Abstract
We often think of consciousness as if it were a capsule surrounded by a boundary. In this paper, I will show in a phenomenological way that such an image of consciousness does not match the reality given to us. In fact, we cannot find any borderline of our own consciousness. This peculiarity of consciousness makes it difficult to understand how we can experience the otherness of the other. How can there be any otherness if there are no boundaries between consciousnesses? I shall make clear how Husserl and Nishida struggled with this fundamental problem. First, I interpret the “unbounded” character of consciousness as “non-contexutuality.” On the basis of this discussion, I present the basic question concerning the other experienced in consciousness. Second, I examine how Husserl addressed this question. The early Husserl tried to deal with this problem on the basis of the idea of “pure consciousness” which was construed as something “indefinite.” The collapse of this idea motivated Husserl to develop his later concept of “primal I” (Ur-Ich). Third, I discuss how Nishida dealt with the same question. After he tackled this problem in his early theory of “pure experience,” he would overcome this attempt in his later article “I and Thou,” which seems to stress the non-contextual encounter with otherness.
This article is based on the following Japanese article. TAGUCHI Shigeru 田口 茂 (2017): The Irrationality of a Closed Individual: The Riddle of Alterity in Husserl and Nishida 閉じた個という不合理: フッサールと西田における他性の謎. Nishida Tetsugakukai Nempō 西田哲学会年報, Vol. 14, 34–50. This work was supported by JSPS Kakenhi Grant Number JP17K02153.
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Notes
- 1.
Recently, Dreyfus and Taylor criticized this kind of separation of the representation from its object as “mediational” picture of knowledge (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015).
- 2.
I have discussed this character of consciousness in detail in a different paper. See Taguchi 2018.
- 3.
Concerning the other, Levinas speaks of “the rupture of the totality, the possibility of a signification without a context” (Levinas 1961: XII).
- 4.
I have discussed this point in detail in Taguchi 2006: Chapter III.
- 5.
Hua XIV: 432; Hua XXXIV: 229; Ms. B I 5/14a, 15b, 23a; Ms. K III 6/100b; Taguchi 2006: 217–220.
- 6.
See Taguchi 2006: 227–232.
- 7.
See Taguchi 2006: 232.
- 8.
“[…] der phänomenologischen Innenrichtung, bei welcher durch mein Innen hindurch der Weg geht in alle Anderen (als Innen-Andere, nicht als äußerliche Menschen, als raumzeitlichen reale) und dadurch erst auf die Welt und auf eigenes und fremdes Menschendasein” (Hua XLII: 247).
- 9.
See An Inquiry into the Good, Part II, Chapter II (Part II, Chapter 6 of the English translation).
- 10.
This kind of “non-contextuality” and “unboundedness” is taken over in Nishida’s later concept of “Basho (place)” and more emphatically pursued. However, I will not touch upon this topic here. See Taguchi 2015.
- 11.
See also IG: 44.
- 12.
I consulted the translation of this passage by Steve Odin (1996: 88).
- 13.
Similar expressions can be found in W: 312 and 315.
- 14.
See also Taguchi 2002.
- 15.
See for example the following passage: “The self, a hostage, is already substituted for the others. ‘I am an other,’ but this is not the alienation Rimbaud refers to. I am outside of any place, in myself” (Levinas 1974: 151; trans. 118). It should be noted that Levinas repudiates “generalization” and “the third party” in this context (ibid.: 163–4; trans. 127). See also Taguchi 2012.
- 16.
In our everyday life, we constantly ignore this strange fact. However, in the life of a schizophrenic, this fact often manifests itself as a thematic problem and dominates their consciousness. See Kimura 1990.
- 17.
Fujita points out the following: “To a thing, I can give a place and meaning in my perspective. Therefore, we can say that things are ‘placed in me.’ However, the Thou rejects such a sense-bestowing from me” (Fujita 2011: 131).
- 18.
See also W: 334.
- 19.
This may remind the passage from Husserl’s manuscript that I already quoted at the end of section 4 (Hua XLII: 247).
Abbreviations
- Hua:
-
Husserliana. Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, Den Haag/Dordrecht 1950ff.
- Hua Dok:
-
Husserliana Dokumente. Den Haag/Dordrecht 1977ff.
- NKZ:
-
The Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō 『西田幾多郎全集』, Iwanami-shoten岩波書店, 1965–66.
- Ms.:
-
Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, quoted according to the archival codes of the Husserl-Archive at Leuven.
- W:
-
“Watashi to Nanji [I and Thou],”「私と汝」in Nishida 1987.
- IG:
-
An Inquiry into the Good (= Nishida 1990).
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Taguchi, S. (2019). Consciousness Without Boundaries? The Riddle of Alterity in Husserl and Nishida. In: TAGUCHI, S., ALTOBRANDO, A. (eds) Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Tetsugaku Companions to Japanese Philosophy, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21942-0_7
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