Conventional Commitment

Fenrich, Katrin

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-19281-5_2

Katrin Fenrich²

132 Accesses

Abstract

The following chapter will shed light on the conventional commitment of States to the three selected international enforcement mechanisms. First, it will analyze the modalities of accession to the constitutive instrument (Sect. 2.1), second, the right to submit reservations (Sect. 2.2) and third, the right to withdraw from the constitutive treaty (Sect. 2.3).

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Notes

1.
Aust (2013), p. 101.
2.
See Article 11 VCLT which lists the “means to be bound by a treaty” and thus the options of expressing consent.
3.
Shany emphasizes that “an additional consent before the exercise of jurisdiction” after the State ratified the relevant constitutive instrument is not necessary, Shany (2014), p. 71.
4.
Hathaway (2005), p. 514.
5.
Ebobrah (2014), p. 240.
6.
Raustiala (2005), p. 609.
7.
Galbraith (2013), p. 322.
8.
Article 14 CERD; Article 22 (1) CAT; Article 77 (1) CRMW; Article 31 CED.
9.
Galbraith (2013), p. 322.
10.
Galbraith rightly points out that “[a]s a legal matter, these mechanisms are basically equivalent: both allow states to take on optional commitments of a similar nature.”, Galbraith (2013), p. 314.
11.
See Galbraith (2013), p. 322 who detects that “[t]he presumption [regarding the opt-out clause] is thus the opposite from that in opt-in clauses”; see also Nowak et al. (2008), p. 837 para. 2 (Article 28).
12.
Nowak et al. (2008), Article 28 para. 2.
13.
Opsahl (1992), pp. 371 f.
14.
Article 14 CERD; Article 22 (1) CAT; Article 77 (1) CRMW and Article 31 CED.
15.
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD.
16.
Bossuyt (1987), p. 797. A/6546 para. 480 and 798 f. A/6546 para. 484.
17.
Galbraith (2013), p. 340.
18.
Bossuyt (1987), pp. 798 f. A/6546 para. 484; McGoldrick (1994), p. 124.
19.
Bossuyt (1987), pp. 798 f. A/6546 paras. 483 f.
20.
Bossuyt (1987), p. 798. A/6546 para. 484.
21.
Bossuyt (1987), pp. 797 f. A/6546 para. 481.
22.
The United Nations Treaty Collection lists 116 States Parties to the OP ICCPR, United Nations, ‘Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General’ https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx, Chapter IV No. 5.
23.
The United Nations Treaty Collection lists 109 States Parties to the OP CEDAW, ibid, Chapter IV No. 8b.
24.
Ibid, Chapter IV No. 9.
25.
Ibid, Chapter IV.
26.
Hathaway (2003), p. 14.
27.
Hathaway (2003), p. 7.
28.
Christian Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al. (2012), p. 656 para. 34 (Article 36).
29.
Article 93 (1) and (2) UN Charter.
30.
Article 36 (1) ICJ Statute.
31.
United Nations Committee of Jurists (1945), pp. 226 ff.; Christian Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al. (2012), p. 639 para. 5 (Article 36).
32.
International Court of Justice, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda): Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application’ (Judgment of 3 February 2006) 2006 ICJ Reports 6, 18 para. 21; International Court of Justice, ‘Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France)’ (Judgment of 4 June 2008) 2008 ICJ Reports 177, 204 para. 62.
33.
Shany (2014), p. 169.
34.
Article 40 (1) ICJ Statute; the compromis constitutes “an agreement for the immediate reference of a specific dispute to settlement by a judicial or arbitral body”, Thirlway (2019), para. 1.
35.
Article 38 (5) Rules of Court; the “ forum prorogatum is a form of jurisdiction which is based on an agreement between the parties that is made and enters into force after the proceedings have been instituted”, Rosenne (2006), p. 672; on the issue see generally Yee (2003), pp. 701 ff.
36.
Article 36 (1) ICJ Statute.
37.
Article 36 (2) ICJ Statute.
38.
Oda (2000), p. 257; Tomka (2002), p. 554.
39.
General Assembly, ‘Report of the International Court of Justice’ (11 August 2016) UN Doc. A/71/4, p. 14 para. 52.
