Abstract
Z.1 gives rise to three interpretations. One takes substantial forms to constitute substantial being and individual composites to be the basic constituents that have this being. The other two take universal substantial forms, or particular substantial forms, to be basic constituents. Support can be found in Z.1 for each of them, but questions also arise for each of them. Z.1 doesn’t seem to contain enough to decide between them. So, one should accept the interpretation that best fits the rest of Z. But until the rest of Z has been investigated, individual composites and substantial forms should each be regarded as candidates for basic constituents.
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Notes
- 1.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this chapter are my own.
- 2.
Bostock (1994, 45), the Revised Oxford translation, and Ross (1924, 159) each take 1028a10–15 to be about senses of ‘being’ or ‘is’. However, the doctrine of the categories is about things in the world. That is, why I translate 1028a10–15 as being about the ways in which being is said. Even if one needs to bring in senses of ‘being’ to understand how being is said, as Burnyeat et al. (1979, 1) note, language will be used to talk about being.
- 3.
Aristotle acknowledges particular substantial forms at Meta 1037a7–9 where he says that Socrates has been thought to be a soul and to be a body and soul. For someone who takes ti esti kai tode ti to refer to particular substantial forms, see Frede and Patzig (1988, II, 11–15).
- 4.
At Meta Δ.8 1017b24–26, Aristotle says that form is a ‘this’. It is not entirely clear in which way he is saying form is a ‘this’. But the contrast he draws there with a subject not predicated of anything else suggests that form is being said to be a ‘this’ because it is a determinate kind.
- 5.
Ross (1924, 159–160) takes ti esti and tode ti to refer to two incompatible conceptions of substance—ti esti referring to substance in the sense of substance of, and so something that is universal; and tode ti referring to an individual substance. However, we have seen that ti esti tode ti can be understood to refer to a single conception of substance—that of a particular substantial form or a determinate substantial kind. So, one needn’t saddle Aristotle with this incompatibility.
- 6.
Recognizing that the opening lines of Z.1 rely on the doctrine of the Categories, Wedin (2000, 163) takes Z.1 to accept the Categories view of basic constituents, and so he takes Z.1 to discuss the substance of these basic constituents. I adopt a weaker position, taking the reference to the Categories in the opening lines of Z.1 to lead one to expect that if what follows gives up the Categories view of basic constituents, one would expect to find in Z.1 or elsewhere an explanation of why it should be given up.
- 7.
We shall see in Chap. 13 that there is more than one way in which a particular form can be understood. According to one of them, a particular form is its own essence. According to another, its essence is the universal substantial form under which it falls. In Chaps. 8 and 13, we shall see that Z.4 and Z.11 provide grounds to take universal substantial forms to be their own essences and the essences of the individual substances whose form they are.
- 8.
That Z is concerned with primary being and the basic constituents that have this kind of being can be seen from the task Aristotle sets for himself in Z.2. After running through a list of views about what things are basic constituents, he says:
We must consider which of these views is right and which is not right, and which things are substances and whether there are any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances are, and whether there is a separate substance, and if so why and how, or whether there is none separable from sensible substances, and we must sketch the what it is (ti estin) of substance. (1028b27–32)
Thus, Z should indicate which things are basic constituents and what it is for them to be.
- 9.
Because Aristotle says that a particular substance underlies (is a hupokeimenon for) a walking thing, a sitting thing, etc., a walking thing or a sitting thing could be an accidental compound composed of an individual substance and walking or sitting. (See, e.g., Lewis 2013, 13–14.) Still, what underlies such a compound will be an individual substance.
- 10.
If Cohen (2013) is right, the Categories individuals in categories other than substance are best understood as accidental unities—for example, an individual pale being pale, as it is instantiated in a particular individual substance. If a walking or a sitting thing in 1028a18–31 is such an accidental unity, this would fit 1028b18–31’s setting out the Categories view of substance.
- 11.
This dismissal of matter is discussed in Chap. 7.
- 12.
See Chap. 8 for a discussion of this claim.
- 13.
For a fuller account of how substantial forms are separate, see section ‘VI. Questions About This Answer’.
