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Russian Nationalism in Education, the Media, and Religion

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Putin’s Totalitarian Democracy

Abstract

Langdon and Tismaneanu examine how the Kremlin’s propagandizing efforts have successfully embedded themselves within Russian society, making nationalism and Putinist ideology an inescapable daily influence in the lives of all Russian citizens. This chapter explores how decades of one-sided narratives enforced by ideological state apparatuses such as the education system, the media, and the Russian Orthodox Church have squelched divergent thought among the Russian population. As a result, these institutions themselves perpetuate the Kremlin’s indoctrinating mission, reproducing nationalist tropes that serve Vladimir Putin’s state and foreclose avenues of friendly encounter with much of the world. This chapter sets the stage for understanding why the Russian citizenry continuously provides Putin with a mandate for power.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Levada Center, “Pride and Patriotism,” Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 9 December 2015. We emphasize this particular survey in our text because its questions are the most direct and applicable to our research. A few other studies have been conducted since this 2015 poll, of course, and readers are encouraged to look them up, but they are not mentioned here because the wordings are not nearly as relevant to the sociological phenomenon around which we have written this book.

  2. 2.

    Anna Arutunyan, The Putin Mystique: Inside Russia’s Power Cult (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2015), pp. 276 and 278.

  3. 3.

    Levada Center, “Democracy in today’s Russia,” Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 20 January 2016.

  4. 4.

    Robert C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1987), p. 17.

  5. 5.

    Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, speech by Vladimir Putin, “Stenograficheskij otchet o vstreche s delegatami Vserossijskoj konferencii prepodavatelej gumanitarnyh i obshhestvennyh nauk,” 21 June 2007.

  6. 6.

    Anna Plotnikova, “Russia’s New Education Minister Gives Stalin a Nod,” Voice of America, 25 August 2016.

  7. 7.

    Eva Hartog, “God, Stalin, and Patriotism—Meet Russia’s New Education Chief,” The Moscow Times, 25 August 2016.

  8. 8.

    For more on this subject, see Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine (London: Allen Lane, 2017).

  9. 9.

    Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2012), p. 218.

  10. 10.

    Mikhail K. Gorshkov, “The Sociology of Post-reform Russia” in Russia: The Challenges of Transformation, eds. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Dmitri Trenin (New York: New York University Press, 2011), p. 147; Mikhail Gorbachev, The New Russia (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), p. 425.

  11. 11.

    Plotnikova, “Russia’s New Education Minister”; Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014), p. 198.

  12. 12.

    Tismaneanu, The Devil in History, p. 218; Leszek Kołakowski. Freedom, Fame, Lying and Betrayal: Essays on Everyday Life, translated by Agnieszka Kołakowska (London and New York: The Penguin Group, 1999), pp. 36–37.

  13. 13.

    Though it is true that Nashi is now defunct, it is nevertheless mentioned here because it made enormous impacts on Russia’s youth. Different youth organizations, including the others also listed in our text, operate using similar tactics, methods, principles, and structures as Nashi did.

  14. 14.

    Tom Balmforth, “Network, Son Of Nashi: New Youth Group Seeks To Woo Russia’s Middle Class,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Molodaya Gvardiya, “Napravlenia,” Molodaya Gvardiya.

  15. 15.

    Sarah Oates, “Russia’s Media and Political Communication in the Digital Age,” in Developments in Russian Politics, 8th ed., eds. Stephen White, Richard Sakwa, and Harney E. Hale (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), pp. 130–144.

  16. 16.

    Anne Garrels, Putin Country: A Journey into the Real Russia (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2016), pp. 182–183.

  17. 17.

    Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, p. 48.

  18. 18.

    Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (New York: Viking Press, 2015), p. 313. It is unsurprising to note that Putin later appointed Kiselev to head Russia’s latest government-owned international news agency Rossiya Segodnya in 2013.

  19. 19.

    Timothy Snyder, “Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine,” The New York Review, 20 March 2014.

  20. 20.

    Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 109.

  21. 21.

    Michael McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2018), pp. 242, 297, and 435.

  22. 22.

    Garrels, Putin Country, pp. 185–186.

  23. 23.

    Dan Kovalik, The Plot to Scapegoat Russia: How the CIA and the Deep State Have Conspired to Vilify Russia (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), pp. 25–27.

  24. 24.

    Kovalik, The Plot to Scapegoat Russia, p. 128.

  25. 25.

    Levada Center, “Trust in the Mass Media,” Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 26 October 2015.

  26. 26.

