Abstract
In this chapter, I examine the grounds of the right of children to be free from extreme poverty, the content of this right, and who the duty-bearers are. In particular, I argue that the socioeconomic right of children to freedom from severe poverty: (1) is grounded in the specific perfect moral duty of right to protect children from extreme poverty (grounds); (2) consists of the right to claim the omission of any act that restricts children’s freedom from extreme poverty (negatively); as well as the right to claim the performing of acts that guarantee children’s freedom from extreme poverty (positively) (content); and (3) is based on a duty which is not of all others, but of specific others, e.g. the relatives or/and the friends of the child, the local authorities, states, and organizations (duty-bearers). In addition, I respond to three possible objections against the proposed philosophical foundation. Within this context, I first point out the moral priority of duties over rights; second, I explain why the socioeconomic right of children to be free from extreme poverty is not a human right; and, third, I explain the reasons why Kant is not a moral constructivist.
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Notes
- 1.
Translations from the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals are from Gregor (1996).
- 2.
What must be pointed out here is that Mary Gregor’s translation of the German word ‘entwickelt’, in the original text, as ‘explicated’ is not correct (Kant 2013: 346). ‘Entwickelt’ means ‘generated’ or ‘developed’, that is, ‘grounded’, and not just ‘explicated’.
- 3.
More on this on Sect. 3.2 below
- 4.
See Sect. 2.
- 5.
In the same vein, Onora O’Neill claims that ‘welfare rights must have necessarily specific duty-bearers; see, for instance, O’Neill (1996), pp. 130, 131, 134.
- 6.
For the moral damage in the case of child poverty, see further Cabezas and Pitillas, in this volume.
- 7.
Although, all others can be accused of acting against the fulfillment of the relevant right.
- 8.
However, I still have the duty not to act against the fulfillment of the relevant right in some way, e.g. to prevent those who are willing to provide food to the children in Ghana from doing so.
- 9.
Incidentally, this might also apply to some human rights which typically straddle the division between ‘civil and political’ and ‘socioeconomic’ rights, e.g. the right for freedom of association. For example, as a UK resident, I do not have a duty (negative, positive) to provide, or abstain from providing the Ghanaian with the resources required for freedom of association, e.g. by providing (or not providing) a public arena, or organising meetings for them. However, I still have the duty not to restrict a Ghanaian’s freedom of association.
- 10.
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Liosi, S. (2019). A Duty-Based Approach to Children’s Right to Freedom from Extreme Poverty. In: Brando, N., Schweiger, G. (eds) Philosophy and Child Poverty. Philosophy and Poverty, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22452-3_14
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