Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Legislators and Judges

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Art of Legislating

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 6))

  • 315 Accesses

Abstract

The great attention devoted to the theory of judicial argumentation contrasts with the scant interest that the theory of legislation awakes. It is a sign of the times that reveals the growing protagonism of the judiciary. But once a theory of legal interpretation is disassociated from the theory of legislation, it somehow loses its foundation and even runs the risk of drowning in arbitrariness. Because any theory of interpretation of the law that intends to be seriously prescriptive in a modern Rechtsstaat, must be explicitly based on a theory of democracy; it must be firmly anchored in a clear and accepted definition of the functions of legislators and judges, in other words, of the relations between parliaments and courts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a history of the republican tradition, see Pocock (1975).

  2. 2.

    This does not mean that all literalism has the purpose of limiting democracy. Proof of this is found in the work of Francisco Laporta (2008) which contains a rigorous defence of literalism and formalism precisely in order to make the regulative ideal viz. regulative Idee of the rule of law a reality.

  3. 3.

    Cf. recently Nourse (2016) or Rosen (2017).

  4. 4.

    For recent approaches to legislative intent, see e.g. Ekins (2012) or Frieling (2017).

  5. 5.

    See Aulis Aarnio (1991, pp. 123 ff) about the value of parliamentary works as a source. In this connection, the Spanish Supreme Court’s Judgment of 1 December 1992 (third Chamber), when dealing with a judge’s request of compensation for the advancing of the retirement age introduced by an ordinary law, stated (Ground 8): “the Act on Public Administrations and Common Administrative Procedure (…), while not yet in force, is orientative of the legislator’s will to regulate this matter for the first time; and this Act does limit compensation to individuals for the application of non-expropriatory legislative interventions in three aspects: 1) that they should not have the legal duty to bear [the consequences of the legal intervention]; 2) that this compensation be established in the statute itself; and 3) that the compensation will be granted in the terms specified by the statute”. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concludes that there is no place for the compensation requested. For its part, the Madrid Appelate Court’s (Audiencia Provincial) Judgment of 10 May 1992 reads as follows: “Article 2.3 of the Organic Law 8/1984 of 26 December 1984 [regulating the system of appeals available to conscientious objectors to military service] clearly condemns ‘anyone who refuses to comply with the substitutive social service’ and both in letter and in spirit is subordinating the moral duty or duty of conscience to compliance with that legal obligation. From the preparatory works of this Act, parliamentary debates and other precedents, it can only be concluded that the legislator took into account and discussed all the questions raised about the possibility pointed out by some parliamentary sectors of establishing a professional and voluntary army”.

  6. 6.

    See e.g. the Constitutional Court’s Judgment of 30 January 1981 (STC 2/1981): the principle non bis in idem, while not expressly included in Art. 9.3 of the Constitution, has actually constitutional rank, because “it was understood by the parliamentarians in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and Public Freedoms of the Congress od Deputies (…) to be intimately linked to the principles of legality and typicity of infractions which are enshrined mainly in Art. 25 of the Constitution”.

  7. 7.

    See e.g. Easterbrook (1988). In a similar sense, Laporta (2008, pp. 175 and 216).

  8. 8.

    In the “Note on the Rudiments of Statutory Interpretation” at the end of The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks (1958, p. 1374) insist on the attitude with which a judge must fulfil his task: respect for the position of Parliament as the main agency of political direction of society subject only to constitutional limitations, respect for the procedures followed in the approval of the law, deference to the interpretation that the agencies have made in good faith and with common sense, awareness of the nature of language as well as the fact that every law is part of the legal system.

  9. 9.

    Cf. also Gluck and Schultz Bressman (2013, 2014).

References

  • Aarnio A (1991) Lo racional como razonable. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid

    Google Scholar 

  • Abrahamson S, Hughes RL (1991) Shall we dance? Steps for legislators and judges in statutory interpretation. Minn Law Rev 75:1045–1093

    Google Scholar 

  • Aleinikoff T (1988) Updating statutory interpretation. Mich Law Rev 87(1):20–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barcellona P (1976) El Estado y los juristas. Fontanella, Barcelona

    Google Scholar 

  • Breyer S (1991/1992) On the uses of legislative history in interpreting statutes. S Cal Law Rev 65:845–874

    Google Scholar 

  • Brisbin R (1997) Justice Antonin Scalia and the conservative revival. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Calabresi G (1982) A common law for the age of statutes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin R (1986) Law’s empire. Fontana Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook FH (1983a) Statutes’ domains. Univ Chic Law Rev 50(2):533–552

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook FH (1983b) The court and the economic system. Harv Law Rev 98(1):4–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook FH (1984) Legal interpretation and the power of the judiciary. Harv J Law Policy 7:87–99

