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Cyber Attack Localization in Smart Grids by Graph Modulation (Brief Announcement)

  • Elisabeth DrayerEmail author
  • Tirza Routtenberg
Conference paper
  • 567 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11527)

Abstract

In this brief announcement we present our ongoing work to localize “false data injection” (FDI) attacks on the system state of modern power systems, better known as smart grids. Because of their exceptional importance for our society and together with the increasing presence of information and telecommunication (ICT) components, these power systems are a vulnerable target for cyber attacks. In our method, we represent the power system as a graph and use a generalized modulation operator that is applied on the states of the system. Our preliminary results indicate that attacked grid states exhibit specific modulation patterns that facilitate the localization of the attacks on the particular buses of the grid. This approach is demonstrated by several case study simulations.

Keywords

False data injection (FDI) attacks Anomaly detection Graph signal processing Laplacian matrix Smart grid 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeer ShevaIsrael

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