Abstract
Z.13 also raises an aporia whose bases imply that substance is indefinable. Rather than providing a reason to revise any arguments in 1038b8–1039a3, it begins an additional series of arguments against 1038b8–1039a3’s Platonic target. Z.14 raises a dilemma that can be seen to commit this target to the bases of Z.13’s aporia, making that aporia ta problem for it. Z.15 argues that Platonic Forms are indefinable, the conclusion that generated Z.13’s aporia, again making it a problem for that Platonic view. Among other things, Z.16 offers a pair of arguments that parallel the pairs of arguments in 1038b8–1039a3—the first relying on Z.13’s idion assumption, and the second committing Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents. None of this requires any revision in 1038b8–1039a3’s arguments.
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- 1.
See, for example, his arguments in Z.15 1040a8–22 and 1040a22–27 that no individual is definable. If an individual were composed entirely of universals, it would be definable.
- 2.
Furth (1984, 122) notes that a literal translation of the Greek at 1039a3, ‘it is clear also thus’ (etic kai hooded dēlon) suggests that Aristotle is saying that what was at issue in 1038b8–1039a3 will be clear from what follows. However, he complains that what follows argues for the incompositeness of substance, something whose paradoxical nature Aristotle then points out. But this need not be the end of the matter. The aporia with this conclusion could be part of another argument against the Z.13 Platonic view—by raising an aporia that poses a problem for that view. That argument would then help make clear the inadequacy of the Z.13 Platonic view.
Burnyeat (2001, 51–52) takes Z.13’s aporia to provide the basis for an argument against a Platonic view, but he doesn’t say whether this is the Platonic view Aristotle argued against in 1038b8–1039a3.
- 3.
For the Platonic view’s taking forms to be basic constituents, see 1039a24–25, which says that the view takes ideas (ideis) to be substance. For man-itself and animal-itself, see 1039a30 and 1039b9. For its taking its basic constituents to be separate, see 1039a25 and 1039a30–31. For their being ‘this-es’, see 1039a30–31. For substantial forms being composed of their genera and differentiae, see 1039a25–26.
- 4.
Burnyeat et al. (1979, 137–138) take what Aristotle says here to be based on parity of reasoning with what Z.14’s target says about the universal man. However, they complain that because this view takes man to be separate from particular men, what follows by parity of reasoning is that animal is separate from particular animals, not the conclusion Aristotle draws—that animal is separate from man and horse. But Aristotle can draw the latter conclusion if Z.14’s target is the Z.13 Platonic view and the argument that lies behind it is the kind of argument accepted by either idion interpretation . According to these interpretations, the Z.13 Platonic view takes animal to be the substance of man, horse, and so on, because it stands to them in the same way man stands to particular men. But if man is separate from the things of which it is the substance, particular men, then animal will be separate from the things of which it is the substance, man, horse, et cetera, and Aristotle will have the conclusion he draws in 1039a30–34. This provides a reason to think that Z.14’s target is the Z.13 Platonic view as understood by one of the idion interpretations.
- 5.
Bostock (1994, 209) asks why man and horse can’t overlap, with animal being in their common part as something that is one in number. He grants that sensible individuals, such as individual men, may be separate in a way that prevents such an overlap. But Aristotle is talking here about substantial forms. So, why couldn’t man and horse overlap in this way? Lewis (2013, 246) says that Aristotle’s argument here applies ‘the logic proper to particulars’, and so assumes that man and horse are particulars.
- 6.
- 7.
This isn’t just a slip of the tongue. 1039b9–11 also takes animal to be the substance of species of animal.
- 8.
Ross (1924, 212) takes this latter claim to be unacceptable all by itself, and so takes 1039a7–9 to constitute a single, complete argument against Z.14’s target. He cites the identity formulation of Z.13’s idion assumption to support the impossibility of animal’s being the substance of many things. He then takes eti (‘furthermore’) at 1039b9 to introduce a new argument against Z.14’s target. However, we saw in Chaps. 14 and 15 that there is reason to think that Z.13’s idion assumption allows the substance of a thing to be the substance of more than one thing. Given this, it seems best to take the claim that there are many things whose substance is animal to be the first step in an argument generating the unacceptable consequence that many things are animal-itself.
- 9.
Lewis (2013, 247–248) takes the argument for this result to depend on Z.13’s idion assumption as he understands it. However, he recognizes that the argument will go through if one takes it to rest on the kind of Platonic principle, I have said it rests on. Still, if one takes the argument to rest on Z.13’s idion assumption , it will go through if one understands this assumption in the way the idion interpretations understand it.
- 10.
It’s true that, at 1039b24–25, Aristotle illustrates the distinction between these two kinds of substance by distinguishing being a house and being this house, saying that the latter but not the former comes to be. However, I agree with Bostock (1994, 217) and Burnyeat et al. (1979, 138) that in saying this Aristotle is only saying that a particular house comes to be.
- 11.
See also Z.10 1036a5–9.
- 12.
