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The Just Deserts Economy

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Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality

Abstract

This chapter notes that, were the Just Deserts proposal in fact implemented, the economy would look much different. As such, the chapter highlights three areas of impact: philanthropy, women, and disability. By separating chance from merit, philanthropic organizations will see the characteristics of their beneficiaries radically change. Surprisingly, and justly, the economic gender gap will disappear. Lastly, disability is likely to receive increased attention as ability, opportunity, and desert begin to play such an important role in people’s lives. The hope is that philanthropists, feminists, and stakeholders in the disability field will consider Just Deserts an ally and will seek to further its aims by refining its estimates of merit.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Arneson (2007), 270–210.

  2. 2.

    Anderson (1999), 289; Sugin (2011).

  3. 3.

    Nagel (1979), 24.

  4. 4.

    Anderson (1999).

  5. 5.

    Abramovitz (1996).

  6. 6.

    Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005).

  7. 7.

    Brault (2012), 10–12, also cf. Table 1. Note, by individuals I refer to civilian, non-institutionalized persons.

  8. 8.

    Arneson (2007).

  9. 9.

    Scanlon (1986), 116–117.

  10. 10.

    Lake (2001), 57.

  11. 11.

    Dworkin argues that individuals should be responsible for preferences with which they identify. Dworkin (1981a); Fleurbaey is also very interested in the subjective elements of responsibility. Fleurbaey (2008), chap. 6.

  12. 12.

    Preferences should here be understood to mean first-order or second-order desires or volitions as long as such may be exogenously dependent upon circumstances of chance. Frankfurt (1971), 7–14.

  13. 13.

    Cohen (1989); Roemer (2012), 166.

  14. 14.

    Admittedly, I would like to give more thought to the question of what we owe, if anything, to children under a Just Deserts proposal. Here I proceed tentatively and assume that the skeptic has not persuaded us that post-birth humans are moral agents.

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Correspondence to Joseph de la Torre Dwyer .

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Dwyer, J.d.l.T. (2020). The Just Deserts Economy. In: Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21126-4_13

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