Abstract
In this chapter, I take a final look at Rasmussen’s Geometry Argument, and a second look at his principle of non-arbitrary limits. Although I raise some doubts about both, I conclude that both are compatible with naturalism, thus indicating further potential agreement. I then end the chapter with a sketch of an account of the varieties of naturalism. The moral of that section is that naturalism is right at home in ontologies that include things in the metaphysical foundation beyond the narrowly physical, such as phenomenal states, objective moral values, abstract objects, and final causes. This sets the stage for the final two sections of the book, which aim to discern the finer-grained nature of foundational reality by considering a wider range of data.
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Notes
- 1.
For a non-fanciful, scientifically informed argument that foundational material reality has tightly circumscribed, non-arbitrary, metaphysically necessary constraints, see McKenzie (2017).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
See, e.g., Howard-Snyder (2016) for a powerful argument that Swinburne’s trinitarianism is heretical, and indeed a version of polytheism, and thereby fundamentally incompatible with Christianity.
- 5.
Perhaps the most famous past Liberal naturalist was Spinoza, but more recent Liberal Naturalists include Torin Alter (2016), David Chalmers (1996), Philip Goff (2017), Yujin Nagasawa (cf. Nagasawa and Wager (2017)), Derk Pereboom (2011), Bertrand Russell (1927), Galen Strawson (2006, 2008), and Daniel Stoljar (2001, 2006). For a recent collection of papers defending liberal naturalism, see, e.g., Alter and Nagasawa (2015).
- 6.
An alternative version of CLN: The one kind of substance is neither physical nor mental, but the physical and mental are composed of it.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Cf. Chalmers (1996).
- 11.
For a recent argument in this vicinity, see, e.g., Moreland (2008).
- 12.
Op. cit.
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Leon, F. (2019). Varieties of Naturalism. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_7
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