- 14.
That it is hypothetically necessary that man is composed of flesh and bones is discussed in Chap. 13.
- 15.
Thus, the way individual composites are independent of items in the categories other than substance is or is very much like what Peramatzis (2011, 13) calls priority in Being what something is.
- 16.
It might be thought that considerations external to Z could resolve this conflict. For example, according to De Anima 415b10–14 , an individual composite’s form is the cause of its being. One might take this as grounds for saying that substantial forms are basic constituents, and so grounds for interpreting Z.1 in a way that acknowledges this. However, as I pointed out in Chap. 4, substantial forms depend for their being on their being instantiated by individual composites, and one might take this as grounds for saying that individual composites are basic constituents, and so grounds for interpreting Z.1 as acknowledging this. Indeed, in the Categories, Aristotle used the latter dependency to take its primary substances to be basic constituents even though, according to the Categories essentialism , its primary substances can’t exist without their secondary substances being predicated of them. This leaves us with the same sort of conflict with which we started. If there is anything outside of Z.1 that will resolve this conflict, it would seem to be the rest of Z.
- 17.
See, for example, the Revised Oxford translation, according to which 1028a33–34 says that none of the other categories exists independently, only substance; Ross (1924, 159), who takes it to say that among the categories, substance alone can exist apart; and Furth (1984, 2), who takes 1038a33–34 to speak of types of things predicated.
- 18.
I acknowledge that relying on the rest of Z to determine how to understand Z.1 assumes that Z has a consistent story to tell about substance. However, as I have said before, taking Aristotle to be consistent in this way is the default position one should adopt when trying to understand him. This is not to say that he can’t be inconsistent over a certain range of texts. It is to say that one shouldn’t conclude that he is inconsistent over a certain range of text until one sees that there are good grounds for rejecting any plausible interpretation that renders him consistent.
- 19.
Lewis (2013, 14–15) takes Z.1 to set out the Categories view of substance as a provisional framework for understanding substance, not all of which Aristotle may endorse in Z. Because of this, he warns against interpreting Z.1 in terms of later discussions in Z that make use of Aristotle’s developed notions of matter and form. However, Lewis recognizes that Z.1’s notion of what is ti esti and a ‘this’ doesn’t appear in the Categories. This at least invites interpretation, if only to understand the framework set out in Z.1. This is one of the things I have tried to do in this chapter. Since I end up claiming that the text of Z.1 doesn’t contain enough to determine which interpretation of it one should accept, in this way, I, at least, agree with Lewis that one will need to look at the rest of Z to find out which version of what is set out in Z.1 Aristotle will accept.
- 20.
For example, if sensible substances turn out to be particular substantial forms, then as Frede and Patzig (1988) maintain, one won’t get a full understanding of what it is for a particular form to be until one understands what it is for Aristotle’s god, the paradigm particular form, to be.
- 21.
Note that this does not rule out Z’s discussing Platonic Forms. According to the theory of Forms, the being of sensible objects is to be understood in terms of their participation in forms. So, when it comes to sensible objects, what turn out to be basic constituents are non-sensible forms. This is important because Z does discuss Platonic Forms.
References
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Burnyeat, Miles et al. (1979), Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ (Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy).
Cohen, S. Marc (2013), “Accidental Beings in Aristotle’s Ontology,” in Anagnostopoulos, Georgios and Miller, Fred D., Jr. (2013) editors, Reason and Analysis in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Essays in Honor of David Keyt, Philosophical Studies Series 120 (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media), 231–242.
Frede, Michael and Patzig, Gϋnther (1988), Aristoteles ‘Metaphysics Z’ (Mϋnchen: Verlag C. H. Beck).
Furth, Montgomery (1984), Aristotle ‘Metaphysics’, Books VII–X, Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company).
Lewis, Frank A. (2013), How Aristotle gets by in ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Ross, W. D. (1924), Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Volume II (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Wedin, Michael (2000), Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, The ‘Categories’ and ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Dahl, N.O. (2019). Z.1, Substantial Forms or Individual Composites as Basic Constituents. In: Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22161-4_6
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