From a ‘Taste for Science’ to a ‘Taste for Publications’?
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This chapter goes deeper into the analysis of how the BRI has affected researchers’ motivation by testing the so-called crowding-out hypothesis. It has been argued that ‘governance by numbers’ and evaluation of research by output control will decrease scholars’ intrinsically motivated curiosity and substitute a ‘taste for science’ with a ‘taste for publications’ (Osterloh in Anal & Krit 2: 276, 2010). Based on both qualitative data and quantitative analysis, there is no evidence that the BRI has changed what motivates Danish university researchers, but the BRI system may cause crowding-out effects with regard to how intrinsically motivated researchers are in their current job and the goodness of fit they experience between their preference for intrinsic motivational factors and how these are fulfilled in their current work situation.
KeywordsCrowding-out Crowding-in Motivation Self-determination Scholars Taste for science
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