40.
For a list of all States having submitted a declaration under Article 36 (2) ICJ Statute see United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter I No. 4.
41.
Shany provides a table on the “Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction, Relative to UN Membership”, Shany (2014), p. 171.
42.
International Court of Justice, ‘Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 26 November 1957) 1957 ICJ Reports 125, 146; International Court of Justice, ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada): Jurisdiction of the Court’ (Judgment of 4 December 1998) 1998 ICJ Reports 432, 453 para. 46.
43.
International Court of Justice, ‘Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 24 May 2007) 2007 ICJ Reports 582, 596 f. para. 32 and 617 para. 98.
44.
International Court of Justice, ‘Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Preliminary Objections’ Judgment of 18 November 1953 ICJ Reports 111, 112.
45.
Article 36 (1) ICJ Statute.
46.
Rosenne (2006), p. 645 para. 176.
47.
Owada (26 October 2010), p. 2.
48.
Owada (26 October 2010), p. 2.
49.
International Court of Justice, ‘LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America)’ Judgment of 27 June 2001 ICJ Reports 466, 475 para. 15 and 514 para. 128 (1) relying on Article 1 of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963; International Court of Justice, ‘Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)’ (Judgment of 31 March 2004) 2004 ICJ Reports 12, 28 para. 22.
50.
International Court of Justice, ‘Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 24 July 1964) 1964 ICJ Reports 6, 9.
51.
Article 22 CERD; Article 30 (1) CAT; Article 29 (1) CEDAW; Article 92 (1) CRWM.
52.
“If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.”, identical wording of all three articles, Article 30 (1) CAT; Article 29 (1) CEDAW; Article 92 (1) CRWM.
53.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda): Application Instituting Proceedings’ (28 May 2002).
54.
International Court of Justice op cit n 32 supra, 33 para. 71 and 35 para. 80.
55.
Ibid, 35 para. 79 see also 41 para. 93.
56.
Ibid, 34 f. paras. 74–79.
57.
Ibid, 40 f. para. 91.
58.
Ibid, 41 para. 92.
59.
Ukraine, ‘Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation): Application instituting proceedings’ (16 January 2017), p. 1 para. 1.
60.
Ibid (16 January 2017), p. 6 paras. 22 f.
61.
Ibid, p. 15 para. 37.
62.
Ibid, p. 21 para. 62.
63.
On the plausibility of the claimed rights under the CERD see Declaration of Judge J. Crawford to International Court of Justice, ‘Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation): Request for the indication of Provisional Measures’ (Order of 19 April 2017) 2017 ICJ Reports 1 ff.
64.
Shany (2014), p. 170.
65.
Those crimes are the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, Articles 6 to 9 of the Rome Statute.
66.
Olásolo (2005), p. 121.
67.
William A. Schabas; Giulia Pecorella in Triffterer (2016), p. 679 para. 13 (Article 12); Schabas refers to it as the “principle of automatic acceptance of jurisdiction over the crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction and the temporal jurisdiction”, Schabas (2016), p. 351 (Article 12); Cryer et al. (2014), p. 168.
68.
Office of the Prosecutor (2003), p. 3.
69.
International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09.
70.
International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali’ ICC-01/09-02/11.
71.
International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abuminyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi’ ICC-01/11-01/11.
72.
International Criminal Court, ‘The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé’ ICC-02/11-01/15.
73.
International Law Commission (1994), p. 42 Article 22.
74.
Ibid, p. 43 para. 2.
75.
Ibid, p. 43 para. 3.
76.
International Law Commission (1993), 17 para. 69.
77.
William A. Schabas; Guilia Pecorella in Triffterer (2016), p. 676 para. 7 (Article 12).
78.
Swart and Sluiter (1999), p. 94.
79.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10.
80.
Article 12 (2) (a) Rome Statute reads as follows: “In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft”.
81.
Paust (2000), pp. 6 f.
82.
Safferling and Büngener (2012), p. 86.
83.
Paust (2000), p. 7.
84.
Wedgwood (2001), p. 194; Cryer (2015), p. 263; Wilmshurst (2002), pp. 136 f.
