Abstract
This chapter looks at Cuba’s international setting, historically and at present. This must be understood in the context of new, alternative world blocks appearing, with the US and the Western world losing the absolute international dominance. In this context, Raúl Castro was carving out a new and more pragmatic international role. We will logically pay special attention to the complicated US-Cuba relationship. The rapprochement initiated between Presidents Castro and Obama promised to bury the historical animosity based on the 1901 Platt Amendment (Plattism), although the US Congress did not allow the lifting of the embargo. Donald Trump’s presidency is once again reviving this conflict. The first dozen years of the new century took Latin America to the left, providing Cuba with a diplomatic breakthrough in the region. With the return to right-wing dominance in alliance with the Trump regime, Cuba once again steered towards more regional isolation. Links to Russia and China are only partly compensating for this. The regional crisis growing out of the Venezuela confrontation may amount to a survival crisis for Cuba.
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Notes
- 1.
The consequences of the disappearance of the USSR were dramatic for Cuba: between 1989 and 1993, Cuba’s exports and imports were reduced by 75–80%, gross investments by 60%, and GDP by 35%. While sugar (mostly being sold to the USSR) represented more than 90% of export revenue in 1990, tourism (mostly from Western Europe and Canada) had become the number one export earner (45%) in 2000, while health services (mostly to Venezuela) had the same position in 2006 (with sugar and tourism each representing about 25%). See Sánchez-Egozcue and Triana Cordoví (2010, figures 1 and 4.)
- 2.
The Cuban embargo is enforced mainly through six statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms–Burton Act 1996, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.
- 3.
Fidel Castro argues at length about the political justification of limited civic liberties in Ramonet (2007). For instance, when asked about the lack of press freedom, he says that as long as there is a US blockade against Cuba and a threat by the US President, “we cannot give the ‘freedom’ to the allies of our enemies whose objective is to struggle against socialism’s reason for existence” (p. 491). He has also argued that the US would benefit more than Cuba from normal relations: “If the United States makes peace with us, it will take away a little of our prestige, our influence, our glory” (Quoted from a 1961 speech in Leogrande and Kornbluh 2014: 406).
- 4.
“Commentary: Milestone congress points to new era for China, the world.” Xinhua, 24.10.17: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702090.htm.
- 5.
“China’s Communist party has come of age—the west should wake up”. The Guardian, 25.10.17: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/25/chinas-communist-party-has-come-of-age-the-west-should-wake-up.
- 6.
This account is based on conversation with a high-level French diplomat, intimately involved in the preparation of the state visit. President Hollande made a similar phone call to President Morales of Bolivia (according to a personal account to the author by a minister who was present when President Morales took this call).
- 7.
Both quotes are based on the CNN report from the meeting, 11.04.2015.
- 8.
- 9.
Quoted in Havana Times, 26 January 2015, from a letter to the Federation of University Students (FEU).
- 10.
See Pedro Campos (2015): “Notas al margen de la visita de Kerry a Cuba”, 14ymedio, 17.08.15.
- 11.
14ymedio, 17.08.15.
- 12.
All these observations were made by the author through quite close contact with both academics and civil society actors during 2015–2016.
- 13.
This was, for instance, the basic message of two Washington representatives (one from State Department and one from Commerce Department), delivered to an audience of Cuban-Americans during the August 2015 ASCE Conference in Miami, at which the author was present.
- 14.
Quote based on US State Department’s official version, downloaded from their website 19.08.15.
- 15.
Thomas L. Friedman (2015): “Iran and the Obama Doctrine”, New York Times, 05.04.15.
- 16.
Quote based on Granma’s official version, downloaded 17.12.14 at 13:12:32.
- 17.
In a poll of residents on the island conducted by Bendixen and Amandi International for Univision Noticias and Fusion in collaboration with The Washington Post in March 2015, one of the questions was: “Do you think that the normalization of the relationship between Cuba and the United States is good for Cuba, bad for Cuba, or do you think that it is not of importance for Cuba?” An overwhelming 97% responded that it is good for Cuba. (Washington Post, 08.04.15: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/cuba-poll-2015/).
- 18.