It is important that the knowledge based on definition that Aristotle talks about here is scientific understanding (epistēmē) and not knowledge arrived at by applying scientific understanding to a sensible object. Otherwise, one might be tempted to raise the objection Bostock raises (1994, 217–218) when he says that even if I cannot know who Socrates is without knowing that he is or was, I can still know who he was when he no longer is. However, I know who Socrates was in part by knowing that he was a man and knowing this by knowing that the definition of man applied to him. This may be a form of knowledge, but it is not (epistēmē). Furthermore, even though this knowledge presupposes a definition, the definition it presupposes is the definition of man, not the definition of Socrates. Thus, this sort of knowledge doesn’t show that Aristotle is mistaken in saying here that there is no definition and demonstration of an individual perceptible object such as Socrates.
Bostock (1994, 218) also raises a more serious problem—that Aristotle’s argument here would rule out definition and demonstration of universal forms that don’t come to be or pass away but are at one time but not at another and so are and are not. Aristotle would want there to be scientific definitions and demonstrations of such forms. However, what is important for present purposes is that Z.15 argues that Platonic Forms are indefinable because they are individuals.
- 13.
See also Burnyeat et al. (1979, 145–146).
- 14.
Ross (1924, 216) seems to think that if the components of a definition are predicable of more than one object, then it follows (or Aristotle will take it to follow) that the definition composed of them applies to more than one object. However, this begs the question against someone who maintains that a combination of terms, each of which applies to more than one object, can still apply to only one object.
- 15.
I include ‘the rational part rules correctly’ to mark off the harmony of the soul that is justice from the harmony of the soul that is temperance. The latter involves appetite’s following reason’s rule whether or not reason rules correctly.
- 16.
One might reply that according to the Republic, justice in the soul and justice in the polis are one and the same thing, justice. So, what applies to both the soul and a polis is a definition of one thing. I take it that Aristotle would respond to this by raising the dilemma he raised in Z.14—asking whether justice is one in number or different in number when it is present in a soul and a polis and arguing that, either way, unacceptable consequences follow.
- 17.
It might be suggested that Z.13 1038b8–1029a3 has already ruled out particular substantial forms, universal substantial forms, and Platonic Forms. So, the only candidates left are sensible substances that have matter—the primary elements and individual composites. I have some sympathy with this suggestion. But appealing to it here is premature since one of the things at issue here is whether Z.13’s aporia and the discussion that follows it don’t provide a reason to revise or reject some of what was argued in 1038b8–1039a3. Perhaps, though, one can say that this appeal holds provided nothing in Z.16 counts against what 1038b8–1039a3 said that ruled out these other candidates.
- 18.
Note that this conclusion is basis (2) of Z.13’s aporia, as I suggested this basis should be understood. If one couples this with what follows from Z.15’s conclusion that no individual is definable, namely, that no individual basic constituent is composed entirely of universals, and if Z.16 argues against the same kind of Platonic view as does Z.14 and Z.15, then it follows that this Platonic view is committed to both bases of Z.13’s aporia as I set them out. That aporia again poses a problem for this Platonic view. This provides another reason to think that Z.16 is part of an argument against a Platonic view that began with Z.13’s aporia.
- 19.
1040b21–24 has been thought to be incompatible with Z.13’s idion assumption when that assumption is taken to say that the substance and essence of a thing stands in a one-to-one correspondence with that thing, and so is the substance and essence of only one thing (e.g., Gill 2001, 248–249, 253–254), and Lewis (2013, 221–222). However, no incompatibility arises if one understands that assumption as the idion interpretations understand it. Indeed, 1040b23–24 is then a formulation of that assumption.
- 20.
Bostock (1994, 227) takes 1040b16–24 to argue against this kind of Platonic view.
- 21.
For example, the considerations set out in Z.13 1038b15–16, where Aristotle offers a subject criterion for substances, or 1039a1–3, where he accuses a Platonist of confusing a ‘such’ with a ‘this’—provided what is said in Z.14–16 doesn’t provide grounds for rejecting or revising what is said in these parts of Z.13.
- 22.
If Cohen (2013) is right, then the Categories individuals present in but not said of a subject and what have been called accidental compounds are the same thing.
- 23.
Presumably because he thinks individual composites have already been ruled out as basic constituents, Bostock (1994, 230) takes this way of filling out 1040b25–27 to imply that particular forms are basic constituents even though he recognizes that they are not separate. However, if what I have been arguing so far is right, individual composites have not been ruled out as basic constituents. So, it won’t follow from individuals in the category of substance being basic constituents that particular forms are basic constituents. It is individual composites that will be basic constituents.
- 24.
See Note 17 for another reason to think that the argument against the Z.13 Platonic view that began with Z.13’s aporia extends through Z.16.
- 25.
There is a sense in which my arguments about Z.13–16 amount to an argument to the best explanation. Taking 1038b8–1039a3 to argue against the Z.13 Platonic view as the first idion interpretation understands it, taking the bases of Z.13’s aporia to be (1) and (2) as I set them out, and taking Z.13’s aporia to begin another argument against the Z.13 Platonic view as the first idion assumption understands it that extends to the end of Z.16 provides the best explanation of what Aristotle says in Z.13–16. If this is right, then each of these considerations mutually supports one another in providing this explanation.
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Dahl, N.O. (2019). The Universal as Substance: Z.13–16—An Aporia and What Follows. In: Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22161-4_16
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