85.
Paust (2000), p. 7.
86.
Moerten Bergsmo; Jelena Pejic; Dan Zhu in Triffterer (2016), p. 770 para. 1 (Article 16).
87.
United Nations, Security Council (12 July 2002) UN Doc. S/RES/1422; United Nations, Security Council (12 June 2003).
88.
Scheffer (2005), p. 344.
89.
United Nations Security Council, ‘Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan’ 31 March 2005 UN Doc. S/PV.5158, p. 4.
90.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2011), p. 6 para. 20.
91.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2015), p. 28 para. 120 (emphasis added).
92.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2015), p. 28 para. 120.
93.
‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding her Decision to Request Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’ (3 November 2017).
94.
Ibid.
95.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2016), p. 45 para. 211.
96.
Swaine (2006).
97.
Neumayer (2007).
98.
Christian Walter in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 240 para. 2 (Article 19); Helfer (2006), p. 379.
99.
Swaine (2006).
100.
Neumayer (2007).
101.
Helfer (2006).
102.
Article 2 (1) (d) VCLT.
103.
Article 19 (a) and (c) VCLT; on the compatibility test see generally Christian Walter in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 245 f. para. 20 (Article 19).
104.
Piper (1985), p. 297.
105.
A. Pellet, ‘Second Report on Reservations to Treaties, by Mr. Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur: Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties’ (10 May and 13 June 1996) UN Doc. A/CN.4/477 & Corr.1 & 2 and Add.1 & Corr.1-4, p. 59 para. 90.
106.
Swaine (2006), pp. 330 f.; Pellet op cit n 105 supra, p. 60 para. 117; see also Schabas (1994), p. 41.
107.
Fitzmaurice (1953), p. 17; Pellet op cit n 105 supra, p. 60 para. 117 (c); see also Schabas (1994), p. 41.
108.
Gerhard Hafner in Triffterer (2016), p. 2287 para. 10 (Article 120); Schabas (1994), p. 40; Schabas (2016), p. 1489 (Article 120).
109.
Del Mar (2014), pp. 285 f.; Hafner, Gerhard in Triffterer (2016), p. 2287 para. 10 (Article 120); Piper (1985), p. 297.
110.
International Law Commission, ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-ninth session (7 May–5 June and 9 July–10 August 2007)’ (2007) Volume II UN Doc. A/62/10, p. 113 para. 1.
111.
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 24: On Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under article 41 of the Covenant’ (4 November 1994) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 7.
112.
United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, ‘The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with Respect to Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties: Seventeenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 23–24 June 2005 and Fourth Inter-Committee Meeting of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 20–22 June 2005’ (13 June 2005) UN Doc. HRI/MC/2005/5, p. 10 para. 22.
113.
Article 20 (1) CERD; Article 28 (1) CEDAW; Article 51 (1) CRC; Article 91 (1) CRMW and Article 46 (1) CRPD.
114.
Article 14 (1) OP CRPD.
115.
Article 19 (a) VCLT.
116.
Cook (1990), p. 644; regarding the CRC see Schabas (1996), p. 474.
117.
International Court of Justice, ‘Advisory Opinion concerning Reservations to the Genocide Convention’ (28 May 1951) 1951 ICJ Reports 15, 24.
118.
United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, ‘Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations: Nineteenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 21–22 June 2007 Sixth Inter-Committee Meeting of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 18–20 June 2007’ (9 February 2007) Un Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5, p. 7 Recommendation No. 4 of the Working Group.
119.
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 24: General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant’ (4 November 1994) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 6.
120.
Ibid, para. 20; General Recommendation No. 20 of the CEDAW Committee regarding “Reservations to the Convention” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Eleventh Session’ (1993) Un Doc. A/47/38, p. 7; Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No. 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6)’ (27 November 2003) UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, p. 5 para. 13.
121.
The World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (12 July 1993) UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, p. 10 para. 5.
122.
According to Article 40 (4) ICCPR, the HRC may “transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties”. While these Comments are not legally binding, Ando (2019), para. 41, they are important for the interpretation and the evolution of the Covenant.
123.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 119 supra, para. 6.
124.
Ibid, para. 1.
125.
Ibid, para. 7.
126.
Ibid, para. 14.
127.
The HRC found the reservation to be invalid and therefore considered the submission to be admissible, Human Rights Committee, ‘Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago: Decision of Admissibility’ (2 November 1999) Communication No. 845/1999, para. 7 (a).
128.
International Law Commission op cit n 110 supra, 114 para. 2.
129.
See the criticism of the United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ‘Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) relating to Reservations’ (Transmitted by Letter dated 28 March 1995) and of France, Observations of States Parties under Article 40, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, France, Human Rights Committee, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee’ (1997) Volume I UN Doc. A/51/40, Annex VI at 106 para. 14; see also Graefrath (1988), p. 74.
130.
Observations on General Comment No. 24 (52), on Issues relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Human Rights Committee, ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee’ (1996) UN Doc. A/50/40, p. 132 para. 11.
131.
Ibid, pp. 132 f. para. 12.
132.
Observations of States Parties under Article 40, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, France, Human Rights Committee op cit n 129 supra, Annex VI at 106 para. 14.
133.
United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland op cit n 129 supra, p. 2.
134.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 127 supra.
135.
Ibid, para. 4.1.
136.
Ibid, para. 6.4.
137.
Ibid, paras. 6.7. and 7 (a).
138.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 119 supra, para. 18.
139.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 129 supra, Annex VI at 106 para. 13.
140.
United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland op cit n 129 supra, p. 4.
141.
On the effect of invalid reservations see generally, Baratta (2000), pp. 413 ff.; Simma and Hernández (2011), pp. 60 ff.; Goodman (2002), pp. 531 ff.; McCall-Smith (2014), pp. 599 ff.
142.
A. Pellet, ‘Fifteenth Report on Reservations to Treaties by Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur’ (26 May 2010) UN Doc. A/CN.4/624/Add.1, p. 35 paras. 465 and 467.
143.
United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, ‘Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations: Nineteenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 21–22 June 2007 and Sixth Inter-Committee Meeting of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Geneva, 18–20 June 2007’ (9 February 2007) UN Doc. HRI/MC/2007/5, p. 7 para. 16 (7).
144.
Neumayer (2007).
145.
A. Pellet, ‘Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties by the Special Rapporteur Mr. Alain Pellet’ (14 June 2005) UN Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.1, paras. 96 ff.
146.
Ibid, para. 99 ii.
147.
International Court of Justice, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)’ (Order of 10 July 2002) 2002 ICJ Reports 219, 246 para. 72.
148.
Joint Separate Opinion by Judges R. Higgins, P. Kooijmans, N. Elaraby, H. Owada and B. Simma to International Court of Justice op cit n 32 supra, p. 69 para. 15.
149.
Joint Separate Opinion by Judges R. Higgins, P. Kooijmans, N. Elaraby, H. Owada and B. Simma to ibid.
150.
Pellet op cit n 145 supra, p. 14 para. 89.
151.
Gamble (1980), p. 387.
152.
And is therefore not entirely indicative for the present analysis.
153.
International Court of Justice, ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America): Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application’ (Judgment of 26 November 1984) 1984 ICJ Reports 392, 418 para. 59; see also International Court of Justice op cit n 42 supra, 452 f. para. 44; International Court of Justice, ‘Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India): Jurisdiction of the Court’ (Judgment of 21 June 2000) 2000 ICJ Reports 12, 29 f. paras. 36–39.
154.
International Court of Justice op cit n 153 supra, 418 para. 60.
155.
Ibid, 418 para. 59.
156.
International Court of Justice, ‘Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 21 March 1959) 1959 ICJ Reports 6, 23.
157.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter I No. 4, Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
158.
See e.g. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Greece, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, ibid, Chapter I No. 4, Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
159.
See e.g. Belgium’s declaration: “recognize[d] […] the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Court, in legal disputes arising after 13 July 1948 concerning situations or facts subsequent to that date” (emphasis added), ibid.
160.
See International Court of Justice op cit n 156 supra, 21 f.
161.
Ibid, 22.
162.
E.g. Cyprus, Honduras, Hungary, United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter I No. 4, Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
163.
Kunig (2019), para. 3.
