Abstract
Rasmussen seeks to build upon the planks of the conversation in two ways. First, before interacting with Leon’s points, Rasmussen develops a new, Geometric Argument, against a purely material foundation. Rasmussen’s second task involves a more direct interaction with Leon’s latest points. Here, Rasmussen seeks to show why Leon’s observations can illuminate Rasmussen’s arguments for a necessary foundation, after we make some distinctions and clarifications. A key idea here is that Leon’s primary points—about modal caution and his principle of material causation—illuminate a path within the arguments for a necessary foundation. And, perhaps most significantly, we converge upon a vision of a foundation that is at least factually necessary.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
If you are Williamson and think all is necessary, then I invite you to translate my talk of “necessary” into talk of “necessarily concrete.” In Williamson’s theory, an original Big Bang event would mark a beginning of the concretization of physical stuff.
- 2.
- 3.
For example, Smith (2001) argues that the ultimate cause could be a timeless point.
- 4.
If we define “physical” as whatever is material or dependent on the material, then the Geometric Argument also targets the broader thesis that the foundation is fully physical (in that sense).
- 5.
See, for example, Hooft (2000).
- 6.
Here is one way in which fields themselves may transcend a purely materialistic description. Our physical descriptions (via mathematical models) may be about the effects of a deeper layer. Even if “fields” are the fundamental layer, that still leaves open a question about the ultimate nature of fields themselves. That nature may not be material (in the ordinary sense). As far as science has revealed, a foundation of fields could transcend the material world while also being visible in its effects throughout the world.
- 7.
A complexity arises if presentism is true. On presentism, “Geometry” never obtains simpliciter because it includes geometries that are not presently instantiated. To iron out the definition of “Geometry” for presentists, let “these shapes at these locations at these times” pick out past-tense “geometric” properties of presently existing objects. So, for example, present things have the past-tense property of being preceded by a geometrical state g at time t.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
The parallel postulate is a special case, given its history of controversy. In my judgment, that controversy is over application, not truth. More specifically, the controversy has been over whether space is curved, not over whether parallel lines in non-curved space would ever meet.
- 11.
There is the famous Humean objection that the whole is automatically explained if each part is sufficiently explained (Hume 1779, 58–59). But in the context of explaining geometric states, Hume’s proposal only works in cases where the total explanation is in terms of geometric states that are not already included in the geometric state to be explained. Otherwise, you have circularity.
- 12.
The geometry book example is from Leibniz in “On the Ultimate Origin of Things.”
- 13.
I have been assuming that non-spatial things can exist in time. If that is not possible, then the conclusion of the argument is all the more intriguing: It implies that at least one concrete thing is either trans-spatial or non-temporal.
- 14.
We can state this result in terms of different theories of time. In static theories (e.g., eternalism), a foundation that exists at all worlds and all times explains why there continue to be things at all times in our world. On dynamic theories (e.g., presentism), a foundation that necessarily exists simpliciter explains why there continue to be things simpliciter.
- 15.
Building on Leon’s points about a classic Trinitarian conception of God, a Trinitarian could theorize that necessary elements within God depend ultimately on God as a whole, which alone instantiates axiological perfection. The point here is that axiological perfection intuitively precludes dependence.
Another option is that we work with a stronger notion of dependence, where x depends on y only if y can exist without x. In that case, we still have an argument from uniformity for the dependence of all contingent things, while no necessary things could be dependent in that same sense.
- 16.
Thanks to Cameron Bertuzzi and Evan Fales for helpful notes on a previous draft.
References
Craig, W. L. 1991. “The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe.” Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3: 85–96.
———. 1993. “Graham Oppy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Sophia 32: 1–11.
Hooft, Gerard’t. 2000. In Search of the Ultimate Building Blocks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hume, David. 1779. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cambridge University Press.
Morriston, Wesley. 1999. “Must the Past Have a Beginning?” Philo 2: 5–19.
———. 2003. “Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?” Faith and Philosophy 20: 288–306.
Oppy, Graham. 1991. “Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Religious Studies 27: 189–197.
———. 2006. Perspectives on Infinity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2009. “Cosmological Arguments.” Nous 43: 31–48.
———. 2013. “Ultimate Naturalistic Causal Explanations.” In The Puzzle of Existence, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt. New York and London: Routledge.
Rasmussen, Joshua. 2013. “Continuity as a Guide to Possibility.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 214: 525–538.
———. 2017. “Extending Modal Knowledge.” In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, edited by R. Fischer and F. Leon. Dordrecht: Synthese Library.
Smith, Quentin. 2001. “An Atheist Explanation of Spacetime.” In God and Time, edited by G. Gegansall and D. Woodruff. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wahlberg, Mats. 2017. “A Cosmological Argument Against Physicalism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9: 165–188.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rasmussen, J. (2019). The Geometric Argument . In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-23751-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-23752-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)