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The Evolving International Procedural Capacity of Individuals pp 1–33Cite as

Preliminary Remarks

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Abstract

International law no longer turns a blind eye to the individual. Quite the contrary, “with increasing frequency international legal norms directly address and engage individuals” and confer rights and obligations upon them. Numerous international treaties, agreements and protocols have been dedicated to the legal position of human beings. Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups and treaty bodies have been established to observe compliance with international Human Rights standards and are consistently presenting suggestions to further advance the law. Criminal courts and tribunals have been installed to prosecute the misconduct of individuals and sanction the commission of international crimes.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Peters (2016), p. 1.

  2. 2.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge C. Trindade to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child’ (Advisory Opinion of 28 August 2002) OC-17/2002, p. 9 para. 23.

  3. 3.

    Parlett (2011), p. 343.

  4. 4.

    Meron (2006).

  5. 5.

    van den Herik (2017), Peters (2016), p. 472.

  6. 6.

    Slaughter (2002); Slaughter and Burke-White equally utilize the notion of individualization, Slaughter and Burke-White (2002), pp. 13 ff.

  7. 7.

    Parlett (2011), p. 4; Grossman and Bradlow (1993), pp. 22 ff.; Ochoa (2007).

  8. 8.

    Orakhelashvili (2001), p. 242.

  9. 9.

    Mullerson (1990), p. 38.

  10. 10.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade, ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child’ (Opinion of 28 August 2002) OC-17/2002, p. 10 para. 28.

  11. 11.

    Parlett (2011), p. 3.

  12. 12.

    Article 5 (1) ICCPR codifies the negative obligation of States which obliges them to refrain from the destruction of the rights enshrined in the Covenant: “Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.”.

  13. 13.

    Cassese (2005), p. 150; Cassidy (2004), p. 564; Clapham (2010), p. 27; J. R. Dugard, ‘First Report on Diplomatic Protection by the Special Rapporteur Mr. John R. Dugard’ (2000) UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 and Add. 1, p. 214 para. 28; McCorquodale (2014), p. 288; Shaw (2014), p. 189; Walter (2019), para. 22.

  14. 14.

    Cowles (1952), pp. 78 f.

  15. 15.

    Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro/Czecoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University v. Czechoslovakia)’ (Judgment of 15 December 1933) PCIJ Series A/B, No. 61, p. 231.

  16. 16.

    International Court of Justice, ‘Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations’ (Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949) 1949 ICJ Reports 174, p. 177.

  17. 17.

    Trindade (2011), p. 14.

  18. 18.

    Shelton (2006), p. 8.

  19. 19.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 56.

  20. 20.

    Bourdieu (1990), p. 381.

  21. 21.

    Peters (2016), p. 480.

  22. 22.

    According to Feichtner (2019), para. 1 “the principle expresses a preference for the allocation and exercise of governmental functions at the lowest level of governance”; see also Peters (2016), p. 483.

  23. 23.

    For the discussion on whether the right to an effective remedy constitutes a free standing right or the procedural dimension of another substantive Human Right see Francioni (2007), pp. 30 ff.

  24. 24.

    Gormley (1966), p. 30.

  25. 25.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge C. Trindade to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru: Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 04 September 1998) Series C No. 41, p. 62 para. 35.

  26. 26.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge C. Trindade to Inter-American Court of Human Rights op cit n 2 supra, p. 9 para. 25.

  27. 27.

    International Court of Justice, ‘Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain): Second Phase’ (Judgment of 5 February 1970) 1970 ICJ Reports 3, p. 32 paras. 33 f.

  28. 28.

    Article 55 UN Charter.

  29. 29.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 56.

  30. 30.

    Briggs (1953), p. 94; McCorquodale (2014), p. 290; Meijknecht (2001), p. 57.

  31. 31.

    Risk aversion and the fear of reputational damages are put forward as motives for States not to include strong enforcement mechanisms in international treaties, Guzman (2010), pp. 138 f.

  32. 32.

    Mullerson (1990), p. 36.

  33. 33.

    Francioni (2007), pp. 6 f.

  34. 34.

    Higgins (1995), p. 51.

  35. 35.

    Lauterpacht (1975), p. 510.

  36. 36.

    Francioni (2007), p. 6.

  37. 37.

    Pentikäinen (2012), p. 146; Shaw (2014), p. 189.

  38. 38.

    Shelton (2006), p. 465.

  39. 39.

    Parlett (2011), p. 350.

  40. 40.

    Peters (2016), p. 493.

  41. 41.

    Schmitt (2017), p. 103.

  42. 42.

    Trindade coined the term in Trindade (2011), p. 18.

  43. 43.

    Brownlie (2012), p. 115; Dahm et al. (2002), pp. 260 f.; Meijknecht (2001), pp. 56 ff.; Ochoa (2007), p. 123; Shaw (2014), p. 142; Simma (2008), p. 734; Verdross and Simma (1981), p. 256 para. 424; for the suggestion to separate the substantive law and the procedural enforceability see Peters (2016), pp. 44–47.

  44. 44.

    The two notions ‘subjectivity’ and ‘legal personality’ are used interchangeably throughout this study. For the interchangeability of these notions see Walter (2019), para. 1; see, however, Meijknecht (2001), pp. 23 ff. who distinguishes between subjectivity and personality.

  45. 45.

    Manner (1952), Portmann (2010), p. 42.

  46. 46.

    Portmann (2010), p. 173.

  47. 47.

    For the responsiveness of international law in general see Ackermann and Fenrich (2017).