164.
See the French version of the same type of reservation: “…to differences relating to matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the French Government” (emphasis added), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, ‘International Court of Justice, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway)’ (Judgment of 6 July 1957) 1957 ICJ Reports 9, 21.
165.
Christian Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al. (2012), p. 694 para. 109 (Article 36).
166.
Stahn (2019), para. 11.
167.
On the validity of the Connally reservation see Gambrell (1961), pp. 57 ff.; Goldie (1962), pp. 277 ff.; Henkin (1971), pp. 374 ff.
168.
Slade and Clark (2002), p. 432.
169.
Gerhard Hafner in Triffterer (2016), p. 2298 para. 10 (Article 120); see also Human Rights Watch, ‘Commentary for the March–April 1998 Preparatory Committee Meeting on the Establishment of an International Court’ (1998), p. 9 referring to the HRC’s General Comment No. 24.
170.
Gerhard Hafner in Triffterer (2016), p. 2284 para. 3 (Article 120); Slade and Clark (2002), p. 432.
171.
International Law Commission (1994), (c) Appendix I Possible Clauses of a Treaty to Accompany the Draft Statute 69 para. 3 (e).
172.
Schabas (1994), p. 1488 (Article 120).
173.
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 24 on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant’, para. 1.
174.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Summary Record of the 2nd Plenary Meeting’ (20 November 1998a) A/CONF.183/SR.2, Statement of Mr. El Maraghy for Egypt para. 80; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Summary Record of the 3rd Plenary Meeting’ (20 November 1998b) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3 Mr. Rogov for Kazakhstan para. 6 proposing a limited right to submit reservations; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Summary Record of the 6th Plenary Meeting’ (20 November 1998) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.6 Mr. Taib for Ruanda para. 114; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Summary Record of the 7th Plenary Meeting’ (25 January 1999) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.7 Mr. Güney for Turkey para. 14 and Mr. Al-Busaidy for Oman para. 71; United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Summary Record of the Eight Plenary Meeting’ (25 January 1999) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.8 Mr. Sadi for Jordan para. 8 and Mr. Ushakov for the Russian Federation para. 23 and Ms. Drozd for Belarus para. 40.
175.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court op cit n 174 supra Mr. Rogov for Kazakhstan para. 6.
176.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court op cit n 174 supra, Mr. El Maraghy for Egypt para. 80.
177.
Slade and Clark (2002), p. 432.
178.
Article 2 (1) (d) VCLT.
179.
International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission: Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its fifty-first Session’ (1996) Volume II UN Doc. A/54/10, p. 97 para. 1.2.
180.
Tabak (2009), pp. 1075 f.
181.
See Newman (2005), pp. 325 ff.
182.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra at Chapter XVIII No. 10.
183.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10.
184.
Office of the Prosecutor (2013), p. 13 para. 46.
185.
Preamble of the Rome Statute and Article 1 Rome Statute.
186.
Meernik and Aloisi (2009), p. 261.
187.
For the interpretation of the notion “genuinely” see Williams A. Schabas; Mohamed M. El Zeidy in Triffterer (2016), pp. 804 ff. paras. 25 ff. (Article 17).
188.
Colombia submitted a similar declaration equally emphasising its primacy over its domestic criminal investigations, United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10.
189.
See Helfer who identified the aim to manage the risk of acceding to a treaty as one of the core incentives for submitting reservations, Helfer (2013).
190.
Coccia (1985), p. 22.
191.
Koremenos (2016), p. 141.
192.
Aust (2013), p. 245; Aust (2019), para. 1.
193.
Article 70 (1) (a) VCLT.
194.
Emphasis added.
195.
This provision postpones the effect of the withdrawal and thus constitutes a procedural safeguard to prevent arbitrary withdrawal from the treaty, Heike Krieger in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 1132 para. 2 (Article 65).
196.
Article 56 (1) VCLT; see also Helfer (2005), p. 1594; Theodore Christakis in Corten and Klein (2011), p. 1257 para. 17 (Article 56).
197.
Theodore Christakis in Corten and Klein (2011), p. 1253 paras. 4 f. (Article 56); Aust (2013), p. 256.