    Francesca Borri inspired this connection in her book Syrian Dust: Reporting from the Heart of the War (2016). Though it is specifically a brave condemnation of the international community’s utter failure when it comes to the Syrian people, Borri’s book recounts the ails of society, in general. This journalist’s lament of the state of today’s media is more than applicable to Russia. Francesca Borri, Syrian Dust: Reporting from the Heart of the War, trans. Anne Milano Appel (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2016), p. 130.

  27. 27.

    For more on how the Russian government’s propaganda spreads to the West, see Timothy Snyder’s fifth chapter, “Truth or Lies,” in The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), pp. 159–216.

  28. 28.

    Marc Bennetts, “Russia considers ban on Armando Iannucci’s film The Death of Stalin,” The Guardian, 20 September 2017; Marc Bennetts, “Russia pulls ‘despicable’ Death of Stalin from cinemas,” The Guardian, 23 January 2018; “Death of Cinema?” Russian Life, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 (March/April 2018), pp. 7–8.

  29. 29.

    “Kinoteatru ‘Pioner’ grozit shtraf do 300 tysjach rublej za pokaz ‘Smerti Stalina,’” NewsRu, 19 February 2018.

  30. 30.

    Bennetts, “Russia pulls ‘despicable’ Death of Stalin.”

  31. 31.

    Levada Center, “Institutional Trust,” Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 16 October 2015.

  32. 32.

    M. Steven Fish, “The Kremlin Emboldened: What is Putinism?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2017), p. 63; Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: Public Affairs, 2016), p. 235.

  33. 33.

    Marcel Van Herpen, Putin’s Propaganda Machine (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 129 and 149: Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, p. 312.

  34. 34.

    Stella Rock, “Russian Piety and Orthodox Culture 1380–1589” in Eastern Christianity, ed. Michael Angold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 275; Thomas Bremer, “How the Russian Orthodox Church Views the ‘Russian World’” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2015), p. 43.

  35. 35.

    Steven Cassedy, Dostoevsky’s Religion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 80.

  36. 36.

    Emil Pain, “Socio-Cultural Factors and Russian Modernization” in Waiting for Reform Under Putin and Medvedev, eds. Lena Jonson and Stephen White (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 98.

  37. 37.

    RT News, Vladimir Putin interviewed by RT News, “Putin Q&A on RT: President on 1st visit to RT’s state-of-the-art HQ,” RT News, 12 June 2013.

  38. 38.

    Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), p. 157; Yegor Kholmogorov, “Atomnoe pravoslavie,” Russkii Obozrevatel, 31 August 2008; Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, pp. 184–188.

  39. 39.

    Sandra Bjelica, “Discourse Analysis of the Masculine Representation of Vladimir Putin” thesis, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, 2014; Leon Aron, “Novorossiya!” Commentary Magazine, 1 December 2014; Cheng Chen, The Return of Ideology: The Search for Regime Identities in Postcommunist Russia and China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), p. 80.

  40. 40.

    Peter Pomerantsev, “Putin’s God Squad: The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics,” Newsweek, 10 September 2012; M. Steven Fish, “What Has Russia Become?” Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April 2018), p. 330.

  41. 41.

    Fish, “What is Putinism?” p. 61.

  42. 42.

    Ben Judah, Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 152.

  43. 43.

    St. George is known as the man who, according to Christian tradition, slayed a terrifying dragon and saved countless human lives and has since become one of the most often-depicted saints in Christian religious icons.

  44. 44.

    The Orange Revolution is one of the several color revolutions of the early 2000s. These were popular movements formed by citizens that sought to promote democracy and to fight corruption. They occurred in former Soviet states, for the most part.

  45. 45.

    Andreas Umland, “New Extremely Right-Wing Intellectual Circles in Russia: The Anti-Orange Committee, the Isborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club” Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 135 (August 2013), p. 3. The brazen association made by the Russian state between all Ukrainians who protested for transparent governance and the Nazi regime is an egregiously apparent attempt at slandering the cause of the color revolutions as a whole.

  46. 46.

    Neil Smelser, The Social Edges of Psychoanalysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 87.

  47. 47.

    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russian Nationalists Attack Event for High-School History Students,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 April 2016.

  48. 48.

    For more on the difference between mass mobilization and the supervision of stability among the Russian population, see Fish, “What is Putinism?” p. 62.

  49. 49.

    Fish, “What is Putinism?” p. 64.

  50. 50.

    Zdzisław Mach, “The concepts of culture and civilization,” European Civilization (class lecture, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland, 4 October 2018).

  51. 51.

    Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, p. 61.

  52. 52.

    Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons: An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), p. 224.

  53. 53.

    Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 107–108.

  54. 54.

    Gorbachev, The New Russia, p. 425.

