to decide whether the resolution was of a procedural or substantive character.

The Spanish Question, Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly covering the period from 17 January to 15 July 1946.

(A/93, Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1 (October 3, 1946))

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    One exception to this statement is Libya, where the investigation came after Resolution 1970. For more on this, see Chap. 6.

  2. 2.

    Mallard (2014); Mavroidis and Wolfe (2015).

  3. 3.

    Johnstone (2008); Alvarez (1996); Malone (1998).

  4. 4.

    Haas (1992).

  5. 5.

    Haas (1992); Adler and Haas (1992).

  6. 6.

    See. e.g. Statement by Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. on Law Enforcement Action Against Distributors of Synthetic Cannabinoids (September 16, 2015), available at http://manhattanda.org/press-release/statement-manhattan-district-attorney-cyrus-r-vance-jr-law enforcement-action-against; see also Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, following the transfer of the first suspect in the Mali investigation: “Intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes” (September 26, 2015), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-26-09-2015.aspx.

  7. 7.

    The New York District Attorney’s Office, Criminal Justice System: How it Works, available at http://manhattanda.org/criminal-justice-system-how-it-works?s=39.

  8. 8.

    Reynolds (2013).

  9. 9.

    See e.g., ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Chap. 6.

  10. 10.

    Courtney and Kaoutzanis (2014).

  11. 11.

    E.g. the Condorcet method (Marquis de Condorcet 1785) or the Borda count (de Borda 1781).

  12. 12.

    Shepsle and Weingast (1981).

  13. 13.

    Shepsle and Weingast (1987).

  14. 14.

    Sinclair (1986).

  15. 15.

    Hammond (1986).

  16. 16.

    Plott and Levine (1978).

  17. 17.

    McKelvey (1981).

  18. 18.

    See Annan (2012, p. 135); Urquhart (1987, p. 208); Bosco (2009, p. 180); Chesterman et al. (2008, p. 132); Interviews: 6, 15, 16, 18.

  19. 19.

    For a detailed analysis of how even the UN Secretary General acts as a diplomat on behalf of the UN system, see Frohlich and Williams (2018).

  20. 20.

    See Châtaignier (2005 p. 15).

  21. 21.

    Interviews: 2, 10, 19.

  22. 22.

    E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“8. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a supplement to financing as an expense of the Organization, a trust fund to receive voluntary contributions to finance the commission of inquiry;”).

  23. 23.

    E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“3. Calls upon States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession relating to acts covered in paragraph 1 (a) above, to make such information available as soon as possible and to provide appropriate assistance to the commission of inquiry; … 5. Calls upon the Burundi authorities and institutions, including all Burundi political parties, to fully cooperate with the international commission of inquiry in the accomplishment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the commission for security, assistance and access in pursuing investigations, including…”).

  24. 24.

    In Burundi, for example, the commission collected evidence from a broad variety of sources, see S/1996/682 (e.g. pp. 39–43).

  25. 25.

    International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005, p. 133).

  26. 26.

    The commission’s mandate comes from UNSC Resolution 1564 (2004) (“12. Requests that the Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, calls on all parties to cooperate fully with such a commission, and further requests the Secretary-General, in conjunction with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights monitors deployed to Darfur;”).

  27. 27.

    Bendor and Moe (1986); Barkow (2010).

  28. 28.

    E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“2. Recommends that the international commission of inquiry be composed of five impartial and internationally respected, experienced jurists who shall be selected by the Secretary-General and shall be furnished with adequate expert staff, and that the Government of Burundi be duly informed;”).

  29. 29.

    See e.g. Lupu and Fowler (2013); Pelc (2014); Spriggs and Hansford (2002).

  30. 30.

    Reydams (2005) (“Most striking, however, is the different temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The ICTY, established in February 1993, has jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The jurisdiction of the ICTR, on the other hand, is limited to the period 1 January 1994–31 December 1994—an artificial and politically convenient time-frame.”).

  31. 31.

    See e.g. Knight and Epstein (1996).

  32. 32.

    See e.g. Pelc (2014).

  33. 33.

    Johnstone (2003).

  34. 34.

    Segal and Spaeth (1996a, b).

  35. 35.

    Pelc (2014).