    Google Scholar 

  • Easterbrook FH (1988) The role of original intent in statutory construction. Harv J Law Policy 11:59–66

    Google Scholar 

  • Ekins R (2012) The nature of legislative intent. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge WN Jr (1987) Dynamic statutory interpretation. Univ Pa Law Rev 135:1479–1555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge WN Jr (1989) Public values in statutory interpretation. Univ Pa Law Rev 137:1007–1104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge WN Jr (1991) Overriding the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation decisions. Yale Law J 101:335–423

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eskridge WN Jr, Frickey P (1987) Legislation scholarship and pedagogy in the post-legal process. Univ Pitt Law Rev 48:691–731

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferrajoli L (1973) Magistratura democratica e l’esercizio alternativo de la funziolne giudiziaria. In: L’Uso alternativo del diritto. Laterza, Roma-Bari

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck MJ (1996) Against the imperial judiciary: the Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignity of the People. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank J (1949) Courts on trial. Myth and reality in American justice. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Frieling T (2017) Gesetzesmaterialien und Wille des Gesetzgebers. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Geny F (2000) Método de interpretación y Fuentes del derecho Privado Positivo [1899]. Granada, Comares

    Google Scholar 

  • Gluck AR, Schultz Bressman L (2013) Statutory interpretation from the inside—an empirical study of congressional drafting, delegation, and the canons: part I. Stan Law Rev 65(5):901–1026

    Google Scholar 

  • Gluck AR, Schultz Bressman L (2014) Statutory interpretation from the inside—an empirical study of congressional drafting, delegation, and the canons: part II. Stan Law Rev 66(4):725–802

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart HLA (1968) El concepto de derecho. Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires. [The concept of law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961]

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart HM, Sacks AM (1958) The legal process: basic problems in the making and application of law. Tentative ed, Cambridge (MA) [Foundation Press, Westbury, 1994]

    Google Scholar 

  • Kantorowicz H (1949) La lucha por la Ciencia del Derecho [1906]. Losada, Buenos Aires

    Google Scholar 

  • Katzmann RS (ed) (1988) Judges and legislators: towards institucional comity. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Katzmann RS (1992) Bridging the Statutory Gulf between Courts and Congress: a challenge for positive political theory. Geo Law Rev 80:656–670

    Google Scholar 

  • Laporta F (2008) El imperio de la ley. Una visión actual. Trotta, Madrid

    Google Scholar 

  • López Calera N et al (1978) Sobre el uso alternativo del Derecho. F. Torres, Valencia

    Google Scholar 

  • Macey JR (1986) Promoting public-regarding legislation through statutory interpretation: an interest group theory. Colum Law Rev 86(2):223–268

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mikva A (1987) Reading and writing statutes. Univ Pitt Law Rev 48:627–637

    Google Scholar 

  • Minow M (1990) Making all the difference: inclusion, exclusion and American law. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Nourse V (2016) Misreading law, misreading democracy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pocock JGA (1975) The Machiavellian moment: florentine political thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton University Press, Princeton. [El momento maquiavélico. Tecnos, Madrid, 2002]

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner R (1983) Statutory interpretation in the classroom and in the courtroom. Univ Chic Law Rev 50:800–822

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen A (2017) Statutory interpretation and the many virtues of legislation. Oxf J Leg Stud 37(1):134–162

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin EL (1991) Beyond public choice: comprehensive rationality in the writing and reading of statutes. N Y Univ Law Rev 66:1–65

    Google Scholar 

  • Scalia A (1997) A matter of interpretation: federal courts and the law. Princenton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Schachter JS (1995) Metademocracy: the changing structure of legitimacy in statutory interpretation. Harv Law Rev 108:595–663

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherry S (1986) Civic virtue and the femenine voice in constitutional adjudication. Vand Law Rev 72:543–616

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein CR (1989) Interpreting statutes in the regulatory state. Harv Law Rev 103:408–505

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein CR (1990) After the rights revolution. Reconceiving the regulatory state. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Twining W, Miers D (1991) How to do things with rules, 3rd edn. Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldron J (1999) The dignity of legislation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Yale Law Journal (1988) The Republican Civic Tradition (symposium). Yale Law J 97:1493–1851

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Alcalá de Henares, Alcalá de Henares, Spain

    Virgilio Zapatero Gómez

Authors
  1. Virgilio Zapatero Gómez
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Zapatero Gómez, V. (2019). Legislators and Judges. In: The Art of Legislating. Legisprudence Library, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23388-4_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23388-4_13

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-23387-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-23388-4

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation