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Oil and the Resource Curse

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The Creation of the East Timorese Economy

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

Abstract

This chapter provides a comprehensive survey of the oil sector, including the detailed boundary negotiations with Australia, the Petroleum Fund established in 2004, the relevance of Dutch Disease theories, corruption and the struggles to contain it, and the general issue of spending effectiveness. The revenues derived from oil and gas have accounted for around 80 percent of GDP during independence. The original intention was not to spend more than the yield from the oil fund every year so as to maintain its real value constant over time. However, excess withdrawals from the fund have been the rule since 2006. Oil and gas reserves that are currently exploited risk to be depleted in the near future. What all this means is that the oil and gas bonanza may soon come to an end, which will, in turn, reduce the ability to fund development projects, unless alternative, domestic, revenue sources can be developed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Auty (1993, 2001).

  2. 2.

    Joseph and Hamaguchi (2014), p. 41.

  3. 3.

    International Monetary Fund (2013), p. 19, (2016).

  4. 4.

    Jannisa (1997), pp. 157–165 tells the story of oil explorations up to 1975.

  5. 5.

    Rau (2002), p. 12.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., p. 19.

  7. 7.

    ESCAP and UNDP (2003), p. 25.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., p. 19.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Timor Sea Office (2006).

  12. 12.

    La’o Hamutuk (2008), World Bank (2018d), p. 38.

  13. 13.

    A Barrel Full (2014).

  14. 14.

    La’o Hamutuk (2016c).

  15. 15.

    For a history of the boundary negotiations, see Schofield and Arsana (2019).

  16. 16.

    Nevins (2004), p. 3.

  17. 17.

    King (2002), p. 3, Nevins (2004), p. 3.

  18. 18.

    Nevins (2004), p. 3.

  19. 19.

    Balint (2005), p. 43.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Antunes (2002), p. 5.

  22. 22.

    Cleary (2007), p. 34.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p.10.

  24. 24.

    Nevins (2004), p. 4.

  25. 25.

    Schofield (2005), p. 263.

  26. 26.

    Nevins (2004), p. 5.

  27. 27.

    Dusevic (2004).

  28. 28.

    Cleary (2007), p. 125.

  29. 29.

    Leach (2016).

  30. 30.

    McBeth (2004).

  31. 31.

    Bugalski (2004), pp. 291–292.

  32. 32.

    McBeth (2004), Nevins (2004), p. 5. It should be noted that the maritime boundary between Indonesia and East Timor also awaits settlement (Schofield and Strating 2018).

  33. 33.

    Nevins (2004), p. 13.

  34. 34.

    Antunes (2002), p. 13, Nevins (2004), p. 5.

  35. 35.

    Mercer (2004), p. 290.

  36. 36.

    República Democrática de Timor-Leste (2003), Mercer (2004), p. 302.

  37. 37.

    Schofield (2005), p. 263.

  38. 38.

    Nevins (2004), pp. 14–15.

  39. 39.

    Gavin (2004), Bugalski (2004), p. 293.

  40. 40.

    Bugalski (2004), p. 290.

  41. 41.

    Cleary (2007), p. 58–59.

  42. 42.

    La’o Hamutuk (2018), p. 2.

  43. 43.

    Schofield (2005), p. 262.

  44. 44.

    Allard (2014), McGrath (2014).

  45. 45.

    Schofield and Strating (2018), p. 3. The 2018 agreement also states that East Timor will receive all the remaining revenues from the Bayu-Undan field together with revenues from the Buffalo field, previously considered to be in the Australian territory. However, these revenues together will not amount to more than US$2 billion, ‘barely enough to cover one year of the state budget’ (Scheiner 2019, p. 95).

  46. 46.

    Hutt (2018). ConocoPhillips has pulled out, selling its share to East Timor (Reuters 2018), and Shell has sold its share to East Timor as well (McWilliam and Leach 2019, p. 12).

  47. 47.

    Gloystein and Paul (2018).

  48. 48.

    Massola (2018).

  49. 49.

    Humphreys et al. (2007), p. 9.

  50. 50.

    Triwibowo and Miranda (2016), p. 2.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Drysdale (2005).

  53. 53.

    Joseph and Hamaguchi (2014), p. 52.

  54. 54.

    McKechnie (2013), p. 5.

  55. 55.

    Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017), p. 20.

  56. 56.

    Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2005).

  57. 57.

    Drysdale (2005), p. 3.

  58. 58.

    McKechnie (2013), p. 2.

  59. 59.

    Ministry of Planning and Finance (2004c).

  60. 60.

    International Monetary Fund (2013), p. 19.

  61. 61.

    Auty (1993), p. 25.

  62. 62.

    Drysdale (2009), p. 24.

  63. 63.

    International Monetary Fund (2005b), p. 22.

  64. 64.

    Ministry of Finance (2018), p. 5.

  65. 65.

    Banco Central de Timor-Leste (2019).

  66. 66.

    Ministry of Finance (2018), p. 6.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., p. 7.

  68. 68.

    Drysdale (2009), p. 74.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    The price of Brent is very similar to the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI Crude) but differs from the price of oil from the Middle East (Dubai Crude Oil).

  71. 71.

    Ministry of Planning and Finance (2004c), p. 7.

  72. 72.

    Knoema (2016).

  73. 73.

    Asian Development Bank (2014).

  74. 74.

    La’o Hamutuk (2016c).

  75. 75.

    International Monetary Fund (2013), p. 19, Scheiner (2015), p. 88.

  76. 76.

    Ministry of Finance (2018), p.8.

  77. 77.

    Banco Central de Timor-Leste (2018), p. 9.

  78. 78.

    Scheiner (2015), p. 78.

  79. 79.

    Ibid. p. 11

  80. 80.

    Scheiner (2015), p. 92.

  81. 81.

    Asian Development Bank (2016), p. 2, Scheiner (2015).

  82. 82.

    Auty (1993, 2001), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), Mehlum et al. (2006a, b).

  83. 83.

    Peck and Chayes (2015), p. 5.

  84. 84.

    Sachs and Warner (1995), p. 11; Karl and Gary (2004), p. 35.

  85. 85.

    Palley (2003).

  86. 86.

    Findlay and Lundahl (2017), Chapters 9–10.

  87. 87.

    World Bank (2005c), p. 304.

  88. 88.

    Corden and Neary (1982).

  89. 89.

    Peck and Chayes (2015), p. 4.

  90. 90.

    Bulte et al. (2005), p. 1039.

  91. 91.

    Ministry of Planning and Finance (2004c), p. 8.

  92. 92.

    See the discussion in Chapter 5.

  93. 93.

    International Monetary Fund (2013), p. 13.

  94. 94.

    Lane and Tornell (1995), Mehlum et al. (2006a, b).

  95. 95.

    Humphreys et al. (2007), p. 4.

  96. 96.

    Gylfason (2001).

  97. 97.

    Hausmann and Rigobon (2002).

  98. 98.

    Scheiner (2015), p. 74.

  99. 99.

    Asian Development Bank (2016), p. 3.

  100. 100.

    República Democrática de Timor-Leste (2011a), p.138.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., pp. 140–141, Palatino (2011), Timor Gap (2016).

  102. 102.

    Cryan (2015), p. 5, Gusmão (2018).

  103. 103.

    Dias (2015), Macauhub (2015).

  104. 104.

    Oil & Gas Asia (n.d.).

  105. 105.

    Reynolds (2016).

  106. 106.

    La’o Hamutuk (2016b).

  107. 107.

    Palatino (2011).

  108. 108.

    La’o Hamutuk (2011), p. 12.

  109. 109.

    It is far from certain that those affected directly by the project understand its possible implications for them (cf. Bovensiepen et al. 2016). For an analysis of some of the negative effects, see Cryan (2015b).

  110. 110.

    Dias (2015), Strating (2017).

  111. 111.

    La’o Hamutuk (2016c).

  112. 112.

    Ibid., p. 13.

  113. 113.

    Dias (2015).

  114. 114.

    The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015b).

  115. 115.

    La’o Hamutuk (2018), p. 11.

  116. 116.

    Quoted by La’o Hamutk (2016b).

  117. 117.

    International Monetary Fund (2017), p. 2.

  118. 118.

    La’o Hamutuk (2017b). To this comes US$85 of loans already signed in 2017.

  119. 119.

    International Monetary Fund (2017), p. 4.

  120. 120.

    La’o Hamutuk (2017b).

  121. 121.

    The loans obtained are loans from multilateral agencies and foreign governments on concessionary interest rates.

  122. 122.

    La’o Hamutuk (2017b).

  123. 123.

    World Bank (2005d), pp. 306–307.

  124. 124.

    Hill (1996), p. 46.

  125. 125.

    Thee (2002), p. 207.

  126. 126.

    Hill (1996), p. 21.

  127. 127.

    Humphreys et al. (2007), p. 1.

  128. 128.

    Usui (1997).

  129. 129.

    Manufacturing accounted for about 22 percent of total GDP growth during the oil boom, followed by trade with 17 percent, agriculture with 16 percent, and public administration with 13 percent (see Hill 1996, Table 2.1).

  130. 130.

    Booth (1988). The growth of industry and agriculture was also supported by currency devaluations in the 1970s and 1980s—a measure not available to East Timor—that partly offset the appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by large oil revenues (Usui 1997, p. 158). Hence, Indonesia managed to avoid decreased competitiveness of the country’s tradable sectors caused by Dutch Disease.

  131. 131.

    Tabor (1992), p.161, Hill (1996), chapters 7–8.

  132. 132.

    Sjöholm (2005), p. 43, Thee (2002), p. 203.

  133. 133.

    Sjöholm (2002), p. 384. Inpres—Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction).

  134. 134.

    Several of its members had pursued post-graduate studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

  135. 135.

    Thee (2002), pp. 194–196.

  136. 136.

    Stevens (2005), Drysdale (2009), pp. 26–27.

  137. 137.

    Guterres (2017).

  138. 138.

    Ibid.

  139. 139.

    See World Bank (2005b), p. 306, for a summary of the literature.

  140. 140.

    Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003).

  141. 141.

    Gutierrez (2003).

  142. 142.

    Karl and Gary (2004), p. 36.

  143. 143.

    Sachs and Warner (1995).

  144. 144.

    Mehlum et al. (2006a, b). See also the classic article by Baumol (1990).

  145. 145.

    Mehlum et al. (2006b), p. 1121.

  146. 146.

    Ibid., p. 1125.

  147. 147.

    Mehlum et al. (2006a, 2006b).

  148. 148.

    USAID (2009), p. 3.

  149. 149.

    Scheiner (2015), p. 84.

  150. 150.

    For example Karl and Gary (2004), p. 40.

  151. 151.

    Bosso (2015), p. 1.

  152. 152.

    International Crisis Group (2013), p. 35.

  153. 153.

    For example World Bank (2005c), p. 5.

  154. 154.

    At the same time, 52.5 percent revealed that they did not understand the meaning of corruption—a somewhat puzzling result.

  155. 155.

    Comissão Anti-Corrupção (2012).

  156. 156.

    Ibid., p. 31.

  157. 157.

    Soares (2015), p. 210.

  158. 158.

    Guterres (2017).

  159. 159.

    Bosso (2015), p. 5.

  160. 160.

    La’o Hamutuk (2013b).

  161. 161.

    Comissão Anti-Corrupção (2013), pp. 10–12.

  162. 162.

    Montlake (2005).

  163. 163.

    International Crisis Group (2013), p. 35.

  164. 164.

    Dodd (2005).

  165. 165.

    Bosso (2015), p. 9.

  166. 166.

    Freedom House (2015).

  167. 167.

    United States Department of State (2014).

  168. 168.

    Scheiner (2019), pp. 90–91.

  169. 169.

    Bosso (2015), p. 7.

  170. 170.

    Ibid.

  171. 171.

    Ibid.

  172. 172.

    USAID (2009), p. 5.

  173. 173.

    See, for example, the comments by Prime Minister José Ramos Horta in McKenna (2005).

  174. 174.

    Soares (2015), p. 207.

  175. 175.

    UNMISET (2005b).

  176. 176.

    Soares (2015), p. 207.

  177. 177.

    Comissão Anti-Corrupção (2012), p. 17.

  178. 178.

    Comissão Anti-Corrupção (2013), pp. 17–18.

  179. 179.

    Bosso (2015), p. 3.

  180. 180.

    Comissão Anti-Corrupção (2013), p. 19.

  181. 181.

    National Parliament Resolution (2014).

  182. 182.

    Ibid.

  183. 183.

    Wyvill (2014), p. 2.

  184. 184.

    Soares (2015), pp. 210–211.

  185. 185.

    Feijó (2015), p. 65.

  186. 186.

    Wyvill (2014), p. 13.

  187. 187.

    Reporters Without Borders (2003).

  188. 188.

    Reporters Without Borders (2017).

  189. 189.

    Reporters Without Borders (2018).

  190. 190.

    USAID (2009), p. 13.

  191. 191.

    International Budget Partnership (2010).

  192. 192.

    International Budget Partnership (2012).

  193. 193.

    International Budget Partnership (2016).

  194. 194.

    International Budget Partnership (2017).

  195. 195.

    International Budget Partnership (2012), p. 2.

  196. 196.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  197. 197.

    Bosso (2015), p. 5.

  198. 198.

    Blunt (2009), p. 93.

  199. 199.

    Ibid., pp. 90–91.

  200. 200.

    Ibid., p. 92.

  201. 201.

    Ibid., p. 93.

  202. 202.

    Ibid.

  203. 203.

    Ibid., p. 99.

  204. 204.

    Ibid.

  205. 205.

    The Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, ‘the founding father of OPEC’, quoted in Karl (2003), p. 8.

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Lundahl, M., Sjöholm, F. (2019). Oil and the Resource Curse. In: The Creation of the East Timorese Economy. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22052-5_6

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