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Passing-on in Cartel Damages Action: An Agent-Based Model

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Abstract

When there are infringements causing a price increase, such as cartels, one of the effects on direct purchaser’s profit is the so-called passing-on effect. Passing-on rate is the proportion of the illegal price increase that cartel direct purchasers, in turn, translate into an increase in their own final price. In this chapter, we develop an agent-based model of a supply chain, where agents are firms who lay on different levels of the chain and are engaged in trading.

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Correspondence to Claudia Nardone .

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Nardone, C., Cecconi, F. (2019). Passing-on in Cartel Damages Action: An Agent-Based Model. In: Cecconi, F., Campennì, M. (eds) Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Economic Modeling. Computational Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22605-3_5

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