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Pricing a Digital Services Marketplace Under Asymmetric Information

  • Pavel IzhutovEmail author
  • Haim Mendelson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11512)

Abstract

This paper addresses the pricing problem of a digital services marketplace under asymmetric information. An example is an online learning platform such as Coursera that provides courses from service providers (in this case, universities) to learners. We focus on the matching of digital services to the consumers of these services using partially-observable consumer and service attributes. We develop the optimal pricing policies of the marketplace and show that when the distributions of unobservable valuations are exponential, the marketplace sets a single matching fee (avoiding price-discrimination across providers) which is levied on the less price-sensitive side of the marketplace.

Keywords

Online marketplaces Digital services Pricing Search 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Axio Inc, Altos PlatformSan Francisco and Los Altos HillsUSA
  2. 2.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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