198.
Christakis describes this voluntary self-restraint as follows: “the State may use its present freedom to limit its future freedom”, Theodore Christakis in Corten and Klein (2011), p. 1265 para. 37 (Article 56).
199.
Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘S.S. Wimbledon (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan v. Germany)’ (Judgment of 17 August 1923) PCIJ Series A, No. 1, p. 25.
200.
Theodore Christakis in Corten and Klein (2011), p. 1252 para. 1 (Article 56).
201.
See Meyer (2000), p. 394.
202.
Helfer (2012), p. 647.
203.
Helfer (2005), p. 1599; Jenks (1969), pp. 179 f.; Theodore Christakis in Corten and Klein (2011), pp. 1260 f. para. 25 (Article 56).
204.
Helfer (2013), p. 181; see also Sykes (1991), p. 279 drawing the same conclusion for trade agreements.
205.
Article 21 CERD; Article 31 (1) CAT; Article 52 CRC; Article 89 (1) CRMW and Article 48 CRPD.
206.
The wording of the provisions is almost identical.
207.
Aust (2019), para. 17; see also Helfer (2012), p. 639.
208.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ‘Notification by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (2 November 1997) UN Doc. C.N.467.1997.TREATIES-10, pp. 2 f.
209.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter IV No. 4 End Note 8.
210.
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 26: On Issues relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (8 December 1997) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1.
211.
Ibid, para. 2.
212.
Ibid.
213.
See e.g. Article 21 CERD which was adopted one year prior to the Covenant; see also ibid.
214.
Ibid, para. 5.
215.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ‘Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on its Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (4 May 2000) UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2.
216.
Nowak (2005), XXXVII para. 35 (Introduction).
217.
Ssenyonjo (2009), para. 1.124.
218.
Helfer (2012), p. 640.
219.
The only exception is Article 31 CED which is silent on the right to withdraw from the optional declaration.
220.
Article 12 (1) OP ICCPR; Article 20 (1) OP ICESCR; Article 19 (1) OP CEDAW; Article 22 (1) OP CRC; Article 16 OP CRPD.
221.
Article 14 (3) CERD; Article 22 (8) (3) CAT; Article 77 (8) CRWM.
222.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter IV No. 5.
223.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 127 supra, para. 4.1.
224.
Ibid, para. 6.3.; Helfer (2006), p. 371.
225.
Art. 19 VCLT.
226.
Article 22 (8) CAT for instance explicitly states that such “a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article…”. Articles 14 (3) CERD and 77 (8) CRMW contain similar references.
227.
Article 21 CERD; Article 31 (1) CAT; Article 52 CRC; Article 89 (1) CRMW and Article 48 CRPD.
228.
Article 12 (1) OP ICCPR.
229.
Articles 20 (1) OP ICESCR and 19 (1) OP CEDAW both establish a 6 months period; Articles 22 (1) OP CRC and 16 OP CRPD establish a period of 1 year.
230.
Koremenos (2016), p. 146.
231.
Koremenos (2016), pp. 125 f.
232.
Human Rights Committee op cit n 210 supra, para. 4.
233.
Article 30 ICJ Statute entitles the ICJ to “frame rules for carrying out its functions”. The Court adopted its Rules on 14 April 1978. They entered into force on 1 July 1987.
234.
Waldock (1948), pp. 377 ff.
235.
Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Germany v. Poland)’ (Judgment of 26 April 1928) PCIJ Series A, No. 15, p. 25; see also International Court of Justice, ‘Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania): Preliminary Objections’ Judgment of 25 March 1948 1948 ICJ Reports 15, 29.
236.
Pouliot (2008), p. 34.
237.
Article 54 VCLT.
238.
Article 29 (3) CEDAW; Article 30 (3) CAT; Article 92 (3) CRMW; Article 22 CERD does not provide the option to withdraw the declaration. However, this article does not constitute an opt-in clause but a compromissory clause in the traditional sense.
239.
See International Court of Justice, ‘Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland): Jurisdiction of the Court’ (Judgment of 2 February 1973) 1973 ICJ Reports 3, 14 f. paras. 25 f., in which the Court avoided addressing this general question.
240.
