Abstract
In the modern world, competition policy is an important part of global governance. Coordination of efforts between different countries is not an easy task, because the distribution of gains and losses from anticompetitive conducts is uneven across the globe. We identify joint interests of BRICS to influence international competition policy regime and analyse the effects of domestic enforcement on global markets. Among the targets of competition enforcement with large effects on global markets are conducts of international property rights holders. BRICS authorities apply remedies in order to weaken intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, both under merger approval and infringement decisions on unilateral conducts.
Similarity of the rules on merger control in BRICS gives reason to believe that global governance in the form of a supranational advisory body with the right of legislative initiative is possible in this area. On the other hand, a review of existing legislation and the institutional structure of BRICS enforcement indicates that enforcement against anticompetitive conducts is unlikely to become the focus of coordinated action.
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- 1.
Generally, sanctions for illegal conduct per se are imposed without analysis of the impact on welfare in each particular case. With effect-based rule, sanctions are imposed if convincing evidence is presented that the practice in question is harmful.
- 2.
Further explanation is based on Ting-Fang and Wu (2016).
- 3.
Liberty Link is a brand of genes for use in agriculture that provides tolerance to Liberty herbicide and glufosinate, developed by Bayer CropScience. Bayer’s Liberty brands and traits compete with Monsanto’s Roundup and Roundup Ready seeds. In this context, the remedy to sell Liberty Link to BASF restores competition in the market. We can see that, in addition, the remedy imposes conditions on new market participant as they obtain market power.
- 4.
This obligation duplicates those imposed by the European Commission.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge gratefully that this chapter was supported by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). The authors express their gratitude to HSE Professor Leonid Grigoryev and other participants of the 4th and 5th International Conferences on Global Governance hosted by the HSE Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs.
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Avdasheva, S., Golovanova, S., Shastitko, A. (2020). The Contribution of BRICS to the International Competition Policy Regime. In: Grigoryev, L., Pabst, A. (eds) Global Governance in Transformation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23092-0_15
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