Quite indicative of these attitudes may be some rare public comments by Alejandro Castro Espín, the son of Raúl Castro. Castro Espín, the senior member of the Commission on defence and national security (Consejo de defensa y Seguridad Nacional) was part of the top-secret Cuban team negotiating the start of the normalisation process with the US. He seemed to have maintained the same and strong anti-imperialist rhetoric and rejection of ‘bourgeois democracy’ even after his father initiated the normalisation process (see 16 January 2015 interview in Acropolis, Athens, published in Project Censored, 27 February 2015: http://projectcensored.org/interview-with-alejandro-castro-espin/). Yet, Castro Espín was apparently present at both personal encounters between the two presidents later in 2015 (April in Panama and September in New York).
- 19.
See the previous reference we made to how the end of the Cold War impacted on the internal correlation of forces in the USSR—weakening the Ministry of Defence and the KGB and the anti-reform influence of conservative communists.
- 20.
Reinaldo Escobar: “17D: Cómo se esfuma el optimismo”, 14ymedio, 17.12.15.
- 21.
http://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/diaz-canel-vuelve-el-ala-dura-del-regimen-cubano-n4129974. When Díaz-Canel said “Teatro Latinoanericano”, he obviously meant “Estadio Latinoamericano”, where the two presidents were sitting comradely together to watch a historic US-Cuban baseball match.
- 22.
According to own notes (the author was present).
- 23.
“Obama moves to make Cuba policies ‘irreversible’”, in Miami Herald, 14.10.16, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article108195527.html.
- 24.
Josefina Vidal in address to a student mobilisation against the blockade at the University of Havana on 17 October 2016 reproduced in extenso in Granma 20.10.16 under the title: “President Obama is leaving, but the blockade remains”. Vidal’s speech and a long round of Q&A with the students was printed in a special 12-page annex to Granma on this date, where also a translation to Spanish of President Obama’s decree was reproduced in full, with the following explanation at the end: “Granma is printing in bold those sections which it considers as ‘injerencistas’ (meddling in Cuba’s internal affairs) or remnants of the past policies between Cuba and the United States.” During the same week, Cuban official media ran a strong campaign against the US blockade, seen, for instance, in Granma’s 22 October printed edition running the full-space cover title: ‘Condemnation of a Homicide and Obsolete Policy’.
- 25.
The most concrete object of protest was the so-called pro-democracy programmes (support to NGOs including Radio/TV Martí) which continued under Obama, probably as a politically necessary trade-off with his opponents in Congress that he shared the goal of democracy in Cuba. According to off-the-record remarks by Cuba handlers in State Department, seen by the author, they would be delighted if Congress would end the funding or repeal the programmes themselves by repealing Helms-Burton or its Section 109, which authorises them.
- 26.
In January 2017, at the biggest entertainment theatre in Havana, Teatro Karl Marx, the four favourite Cuban humourists presented the show Ésta es otra historia. By far the biggest applause and the loudest laughter were released by the following comment from El Médico, a clumsy figure representing the Party and the System among the four figures: “What a difficulty we find ourselves in now, that our main enemy is disappearing. I think the only solution is that we find another enemy on whom to blame our problems!” (Recollection from memory (no available manuscript), Teatro Karl Marx, Havana, Sunday 22.01.16 (second performance at 9 pm)). During three weeks in January/February, there were a total of 18 performances, all sold out, with a total number of spectators above 50,000.
- 27.
