Abstract
There is an interpretation that best solves 1038b8–1039a3’s problems. Its target argues that—as with substantial forms and individual composites—universals at the level of genera are the essences of substantial forms and make them basic constituents and similarly for higher level universals. This implies that higher level universals are essences of lower objects in virtue of being the essences of intermediate objects. 1038b8–15 argues that this violates its idion assumption, which denies there are such intermediate objects. 1038b15–16 argues that no universal is a basic constituent, implying individual composites basic constituents. Aristotle’s interlocutor thinks his view satisfies Z.13’s idion assumption because its universals are essences only of objects immediately below them. Aristotle argues that this is mistaken, and adds two arguments that parallel 1038b8–15 and 1038b15–16.
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Notes
- 1.
This means that a universal like man will be a ‘this’ in the way an individual composite is a ‘this’ and so will be an individual. This won’t be surprising if the view in question takes the universals that are basic constituents to be Forms. According to Aristotle, Forms are katholou and individuals, and so would be ‘this-es’ that are individuals. (See Chap. 2, section ‘V. Katholou (Universal)’ to see why a Form can be katholou and an individual.)
It might also seem odd to take animal to be the essence of man when it is only part of what composes man. However, it won’t seem so odd if one presses the analogy the argument draws with man and a particular man. A particular man has matter and so is composed of more than its form and essence. If the relation between animal and man is essentially the same as that between man and a particular man, animal can be the essence of man even though it is only part of what composes man.
- 2.
There is another argument for this feature of the Platonic view, the argument in Chap. 14, Note 27. However, for reasons that will be clearer later (see Note 11), it is best not to take that argument to be part of the first idion interpretation’s understanding of the Z.13 Platonic view.
- 3.
This follows trivially for the things that have and are essences in the primary way in which things have essence—substantial forms—since they are their own essences. It also holds for things that have essences secondarily and derivatively. For example, the essences of individual composites are their substantial forms, where substantial forms are determinate kinds. So, individual composites fall under them without having to fall under another specific kind. Thus, substantial forms are not essences of individual composites in virtue of being the essence of some other object. Or, take pale. It has an essence secondarily and derivatively since pale is a feature of a surface, perhaps smoothness; and a surface can’t be smooth unless it is the surface of an object with an essence that implies that it has a nontransparent body. However, this latter essence is not the essence of pale. So, a surface that is pale has the essence of pale in virtue of that essence and that surface and not in virtue of that essence being the essence of some other object.
- 4.
This will be true even if Z.6 argues that basic constituents are the same in formula as their essences. If this isn’t clear, it will be made clear in section ‘VI. Is There Any Reason to Prefer One of These Interpretations over the Other?’.
- 5.
Again, Aristotle is entitled to consider only the possibilities that a universal at the level of genera or higher is the essence of all or of none of the objects of which it is said universally because the view he is arguing against admits only these two possibilities. According to it, a universal is the essence of the objects of which it is said universally. But then a universal will be the essence of all of those objects or none of them. 1038b9–15 then explains why universals at the level of genera or higher can’t be the essences of all of these objects.
- 6.
One might object, claiming that (IC)’s subject criterion is or is based on that of Z.3 and pointing out that Z.3 takes form to satisfy this criterion. Given this, (IC) should allow substantial forms to satisfy its subject criterion. So, (IC) should only rule out universals at the level of genera or higher as basic constituents, something that would allow substantial forms to be basic constituents.
However, nothing in the text indicates that when (IC) says that a universal is always said of a subject, it is only speaking about universals at the level of genera or higher. Furthermore, in Chap. 7, I pointed out the difficulties in seeing how a universal substantial form could be a subject not said of another. Indeed, Z.11’s talking of an individual composite’s form to be its essence implies that a substantial form is said of another. Nor will it do to take substantial forms to be particular forms. Particular forms are predicated kata sumbebēkos of the bits of matter from which the individual composites whose forms they are came to be. And if a particular form is the essence of the individual composite whose particular form it is, then particular forms are predicated kath’ hauto of a subject. Besides, the beginning of Z.13 mentions only two of the three things Z.3 said are subjects not said of another—matter and individual composites. This could be an indication that by the time Aristotle reaches Z.13, he no longer thinks substantial forms satisfy this criterion.
Given all of this, it seems best to take (IC) to argue that no universal is a basic constituent.
It’s true that Chap. 7 acknowledged one way in which form could satisfy Z.3’s subject criterion—that a subject is not predicated kath’ hauto of anything distinct from it in being. The second idion interpretation will understand (IC)’s subject criterion in this way. So, this possibility won’t be ignored. But the first idion interpretation doesn’t take substantial forms to satisfy (IC)’s subject criterion, and what I just said provides some grounds to think that it is right to do so.
- 7.
Note that on this way of understanding (IIC), eidei at 1038b23 needn’t be bracketed. Indeed, it is what one would expect.
- 8.
Someone might point out that the interlocutor’s view is still at odds with the first idion interpretations’ understanding of (IC)’s argument. How then can he think that his view is immune to the arguments in Part (I)? However, we have seen that a Platonist can reject (IC)’s subject criterion, and so claim that (IC) doesn’t pose a problem for him. Because of this, Aristotle would have a stronger response to his interlocutor if he didn’t rely on (IC)’s argument but instead responded to what the interlocutor thinks makes his view immune to (IB)’s argument. This is what Aristotle does in (IIE) and (IIF).
It’s true that (IIG) offers a counterpart to the argument in (IC). But as we shall see, a Platonist can also deny that this argument poses a problem for him. So, (IIE) and (IIF) will comprise the core of Aristotle’s argument against his interlocutor. This raises the question of why Aristotle would go on to offer the argument in (IIG). But the same kind of answers can be given here to this question as were given to the comparable question that arose for (IC).
- 9.
It might be pointed out that the argument that provides the basis for the interlocutor’s view took the substantial forms that turn out to be basic constituents to be individual ‘this-es’. How then can the interlocutor in (IID) take substantial forms to be ‘this-es’ that are determinate kinds? The answer is that at this stage of the argument, there is nothing to prevent the interlocutor from saying that substantial forms and the universals that compose them are ‘this-es’ in both of these ways. It is the arguments in (IIE) and (IIF) that prevent him from saying this.
- 10.
See Note 28 of Chap. 14.
- 11.
It is easier to understand how the interlocutor could mistakenly think that universals at the level of genera are essences only of objects immediately below them if the first idion interpretation’s understanding of why the Z.13 Platonic view takes a universal like animal to be the essence of an individual man is different from the reason given in (IIE). That is why I stated this aspect of the Z.13 view as I did earlier, and said what I said in Note 2.
- 12.
Note that when (IID) and (IIE) are understood in this way, they don’t raise the dilemma against the Platonist that Lewis (2013, 219–220) takes them to raise—that (IID) argues for, but (IIE) argues against, a substance having parts that are substance—because (IID) supports the Platonic view of Aristotle’s interlocutor, but (IIE) argues against it. Nor does the interlocutor have the response to the argument in (IIE) that Lewis (2013, 220–221) takes him to have.
- 13.
Again, animal will be the essence of particular men in virtue of being the essence of man.
- 14.
Again, if this isn’t clear, it will become clear in section ‘VI. Is There Any Reason to Prefer One of These Interpretations over the Other?’.
- 15.
- 16.
This commits Aristotle to talking in Z.3 about substance in the sense of substance of when he adds the subject to the things said there to be substance. This doesn’t pose a problem for the above way of understanding Z.3’s subject criterion. Indeed, it seems to fit what Aristotle says at the beginning of Z.3, where he says that essence, the universal, and the genus are thought to be substance in the sense of substance. He would now be saying the same thing about the subject. But it does raise the question of how the other two things Aristotle says are subjects, matter and the composite, can be thought to be substance in this way since they aren’t said of anything. One possibility is that the substance of an individual sensible object is what makes that object a single object and the same single object over time. Either the bits of matter that a sensible object has, or the particular composite of matter and form that the sensible object is, could be taken to be such a thing. This would make them candidates for substance in the sense of substance of. But it would also make them candidates for basic constituents. So, Z.3’s subject criterion would still be a mark of basic constituents.
- 17.
This way of understanding what is said in (IIG) requires understanding how a version of the TMA can arise from taking determinable universals to be determinate kinds. I am not sure what such a version would be. But I shall not press the point at this time.
- 18.
A problem may also arise from the first idion interpretation’s taking the conclusion that parts (I) and (II) support to be that no universal is a basic constituent because it has a higher universal as its essence. As (IA) and (IIG) state their conclusions, they don’t mention any such restriction. However, if this is a problem for the first idion interpretation, it is also a problem for the second idion interpretation since it takes parts (I) and (II) to argue for the restricted conclusion that no universal at the level of genera or higher is a basic constituent because it is the essence of the things of which it is said universally.
- 19.
See, for example, Gill (2005, 120–121), who takes this to be a mark against Burnyeat’s claim that Z.13 begins a new argument independent of what precedes it in Z.
References
Burnyeat, Myles (2001), A Map of ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta (Pittsburgh: Mathesis Publications).
Gill, Mary Louise (1991), Aristotle on Substance, The Paradox of Unity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Gill, Mary Louise (2001), “Aristotle’s Attack on Universals,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 20, 235–260.
Gill, Mary Louise (2005), “Myles Burnyeat’s Map of ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta,” Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 114–121.
Lewis, Frank A. (2013), How Aristotle gets by in ‘Metaphysics’ Zeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Dahl, N.O. (2019). The Universal as Substance: 1038b8–1039a3—Solutions to the Problems. In: Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22161-4_15
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