References

Interviews

  • Interview No. 2; Interview Details: Member of UN Office of Legal Affairs, on Skype (June 24, 2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 6; Interview Details: Member of UN Office of Legal Affairs, New York (August 6, 2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 10; Interview Details: Diplomat from France, New York (October 7, 2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 15; Interview Details: Member of UN Office of Legal Affairs, New York (December 6, 2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 16; Interview Details: Member of UN Office of Legal Affairs, New York (December 6, 2013).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 18; Interview Details: Diplomat from United Kingdom, London (January 7, 2014).

    Google Scholar 

  • Interview No. 19; Interview Details: Diplomat from Greece, on Skype (January 19, 2014).

    Google Scholar 

Books and Articles

  • Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organization 46 (01): 367–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alvarez, Jose E. 1996. Judging the Security Council. American Journal of International Law 90 (1): 1–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Annan, Kofi. 2012. A Life in War and Peace. Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barkow, Rachel E. 2010. Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design. Texas Law Review 89: 15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bendor, Jonathan, and Terry M. Moe. 1986. Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics. American Political Science Review 80 (4): 1187–1207.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chesterman, Simon, Thomas M. Franck, and David M. Malone. 2008. Law and the Practice of the United Nations. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bosco, David. 2009. Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Châtaignier, Jean-Marc. 2005. L’ONU dans la crise en Sierra Leone (Éditions KARTHALA).

    Google Scholar 

  • Courtney, Jocelyn, and Christodoulos Kaoutzanis. 2014. Proactive Gatekeepers: The Jurisprudence of the ICC’s Pre-trial Chambers. Chicago Journal of International Law 15: 518.

    Google Scholar 

  • de Borda, Jean-Charles. 1781. Mémoire sur les Élections au Scrutin. Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frohlich, Manuel, and Abiodun Williams. 2018. The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46 (1): 1–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hammond, Thomas H. 1986. Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics. American Journal of Political Science 30: 379–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnstone, Ian. 2003. Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument. European Journal of International Law 14 (3): 437–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2008. Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit. American Journal of International Law 102: 275–308.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knight, Jack, and Lee Epstein. 1996. The Norm of Stare Decisis. American Journal of Political Science 40: 1018–1035.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lupu, Yonatan, and James H. Fowler. 2013. Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. The Journal of Legal Studies 42 (1): 151–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mallard, Graham. 2014. Static Common Agency and Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys 28 (1): 17–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malone, David. 1998. Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, the Case of Haiti, 1990–1997. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marquis de Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat. 1785. Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix.

  • Mavroidis, Petros C., and Robert Wolfe. 2015. From Sunshine to a Common Agent. The Evolving Understanding of Transparency in the WTO. The Evolving Understanding of Transparency in the WTO (February 2015). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, R.D. 1981. A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design. Management Science 27 (3): 303.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2014. The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application. American Political Science Review 108 (3): 547.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Plott, Charles R., and Michael E. Levine. 1978. A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions. The American Economic Review 68 (1): 146–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reydams, Luc. 2005. The ICTR Ten Years on Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm? Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (4): 977–988.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. 2013. Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime. Columbia Law Review Sidebar 113: 102–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 1996a. The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices. American Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 971–1003.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1996b. Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response. American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1064.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice. Public Choice 37 (3): 503–519.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1987. The institutional foundations of committee power. American Political Science Review 81 (01): 85–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair, Barbara. 1986. The Role of Committees in Agenda Setting in the U. S. Congress. Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (1): 35–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spriggs, James F., and Thomas G. Hansford. 2002. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Incorporation and Interpretation of Precedent. Law and Society Review 36: 139–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Urquhart, Brian. 1987. A Life in Peace and War. New York: Harper & Row.

    Google Scholar 

Court Documents

    International Criminal Court

    Government Documents

    UN Documents

      Reports

      • A/93, Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1 (October 3, 1946).

        Google Scholar 

      Letters

      • S/1996/682, Letter dated 25 July 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (August 22, 1996).

        Google Scholar 

      Resolutions

      Download references

      Author information

      Authors and Affiliations

      1. Stamford, CT, USA

        Christodoulos Kaoutzanis

      Authors
      1. Christodoulos Kaoutzanis
        View author publications

        You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

      Rights and permissions

      Reprints and permissions

      Copyright information

      © 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

      About this chapter

      Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

      Cite this chapter

      Kaoutzanis, C. (2020). The Argument: Three Procedural Steps. In: The UN Security Council and International Criminal Tribunals: Procedure Matters . Studies in Global Justice, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23777-6_4

      Download citation

      Publish with us

      Policies and ethics

      Search

      Navigation