Incentive Systems Surrounding the Modern Scholar

  • Poul Erik MouritzenEmail author
  • Niels Opstrup
Part of the Public Sector Organizations book series (PSO)


Like other institutions, the institution of science has developed an elaborate system for allocating rewards to those members who live up to its norms. The BRI, meanwhile, can be understood as an externally imposed set of authoritative criteria for what is to be considered ‘good’ publication behaviour, which it attempts to stimulate via economic incentives at the university level. The question is then how this new set of incentives fits and interacts with the norms and traditional incentive systems in academia. Do researchers reject it or follow it—or has the system somehow ‘colonized’ the existing incentives? How large a role does the BRI play for Danish university scholars’ publication decisions compared to other academic ‘incentive systems,’ and to what extent do they perceive the BRI system as controlling or supportive?


Academic incentives Principal–agent theory Bibliometric research indicator Colonization 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark
  2. 2.Department of Political Science and Public ManagementUniversity of Southern DenmarkOdenseDenmark

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