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Singapore: Working Towards Prosperity

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Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Economic Community
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Abstract

There are three main sections in this chapter. The first section gives an overview of the economy and an insight into the ethos behind both the single-minded pursuit of material success and the mode of governance which characterizes Singapore. The second section examines the history of growth in the twentieth century, noting the consistent implementation of evolving but consistent policies including the development of human capital. The third section describes developments in the twenty-first century such as new destinations for trade and changing investment patterns.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    An offshore financial centre operates as a sink if the funds remain in it. It operates as a conduit if most funds are redirected to other locations for long-term deposit. Expressed in terms of Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017), “Sink-OFCs [offshore financial centres] attract and retain foreign capital while conduit-OFCs are attractive intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments and enable the transfer of capital without taxation.”

  2. 2.

    One apparent exception to this is Singapore’s prominent place on The Economist’s “crony capitalism index.” However, this has little to do with rent seeking within Singapore and much to do with expat billionaires exploiting protected industries in their home countries. See Anonymous 2016.

  3. 3.

    This is the estimate of Sim et al. (2014), based on Bloomberg data for 2008–2013. Stock market capitalization is the total value of all shares traded on the stock market. In 2008, 26 of the largest 100 business corporations were government linked (Tan 2010). However, the principle state-owned holding company, Temasek, has been diversifying out of Singapore, halving from about 50% holdings within Singapore in 2004 to about 27% in 2018 (Temasek 2018).

    King (2017) estimates revenues of the diverse holdings of Temasek are roughly equal to 20% of Singapore’s GDP.

  4. 4.

    Popular wisdom conceives economic governance as a theatre in which business competes against private citizens for the allocation of wealth that is produced. The attraction of this lobbying model is the limitation of government power. Unfortunately, it omits a simple truth: because businesses organize private citizens for the production of wealth, social welfare is a key element in planning economic development. Singapore calculated expenditures on social welfare as part of development planning.

  5. 5.

    Mr Lim Kim San spearheaded Singapore’s public housing in the 1960s to address the critical shortage of housing. He was the first chairman of Housing Development Board; one of the early projects was to build two blocks of flats in Tanjong Pagar (in Central Singapore) to house workers employed by the Tanjong Pagar Harbour Board (now the Port Authority of Singapore).

  6. 6.

    This had a curious effect upon the demand side make-up of GDP (C+I+G+(X−M)) or households and NPISHs’ final consumption expenditure + gross capital formation + general government final consumption expenditure + external balance on goods and services. (NPISH stands for non-profit institutions serving households such as churches and political parties, and their expenditures are normally considerably less than those of households. Most data sources such as the World Bank combine their expenditures with those of households.) The average profile of OECD countries serves as a reference: private consumption at 60%, investment a little over 20%, government consumption expenditure around 20% and more or less balanced trade (0%). General government final consumption expenditure in Singapore has hovered around 10%, half the proportion of OECD countries. Gross capital formation has at times varied markedly, and will be discussed in the section “The Twenty-First Century: New Horizons” but otherwise hovered around 35%. External balance on goods and services and households and NPISHs’ final consumption expenditure together have totalled about 55–60% as in the OECD countries, but the proportions of the two have varied dramatically GDP. This has led some critics to claim that households are being squeezed in Singapore with less and less disposable income to spend. Statistics of household expenditure show steady increase with the exception of the external shocks of the Konfrontasi campaign, the Asian financial crisis and the recession caused by the global financial crisis. Household expenditure has not been squeezed but rather simply has been displaced by trade because of the basic algebra of the demand side of GDP.

    The total of trade and household expenditure maintaining a level of about 60% except for a couple of troughs in the early 1970s and early 1980s. These troughs coincide more or less with peaks in gross capital formation in Singapore, otherwise around 35% for the last 30 years of the twentieth century.

  7. 7.

