Abstract
Life Imprisonment, unlike the death penalty, does not attract the attention of the doctrine. There are, however, significant developments in the European Court of Human Rights case law. In this paper, using a comparative methodology, we highlight the standard that, at international level, allows to consider Life Imprisonment compatible with human dignity-that is the right to a substantial judicial review. It is no longer acceptable that the ‘last word’ on the lifers’ early release is still entrusted to political power.
Davide Galliani is Associate Professor of Public Law and Jean Monnet Professor of Fundamental Rights, University of Milan. This contribution develops some reflections previously exposed in Galliani (2016).
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Notes
- 1.
The Amnesty Law Database, created by Professor Louise Mallinder, University of Ulster (http://www.politicalsettlements.org/portfolio/amnesties/: last access: 8 April, 2019).
- 2.
The most recent book in this subject is Novak (2015).
- 3.
See Center For Law and Global Justice (2012), p. 25, note 144. These States are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, China, Comoros, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. In note 145, the document underlines that there were twenty-one countries for which researchers could not locate statutory or case law text confirming whether LWOP exists or not. They are: Barbados, Bhutan, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates.
- 4.
In chronological order: (1) United Kingdom: Vinter and Others v. UK, Grand Chamber, July 9, 2013 (Article 3, violation) and Hutchinson v. UK, Grand Chamber, January 17, 2017 (Article 3, no violation); (2) the Netherlands: Murray v. Netherlands, Grand Chamber, April 26, 2016 (Article 3, violation); (3) Turkey: Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2), Second Section, March 18, 2014 (Article 3, violation) [final] and other cases against Turkey; (4) Hungary: László Magyar v. Hungary, Second Section, May 20, 2014 (Article 3, violation) [final]; (5) Bulgaria: Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, Fourth Section, July 8, 2014 (Article 3, violation) [final]; (6) Slovakia: Cacko v. Slovakia, Third Section, July 22, 2014 (Article 3: violation, no violation) [final]; (7) Lithuania: Matiošaitis v. Lithuania, Former Second Section, May 23, 2017 (Article 3, violation) [final]; (8) Petukhov v. Ukraine no. 2, Fourth Section, March 12, 2019 (Article 3: violation).
- 5.
We can not consider Lynch and Whelan v. Ireland, Fifth Section, July 8, 2014, app. nos. 70495/10 and 74565/10, a decision of inadmissibility. The reason is that in Ireland Life Imprisonment Without Parole does not appear to exist. The Irish system seems different from the one of the United Kingdom. Also the case of Cyprus is out of our considerations: after Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Grand Chamber, February 12, 2008 (Article 3, no violation; article 5, § 4, violation) the State introduced Parole (Release) Board.
- 6.
Another interesting question here no subject to discussion, is the existence (or not) of a binding international law that prohibits the use of the clemency powers relating to genocide, crime against humanity, and others. In any case, for the Life Imprisonment in the United States, see Flanagan (1995), Berry (2010), Ogletree and Sarat (2012).
- 7.
This point is crucial. In some cases, it can happen that the Minister explains the motivations of his or her decision. For example, the Minister could send a ‘personal’ letter to lifer. Does the Minister have to do this? No. These particular cases are not usual and especially are not provided by law. In most cases, the Minister uses only one words: ‘no’. This is what law allows. See for more (interesting) reflections, Griffin and O’Donnel (2012), and Griffin (2015).
- 8.
See the excellent book of Appleton (2010).
- 9.
Apart from the importance of rehabilitation, highlighted by the Resolutions of the Council of Europe (see Appendix), in some of these States, where Life Imprisonment has only retributive scope, the deterrent goal of penalties is deny because it is against human dignity!
- 10.
Without considering that, in the case of mandatory Life Imprisonment, the problem doubles. The space of the judicial review is limited at the beginning and at the end.
- 11.
- 12.
Article 27, § 3 of the Italian Constitution: ‘Punishment cannot be inhuman treatment and must aim at the rehabilitation of the convict’ (‘Le pene non possono consistere in trattamenti contrari al senso di umanità e devono tendere alla rieducazione del condannato’).
- 13.
“Zu den Voraussetzungen eines menschenwürdigen Strafvollzugs gehört, daß dem zu lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe Verurteilten grundsätzlich eine Chance verbleibt, je wieder der Freiheit teilhaftig zu werden. Die Möglichkeit der Begnadigung allein ist nicht ausreichend” (45 BVerfGE 187, June 21, 1977). Thanks’ to Professor Dirk Van Zyl Smit for the translation.
- 14.
European Court of Human Rights, Stafford v. UK, Grand Chamber, May 28, 2002, § 78 (unanimously finding violation of Article 5, § 1 and Article 5, § 4).
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Galliani, D. (2019). Judicial Review and Life Imprisonment. In: Pinto de Albuquerque, P., Wojtyczek, K. (eds) Judicial Power in a Globalized World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20744-1_14
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