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Strong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System

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Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11464))

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Abstract

We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the algorithm Prov (as well Verf) also takes crs as implicit input. Unless otherwise stated, we don’t give it explicitly henceforth.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No. 2016YFB0801201), the Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61802255, 61602396, U1636217) and the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 2017M621472).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Shi-Feng Sun, Dawu Gu, Shuai Han & Yu Yu

  2. Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, China

    Man Ho Au

  3. Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

    Shi-Feng Sun & Joseph Liu

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  1. Shi-Feng Sun
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  2. Dawu Gu
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Correspondence to Dawu Gu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore

    Robert H. Deng

  2. Universidad del Rosario, Bogota, Colombia

    Valérie Gauthier-Umaña

  3. Cyxtera Technologies, Bogota, Colombia

    Martín Ochoa

  4. Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

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Sun, SF., Gu, D., Au, M.H., Han, S., Yu, Y., Liu, J. (2019). Strong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System. In: Deng, R., Gauthier-Umaña, V., Ochoa, M., Yung, M. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11464. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24

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