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Conclusions: Perverse Social Capital as a Cause of High Violence in the Barrios of Caracas

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Violence in the Barrios of Caracas

Part of the book series: The Latin American Studies Book Series ((LASBS))

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Abstract

Venezuela’s politico-economic macrostructure puzzled the explanation of violence—measured through annual homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants—in the barrios of Caracas because this outcome behaved pro-cyclically from the early 2000s until 2011. Urban violence rates behaved pro-cyclically during this time because homicide rates rose or remained extremely high, while socioeconomic indicators improved. High urban violence rates under improving socioeconomic conditions created a theoretical puzzle for the structural analysis of violence rates in the barrios of Caracas, as its behavior countered the mechanism established by the relevant literature (Cook and Zarkin 1985; Florence and Barnett 2013, 307–309; Rosenfeld et al. 2013, 2–3; Zubillaga 2013, 108–109). To explain this puzzle, the theoretical model proposed by this book followed Heidrun Zinecker’s distinction between the macrostructures making cases like the barrios of Caracas susceptible to high urban violence and the substructures leading to actual high urban violence rates (Zinecker 2014, 42–43). Therefore, this book abductively analyzed the moderating role of social capital between the politico-economic predictor variable of institutional-anomie created by rent-cum-marginality and the outcome of urban violence (see Chaps. 1 and 2). The main conclusion of this book is that a perverse composition of social capital—due to high social network density in all studied barrios and low collective efficacy in the high violence barrios—explained high urban violence rates while socioeconomic indicators behaved pro-cyclically .

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lynchings, and the organization of lynch mobs in Venezuela grew significantly after 2015 and especially during 2016 (Observatorio Venezonalo de Violencia, “Linchamientos en Venezuela aumentan 650% en 2016,” http://observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/linchamientos-en-venezuela-aumentan-650-en-2016/). Lynchings affect primarily marginalized urban spaces , as people use perverse social capital as a scape valve to the presence of high crime. I reach this observation from talking with interviewed partners that witnessed lynch mobs (1.04 19 April 2016), and after witnessing a lynching myself during fieldwork on May 4, 2016. Lynched alleged criminals not always die; severe battery is common though. However, lynched people are almost exclusively petty thieves, which commit crimes without the possession of a firearm. Hence, lynchings are an escape valve of popular frustration, and not an example of collective efficacy against violent agents.

  2. 2.

    In English: “You are asking me if there are thugs [in the barrio]?! Of course, there are thugs my friend! There are plenty of thugs to go around!… But one grows up, and one gets to know them…they become thugs and one knows them…[violence] is not organized…nobody comes in [from outside] to steal, nobody comes in to make trouble there, because they [the thugs of her barrio] are there; If somebody comes in from other parts of the barrio , they [the thugs] come out too, they come out to defend the barrio . They shoot at each other, [because] they come in to make trouble”. By the term “echar broma,” or making trouble, the interview partner meant to commit some form of violent crime such as armed robbery or killing a rival gang member to gain more control over territory.

  3. 3.

    Investments in high quality and inclusive education, especially primary and secondary, can foster heterogeneous social networks (Fukuyama 2001, 17–18). This strengthens productive social capital , as it lowers transaction of urban communities to pull local and extra-local resources together. Moreover, educational organizations are a good field to implement social mixing policies, especially targeting young males (Imbusch 2010, 22–24, 31–35; Auyero and Kilanski 2015, 189–191). Such policy can disrupt the presence and development of street gangs (Patacchini and Zenou 2009, 23).

  4. 4.

    I did not include political polarization in the comparative analysis of social capital in the barrios of Caracas, as this factor became a significant element of Venezuela’s institutional context during the 2000s; when Hugo Chavez was in power (Corrales 2014, 397–398). However , Violence rates in Caracas rose and stabilized during the 1990s (see Fig. 1.1). Hence, political polarization was probably not a major element affecting social capital in the studied barrios . However, only further analysis can confirm or reject that hypothesis.

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  1. Global Studies, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Saxony, Germany

    Daniel S. Leon

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Leon, D.S. (2020). Conclusions: Perverse Social Capital as a Cause of High Violence in the Barrios of Caracas. In: Violence in the Barrios of Caracas. The Latin American Studies Book Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22940-5_6

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