International Court of Justice op cit n 153 supra, 419 para. 61.
241.
Ibid, 419 paras. 61 and 63; International Court of Justice, ‘Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea intervening): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 11 June 1998) 1998 ICJ Reports 275, 295 para. 33.
242.
International Court of Justice op cit n 153 supra, 419 f. para. 63.
243.
Ibid, 419 para. 63.
244.
Christian Tomuschat in Zimmermann et al. (2012), p. 680 para. 77 (Article 36).
245.
France, ‘Notification of Termination of the Declaration of 20 May 1966’ (10 January 1974) 907 UNTS 129.
246.
United States of America, ‘Notification of Termination of the Declaration of 14 August 1946’ (7 October 1985) 1408 UNTS 270.
247.
Schabas (2016), p. 1535 (Article 127).
248.
Roger S. Clark in Triffterer (2016), p. 2324 para. 7 (Article 127).
249.
Schabas (2016), p. 1534 Article 127.
250.
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, ‘The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. The Southern African Litigation Centre’ 15 March 2016 Case No. 867/15 ZASCA 17, p. 6 para. 2.
251.
International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ (04 March 2009) ICC-02/05-01/09.
252.
International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ 12 July 2010 ICC-02/05-01/09.
253.
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa op cit n 250 supra, p. 6 para. 2.
254.
Ibid.
255.
Quoted statement by the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services Masutha, [21 October 2016].
256.
African Union, ‘Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal: Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1’ (1–3 July 2009) Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, para. 10.
257.
Labuda (15 February 2017); see also Labuda (23 November 2016).
258.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10 End Note 2; see also Labuda (23 November 2016).
259.
African Union (12 January 2017).
260.
African Union (12 January 2017), p. 2 para. 8.
261.
African Union (12 January 2017), p. 6 para. 21.
262.
African Union (12 January 2017), p. 3 para. 10.
263.
NPR News (14 February 2017).
264.
The Republic of the Gambia, ‘Gambia: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal’ (16 February 2017) UN Doc. C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10.
265.
Republic of South Africa, ‘South Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal’ (7 March 2017) UN Doc. C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10.
266.
High Court of South Africa, ‘Democratic Alliance and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others’ (22 February 2017) Case No: 83145/2016.
267.
Ibid, pp. 2 and 35 para. 77.
268.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2016), para. 158.
269.
International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor (2016), para. 168.
270.
“I have the honour to inform you about the intention of the Russian Federation not to become a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998 and signed on behalf of the Russian Federation on 13 September 2000.”, United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10 Note 9.
271.
“Unfortunately the Court failed to meet the expectations to become a truly independent, authoritative international tribunal”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement of 16 November 2016.
272.
See also Sayapin (16 November 2016).
273.
United Nations op cit n 22 supra, Chapter XVIII No. 10.
274.
Roger S. Clark in Triffterer (2016), p. 2322 para. 1 (Article 127).
275.
Koremenos (2016), p. 146.
276.
For external (political) factors relevant for the decision-making process see Alter (2008); Helfer and Slaughter (1997), pp. 273 ff.; Posner and Yoo (2004).
277.
Helfer and Slaughter identify the Courts’ “awareness of audience” to be one of the key factors to an effective supranational adjudication, Helfer and Slaughter (1997), pp. 308 ff.
278.
Koremenos (2016), p. 141.
279.
“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished […]”, Preamble para. 4 of the Rome Statute; para. 5 of the Preamble establishes the prevention of impunity as one of the main goals of the Rome Statute: “Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.”; see also Schabas (2016), pp. 44 f. (Preamble).
280.
Preamble para. 4 of the Rome Statute.
281.
Triffterer points out that “attacks by States on the well-being of its own population, especially cases of genocide […], are no longer an internal affair, but endanger the international community as such.” Otto Triffterer; Morten Bergsmo; Kai Ambos in Triffterer (2016), p. 8 para. 9 (Preamble).
282.
Article 4 (2) ICCPR establishes that “[n]o derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision”. This includes the right to life, the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of slavery.

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Fenrich, K. (2019). Conventional Commitment. In: The Evolving International Procedural Capacity of Individuals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19281-5_2

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