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Modal Skepticism and Material Causation

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Is God the Best Explanation of Things?

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Abstract

This chapter aims to further shed light on our search for a foundational reality by raising three concerns for Rasmussen’s case for a metaphysically necessary foundation. First, there are worries that our knowledge of what is possible is limited to “ordinary” or “nearby” possibilities. Second, even if there are sufficient grounds for inferring a necessary foundation, it’s epistemically possible that the foundation is factually necessary, and not metaphysically necessary. Finally, the grounds for thinking things need a material cause calls into question the inference to a caused beginning of the universe. The aim is to shed further light on the nature of the foundation. In particular, I seek to build upon Rasmussen’s insights regarding a necessary foundation by offering tools to discern the type of necessity had by the foundation, and whether the foundation is at least partly material.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kripke (1980).

  2. 2.

    Seddon (1972), Van Inwagen (1977, 1979, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2008), and Fischer and Leon (2016a).

  3. 3.

    This example is from Seddon (1972). For a host of other examples that make the same point, see Van Inwagen (1977, 1979, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2008).

  4. 4.

    Here I am employing the common notion of a defeater in epistemology, as well as the related standard distinction between a rebutting defeater and an undercutting defeater . According to this distinction, and very roughly, a rebutting defeater is a reason or ground for thinking that a belief is false, and an undercutting defeater is reason or ground that deflates or removes the basis for thinking that a belief is true. So, for example, suppose I believe on the basis of a visiting person’s testimony that there is a package on my doorstep. Then if I open the door and look to find that there is no such package on my doorstep, then this constitutes a rebutting defeater for my original belief. By contrast, if instead I come to learn that the person whose testimony I’m here trusting tells everyone they visit that they have a package on their doorstep (whether there is one there or not), then this fact constitutes an undercutting defeater for my original belief.

  5. 5.

    For a fuller exposition and defense of this point, see Fischer and Leon (2016a).

  6. 6.

    This criticism is raised by, e.g., van Cleve (1983) and Yablo (1993).

  7. 7.

    Plantinga (1974).

  8. 8.

    Van Inwagen (2002).

  9. 9.

    Williamson (2007) and Nichols (2006).

  10. 10.

    For a representative sampling, see Fischer and Leon (2016b).

  11. 11.

    Leon (2009, 2016), Hawke (2011), and Roca-Royes (2016).

  12. 12.

    Hanrahan (2007), Biggs (2011), and Fischer (2015, 2016, 2017).

  13. 13.

    Leon (2009, 2016).

  14. 14.

    So, for example, one might continue the Subtraction Argument and subtract God from the universe after one subtracts the last physical particle, thereby erasing in thought all concrete objects from the world.

  15. 15.

    See, for example, Swinburne (1994).

  16. 16.

    On the account of God as factually necessary, see, for example, Hick (1961), Rowe (1998), and Swinburne (1994).

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  1. El Camino College, Torrance, CA, USA

    Felipe Leon

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Leon, F. (2019). Modal Skepticism and Material Causation. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_3

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