    There are several good descriptions of the “stages” in Singapore’s development, for example, in Soon and Stoever (1996):

    • import substitution (1959–1965)

    • labour-intensive export-oriented manufacturing (1966–1973)

    • first attempts at upgrading the economy (1973–1978)

    • economic restructuring (1979–1984)

    • retrenchment and further diversification (1985 onwards)

    • Menon (2015) adds the rise of services

    Other descriptions of stages can be found in Lan 2001, Seetoh and Ong 2008, Auyong 2014 and 2016. For a capsule summary, see Economic Development Board n.d.

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Correspondence to Roderick Macdonald .

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Appendix

Appendix

The development of the economy of Singapore has been repeatedly described as a graduation up the ladder of value and technical know-how. The Economic Complexity Index (with scores labelled ECI and the more accurate ECI+) is an indicator of the degree of complexity of a nation’s economy. One thus might expect ECI and ECI+ scores over the years to map out the evolution of Singapore’s progress. However, ECI and ECI+ do not directly measure the complexity of processes producing goods and services. The fundamental calculation is based on the diversity of exports and their ubiquity (the number of countries able to produce them weighted by the complexity of each of those countries). Thus, complexity and sophistication are not synonymous. Complexity is measured by diversity and uniqueness of offerings. Sophistication is indicated by the technical refinement and complexity of a process as well as its educational requirements for operators.

Both the start and the end of the curve in Fig. 6.14 seem to contradict the narrative of Singapore steadily moving up the ladder of technical sophistication. One solution would be to argue that industrial policies took time to have an effect (although this would not explain the decrease in complexity from 1964 to 1967 and 1970) and that either those policies were abandoned with the Asian financial crisis (ECI+) or in 1993 (ECI) or there was no room for greater complexity at those points. Regarding the latter part of the curve, human ingenuity, current developments in technology and the higher rankings of other countries belie the last explanation. Nor has the government of Singapore abandoned the pursuit of greater sophistication among its businesses.

Fig. 6.14
A graph represents the economic complexity index for Singapore from 1964 to 2016. The lines plotted for the 2 indicators, E C I and E C I plus, depict fluctuating and growing trends.

Index of complexity for Singapore 1964–2016. ECI+ is a better indicator than ECI according to Albeaik et al. 2017. Data source: Observatory of Economic Complexity

One problem is the data on which the index is based: services are excluded. This is not an oversight of the creators of the index, but simply a limitation of the data available across countries (Hausmann et al. 2018, p. 23). Because Singapore has a population under six million, it does not aspire to extremely complex manufacturing requiring a vast domestic network of tributary producers. Rather, it seeks sophistication in services. This is not captured by the Economic Complexity Index.

A second limitation of the index in its current form is revealed in Fig. 6.15.

Fig. 6.15
A graph compares the economic complexity index of 5 countries from 1964 to 2016, namely, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. All of them depict growing trends with fluctuations.

Evolution of complexity compared. Data source: Atlas of Economic Complexity

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have curves of a similar shape. They have different starting points, and the curve for Indonesia has the most dramatic slope of the three from 1976 to 1992, rising more sharply than that of Singapore. This corresponds to the better years under Suharto, during which economic policy was dictated by the “Berkeley Mafia” and foreign direct investment skyrocketed. This more pronounced slope might make sense. However, the general similarity of the curves for the three countries is a little surprising. Further, although the curves for Thailand and the Philippines are different, the general upward trend is there.

What is happening? There seem to be two factors at play. First, the world economy is more complex today than it was in 1964. A country could be losing ground with respect to the rest of the world but still increase in economic complexity. So there could well be a general upward trend in the curve of a country like the Philippines even though that economy was relatively stagnant from 1982 to 2004. Second, the data for economic complexity are taken from exports. Exports represented between 150% and 200% of GDP in Singapore until 2018 excepting the anomaly years to 1972 and the four years thereafter (see Fig. 6.16). As a result, the complexity of the economy adding value is diluted by the trade throughput.

Fig. 6.16
A line graph depicts the Singapore exports of goods and services as the percentage of G D P. It has several fluctuations.

Singapore exports of goods and services (% of GDP). Data source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files

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Macdonald, R., Tan, S. (2019). Singapore: Working Towards Prosperity. In: Macdonald, R. (eds) Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Economic Community. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19722-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19722-3_6

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