“Trump outlines new Cuba policy in speech in Miami’s Little Havana”, USA Today, 16.06.17: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/16/donald-trump-cuba-miami/102917748/. Trump claimed in this speech that the Cuban-American community “supported us by tremendous margins” in the presidential elections. This is simply wrong: Post-election analyses showed that Clinton actually won the Cuban-dominated Miami-Dade district over Trump by 290,000 votes (63.7 vs. 34.1%), with wide margins in the most heavily Cuban-American neighbourhoods. According to a 2016 Cuba poll by Florida International University, with a sample of 743 Cuban-American voters in Miami-Dade, nearly 70% said they support the US decision to open diplomatic relations with Cuba and 63% oppose the US embargo of the island nation. (“Was vote by Miami’s Cuban community a referendum on Obama’s policy?”, Miami Herald, 16.12.16: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article121426379.html#storylink=cpy). Also see: https://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/501084734/florida-2016-presidential-and-state-election-results.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
“Mystery of sonic weapon attacks at US embassy in Cuba deepens”, The Guardian, 14.09.17: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/14/mystery-of-sonic-weapon-attacks-at-us-embassy-in-cuba-deepens. We may never know the real story behind ‘the sonic attacks’. Perhaps the theory of ‘mass hysteria’ or imaginary ‘conversion disorder’ will turn out to be the ultimate explanation (Jack Hitt: “The real story behind the Havana Embassy mystery”, Vanity Fair, 6.01.19).
- 32.
“Trump weighs dramatic tightening of US embargo on Cuba”, Washington Post, 17.01.19.
- 33.
- 34.
This argument has been further elaborated in Bye (2016).
- 35.
One of the first serious examples of this was the December 2013 decision in Bolivia to expel the Danish NGO IBIS, which had been working in support of social movements very close to President Morales since long before he became president, apparently because some of their national partners had become more critical to him.
- 36.
The Inter-American Court ordered the halt of a gigantic dam construction in Brazil due to its expected negative effects on the environment and the indigenous population.
- 37.
The US may block the entrance of Cuba to the IFIs. However, membership in the probably most important credit institution, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is closely linked to membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). Cuba’s suspension from the OAS (since 1962) was lifted by a majority vote in 2009 against the protest of the US, at a time when the clear majority of OAS members were clearly sympathetic to Cuba. Cuba made it clear, however, that the country has no intention of returning to this regional body. An option proposed by several economists (ref. Vidal and Scott Brown 2015) is that Cuba starts the approach to IFIs by seeking technical advice, notably from the IMF for the unification of the Cuban currencies.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
Pavel Vidal and Johannes Werner: Economic Trend Report, Fourth Quarter 2018 (received in February 2019).
- 42.
Joaquín Villalobos: “Cubanos go home”. El País, 21.02.19.
- 43.
EU’s top diplomat Federica Mogherini visited Havana in January 2018, signalling that the EU was ready to fill the vacuum left behind by President Trump’s reversal of US rapprochement towards Cuba. She stated that “The EU has become Cuba’s first trade partner and was already the first in investment and development cooperation … which means it is possible to increase the level of economic relations and investments”. She said cooperation agreements in renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, culture and expertise valued at 49 million euros ($59.1 million) would be signed shortly, and that a delegation from the European Investment Bank would visit Cuba later in January. (“EU diplomat meets Cuban President at end of visit”, Reuters, Havana, 05.01.18).
- 44.
In a speech prior to his Latin America trip in February 2018, Secretary of State Tillerson warned about Latin American countries’ “excessive reliance on economic ties with China”, and Russia’s sale of arms and military equipment to “unfriendly governments” (obviously including Cuba), ironically (in the perspective of US historical policies) saying “the region did not need new imperial powers”: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-latam-china/latin-america-should-not-rely-on-china-u-s-secretary-of-state-tillerson-idUSKBN1FL6D5.
- 45.
On Russian commitments: https://www.energia16.com/russia-to-supply-oil-to-cuba/?lang=en; on Algerian deliveries: Reuters (Havana) 11.01.18.
- 46.
“Rusia abre sus brazos al nuevo presidente Cubano”, Redacción Sputnik, 19.04.18.
- 47.
“China-Cuba Relations: Assessing U.S. Stakes”, The Diplomat, 24.12.16 (i.e. based on interview with Emilio Morales).
- 48.
“China’s exports to Cuba slump as island’s cash crunch deepens”; Reuters Havana (Marc Frank) 06.12.17.
- 49.
“Cuba-China relations at all-time high”, Granma (English edition), 02.06.17.
- 50.
Compare to what Gainsborough (2010) described as the authoritarian regional factors impacting on the transition in Vietnam.
- 51.
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Bye, V. (2020). The Evolving International Arena: Fitting into a New Context. In: Cuba, From Fidel to Raúl and Beyond. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21806-5_5
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