Introduction

Abstract

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently began their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. In this introductory chapter, I first provide a brief overview of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms competition and some recent trends that threaten to undermine deterrence stability. I then give a synopsis of the underlying political context of Indo-Pakistani relations, focusing mainly on the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which goes back to the partition of India and Pakistan when they gained their independence from Britain in August 1947. The combination of nuclear deterrence and continuing subconventional violence, such as the February 2019 attack on Indian forces in Pulwama, Kashmir, creates a kind of “ugly stability” that is unique in the nuclear era—and a main theme of the book. In the last section of this introduction, I preview the book’s organization by outlining the chapter topics and main arguments.