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Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Economic Modeling pp 27–54Cite as

Real Worlds: Simulating Non-standard Rationality in Microeconomics

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Abstract

In this chapter, the differences between the standard notion of rationality, used in neoclassical economic model, and the notion of “non-standard” rationality are highlighted. The notion of non-standard rationality has been used in an attempt to address the discrepancies found between the ideal cognitive attitudes of the homo economicus and limited rational abilities of real decision-makers. By contrast, this notion is not supported by any adequate nor exhaustive theoretical account of “non-standard” preferences and therefore doesn’t provide useful applications for real-world simulations in microeconomics.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università di Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Giuliana Gerace

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  1. Giuliana Gerace
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  1. LABSS, ISTC-CNR, ROME, Italy

    Federico Cecconi

  2. Biosciences, University of Exeter, Penryn, Cornwall, UK

    Marco Campennì

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Gerace, G. (2019). Real Worlds: Simulating Non-standard Rationality in Microeconomics. In: Cecconi, F., Campennì, M. (eds) Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Economic Modeling. Computational Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22605-3_3

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