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Socioeconomic Contention in Post-2011 Egypt and Tunisia: A Comparison

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Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America

Part of the book series: Middle East Today ((MIET))

Abstract

This chapter presents the results of a quantitative protest event data analysis. In line with the overall topic of the book, the focus is on the dynamics of socioeconomic protests since the 2011 revolutions. Empirically, the chapter is based on the data provided by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which has been coded and analyzed so as to specifically grasp socioeconomic contention. After briefly describing the data and the methods used, the chapter presents and discusses the main findings on the overall evolution of protests and the specific dynamics of socioeconomic contention in Egypt and Tunisia between 2011 and 2016. After looking at the protest numbers in both countries and their evolution over time, it assesses the protest actors, their claims, the different tactics used, and the geographical patterns of socioeconomic protests. In a final step, the chapter discusses the results of the data analysis from a comparative perspective and finds important differences in the quantity and striking similarities in the quality of socioeconomic protest in the two countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    To test our findings from the ACLED database we compared them with findings from other sets of data on protest events in both North African countries provided by different national NGOs. In all data sets we found similar dynamics. For further details see footnotes 2 and 6 in this chapter.

  2. 2.

    Since May 2014 the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux, FTDES) has published monthly reports on protest events all over the country. The so-called OST (Rapports de l’Observatoire Social Tunisien) reports contain information on the protest actors and their demands as well as on the types of action. The protest numbers are considerably higher than in ACLED, which might be due to their inclusion of Arabic-speaking media articles, in which small-scale protest actions are also mentioned. Furthermore, FTDES owns local offices in the marginalized regions, in which information and data on protest actions in those regions are collected. However, since both databases ACLED and OST showed very similar trends, ACLED represents a valid set of data for further analysis. For further information, see https://ftdes.net/ (accessed 26 June 2017).

  3. 3.

    The National Dialogue Quartet received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 for its outstanding contributions to the political development of post-revolutionary Tunisia.

  4. 4.

    The category “unions, political parties, and protest alliances” includes mostly protest actions organized by one specific trade union or political party. However, few protest alliances between different trade unions and civil society organizations were counted—most of them in 2011. Those protest alliances also fall under this category.

  5. 5.

    Different groups of workers from the service, industrial, or fishing and agricultural sectors have been placed in a different category from trade unions such as the UGTT. First, those groups of protest actors have been named “employees” in media reporting, mostly without any reference to external support by the trade unions. Second, as Beissinger et al. (2012, p. 15) point out, in most of the cases, people who described their occupation as “workers” in the Arab Barometer (2011) were not members of a trade union. By contrast, trade union members were mostly government employees or professionals and people in “other occupations” (Beissinger et al. 2012, p. 15).

  6. 6.

    A few other databases on labor protests in Egypt since 2011 are provided by Egyptian NGOs. In their reports on workers’ protests, the Economic Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) analyzed labor protests in post-revolutionary Egypt. ECESR counted significantly more labor protests than ACLED. These differences in protest numbers, again, might stem from the fact that they coded Arab-speaking media coverage, in which even small-scale strikes and protest events have been reported on. Yet, we observe very similar trends in both databases. Consequently, we decided to work with ACLED, which represents the most comprehensive of all three databases.

  7. 7.

    For the role of workers’ strikes and the independent trade unions in Egypt during the 2011 uprisings and beyond, see Chap. 6 (in this volume).

  8. 8.

    Egypt’s 2000s were marked by workers’ movements demanding higher wages and the payment of bonuses and “other wage supplements critical to bringing income to a level that can sustain survival” (Beinin 2011, p. 191). Those protests, as Beinin (2011, p. 192) argues, lacked “a national or regional trade union or political organizational framework.” In the same vein, workers’ protests that accompanied the ouster of Mubarak in 2011 were held by workers who demonstrated as individuals without any organizational support (Beinin 2011, p. 194).

  9. 9.

    After the first round of parliamentary elections and only four months after its first session had taken place, the parliament was dissolved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which thus gained legislative power before Mursi became president (Pioppi 2013, p. 58).

  10. 10.

    The highest ranked governorates are Port Said, Suez, Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta. Only in 2010 was Cairo replaced by Ismailia in the group of the top five ranks for the first time since 1995. This is partly explained by Ismailia’s remarkable increase in the education index as a sub-index of the Human Development Index (EHDR 2010, p. 21).

  11. 11.

    Among the 13 best-performing governorates, only Luxor, which is a very small governorate located in Upper Egypt, is listed at rank number 12. It performs slightly better than the Lower Egypt governorate Beheira (rank number 13) in the UNDP Report on Poverty in Egypt. However, this does not crucially influence our findings on the gap between Lower and Upper Egypt. Consequently, Luxor has been placed in the category of the lower performing Upper Egypt regions in following discussions.

  12. 12.

    Official population numbers are taken from the Statistical Yearbook (2016) of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in Egypt. For further information, see CAPMAS (2016).

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Correspondence to Prisca Jöst .

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Jöst, P., Vatthauer, JP. (2020). Socioeconomic Contention in Post-2011 Egypt and Tunisia: A Comparison. In: Weipert-Fenner, I., Wolff, J. (eds) Socioeconomic Protests in MENA and Latin America. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19621-9_3

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