  55. 55.

    Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 10–11.

  56. 56.

    Lucas, The New Cold War, pp. 8–9. The election has never officially been declared fraudulent, but it is common knowledge that as the election approached, Yeltsin’s popularity was sinking. The vote counts reported from various regions of the Russian Federation did not seem to jibe with this pattern. According to the data, Yeltsin won absurd percentages of votes in places like Chechnya, which he had just spent the last few years viciously bombing as a part of the First Chechen War.

  57. 57.

    Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2014). We refer readers to Karen Dawisha’s excellent examination of the shocking depth of corruption embedded within the Russian state at the behest of its top leaders.

  58. 58.

    Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy, p. 323.

  59. 59.

    Richard Lourie, Putin: His Downfall and Russia’s Coming Crash (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2017), p. 220; Voice of America, “‘Terrible Crimes’ Made Putin World’s Richest Person, Financier Testifies,” Voice of America, 27 July 2017.

  60. 60.

    Lucas, The New Cold War, p. 18; Graeme Gill, “Russia and the Vulnerability of Electoral Authoritarianism?” Slavic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Summer 2016), p. 372; Sarah Henderson, “Review Essay,” Slavic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Summer 2016), p. 447.

  61. 61.

    Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), p. 140.

  62. 62.

    Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, p. 66.

  63. 63.

    Masha Gessen, “The Wrath of Putin,” Vanity Fair, April 2012.

  64. 64.

    McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace, p. 70.

  65. 65.

    Leszek Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 189.

  66. 66.

    Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 141.

  67. 67.

    Arutunyan, The Putin Mystique, p. 215.

  68. 68.

    The Valdai Discussion Club is an organization established by several Russian educational and research-oriented institutions in 2004 to share (rather biased) information about Russia with intellectuals and foreign experts all over the world.

  69. 69.

    The Moscow Times, “‘No Putin, No Russia,’ Says Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff,” The Moscow Times, 23 October 2014.

  70. 70.

    The Moscow Times, “Russian Candymaker Hopes Putin Chocolate Bars Are a Recipe for Success,” The Moscow Times, 26 November 2014.

  71. 71.

    Graham H. Roberts, Consumer Culture, Branding and Identity in the New Russia: From Five-year Plan to 4x4 (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 82–83.

  72. 72.

    Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, pp. 67, 126, and 148.

  73. 73.

    Vladimir Voinovich, The Anti-Soviet Soviet Union, trans. Richard Lourie (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p. 38.

  74. 74.

    Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, p. 66; Levada Center, “Is Russia a superpower?” Levada Center: Yuri Levada Analytical Center, 3 December 2015.

  75. 75.

    Luke March, “Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition,” Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall 2009), p. 527.

  76. 76.

    Graeme B. Robertson, “Managing Society: Protests, Civil Society, and Regime in Putin’s Russia,” Slavic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall 2009), p. 546.

  77. 77.

    Agamben, State of Exception, p. 33; Mariana Budjeryn, “Violence, Power, and Nuclear Putin,” The World Affairs Journal, 15 May 2014.

  78. 78.

    Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. xxxiii.

  79. 79.

    Joanna Bourke, “Why does politics turn to violence?” in Global Politics: A New Introduction, 2nd ed., eds. Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 475–476; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism; Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004), p. 41; Franz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 17.

  80. 80.

    Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 121; Pomerantsev, Nothing is True, p. 86.

  81. 81.

    For more on the pogrom that occurred in Jedwabne, Poland, see Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

  82. 82.

    Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, p. 249.

  83. 83.

    While the two men who attacked Galina Starovoitova were arrested and jailed, it is widely believed that the Russian state security services ordered her murder. Amy Knight, Orders to Kill: the Putin Regime and Political Murder (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2017), pp. 57–78.

  84. 84.

    Galina Starovoitova, “Weimar Russia?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 108–109.

  85. 85.

    “Brainwashed” should be acknowledged as a contentious term. Is it actually “brainwashing” if the person or entity advocating for a certain topic believes in it? Do Russian state officials truly believe in the unrivaled superiority of their nation and all the ideological assumptions that accompany it? This is an intriguing topic that deserves to be explored in an opus of its own. Without such a detailed analysis, and for lack of a better term, “brainwashed” is used here in our research. George Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism,” Polemic, October 1945.

  86. 86.

    Bourke, “Why does politics turn to violence?” p. 480.

  87. 87.

    Arutunyan, The Putin Mystique, p. 9.

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Langdon, K.C., Tismaneanu, V. (2020). Russian Nationalism in Education, the Media, and Religion. In: Putin’s Totalitarian Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20579-9_6

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