  48. 48.

    Trindade (2011), p. 13.

  49. 49.

    Mazzeschi (2009), pp. 214 f.; see also Alvarez (2011), p. 26.

  50. 50.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 31; Mazzeschi (2009), pp. 214 f.; Parlett (2011), p. 38.

  51. 51.

    Peters (2016), p. 41.

  52. 52.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 31.

  53. 53.

    Peters (2016), p. 40.

  54. 54.

    Dahm et al. (2002), p. 267.

  55. 55.

    Orakhelashvili (2001), p. 276.

  56. 56.

    Peters (2016), p. 40; see also Higgins (1995), p. 49 who argues that the concept of subjectivity has “no functional purpose”.

  57. 57.

    Parlett (2011), p. 29.

  58. 58.

    Parlett (2011), p. 29.

  59. 59.

    Portmann (2010), p. 19.

  60. 60.

    Portmann (2010), p. 19.

  61. 61.

    Concurring Opinion of C. Trindade to Inter-American Court of Human Rights op cit n 2 supra, p. 10 para. 27.

  62. 62.

    Brownlie (2012), p. 115 (emphasis added).

  63. 63.

    Simma (2008), p. 734.

  64. 64.

    Simma (2008), p. 734.

  65. 65.

    Kelsen (1966), p. 231.

  66. 66.

    Kelsen (1966), p. 180 (emphasis added).

  67. 67.

    On the formal conception of international legal personality see generally Portmann (2010), p. 173. In contrast to the States-only conception or the object theory, formalists do not presume international personality to be limited to States only. Any entity which fulfills the required preconditions may be considered an international subject of law. For the object theory see generally Manner (1952), pp. 428 ff.

  68. 68.

    Peters (2016), p. 45.

  69. 69.

    Jellinek (2011), p. 51.

  70. 70.

    International Court of Justice op cit n 16 supra, p. 179 (emphasis added).

  71. 71.

    Brownlie (2012), p. 57.

  72. 72.

    See Meijknecht (2001), p. 58; Peters (2016), p. 38.

  73. 73.

    Portmann (2010), p. 126; for proponents of this concept supporting Portman’s summary see Brierly (1936), p. 47; Concurring Opinion of Antonio C. Trindade to Inter-American Court of Human Rights op cit n 2 supra, pp. 9 f. paras. 26 ff.; Lauterpacht (1950 reprint 1968), pp. 70 f.; Scelle (1932), p. 42.

  74. 74.

    Bourquin (1931), p. 42; Brierly (1936), p. 47.

  75. 75.

    See Portmann (2010), pp. 126 f.

  76. 76.

    Lauterpacht (1950 reprint 1968), p. 27.

  77. 77.

    Lauterpacht (1950 reprint 1968), p. 27.

  78. 78.

    Lauterpacht (1950 reprint 1968), p. 61.

  79. 79.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 60.

  80. 80.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 61.

  81. 81.

    Meijknecht (2001), p. 55.

  82. 82.

    Ochoa (2007); McCorquodale (2014), p. 294; Orakhelashvili (2001), pp. 256 ff.

  83. 83.

    “[W]hile individuals have a kind of status as passive subjects of international law, individuals do not have independency or autonomy in the international legal system at any meaningful extent”, Parlett (2011), pp. 370 see also 353; see also Ferdinand Gärditz (2014), p. 91 and McCorquodale (2014), p. 284.

  84. 84.

    The object theory or the recognition theory are examples thereof.

  85. 85.

    Such as the actor or process conception, see Portmann (2010), pp. 208 ff. and the concept of cosmopolitanism, see Parlett (2011), pp. 43 f.; for the irrelevance of the criterion of enforceability see Dahm et al. (2002), p. 261.

  86. 86.

    Francioni (2007), p. 2.

  87. 87.

    1520 UNTS 217 ff.

  88. 88.

    American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 UNTS 123 ff.

  89. 89.

    Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221 ff.

  90. 90.

    999 UNTS 171 ff.

  91. 91.

    Capone (2019), para. 1; for a similar definition see Shelton (2019), para. 1.

  92. 92.

    For the discussion on the definition of the term ‘remedy’ see generally Haasdijk (1992), pp. 245 ff.

  93. 93.

    Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cancade Trindade, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia: Merits, Reparations and Costs’ (Judgment of 31 January 2006), p. 21 paras. 61 f.

  94. 94.

    Francioni (2007), p. 41.

  95. 95.

    Article 8 of the United Nations General Assembly, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December 1948) UN Doc. A/RES/3/217 A.

  96. 96.

    Kelsen (1966), p. 232.

  97. 97.

    Francioni (2007), p. 8.

  98. 98.

    Shelton (2006), p. 8; see also Capone (2019), para. 1.

  99. 99.

    Schmitt (2017), pp. 93 ff.

  100. 100.

    Schmitt (2017), p. 95.

  101. 101.

    United Nations General Assembly, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,’ (16 December 2005) UN Doc. A/Res/60/147.

  102. 102.

    Ibid, para. 12 (emphasis added); on this dimension see also Trindade (2011), Zarbiyev (2012), p. 256.

  103. 103.

    United Nations General Assembly op cit n 101 supra, para. 15.

  104. 104.

    Briggs (1953), p. 94; McCorquodale (2014), p. 290; Meijknecht (2001), p. 57.

  105. 105.

    See Guzman (2010), p. 131.

  106. 106.

    Briggs (1953), p. 94; Lippman (1979), p. 265; Bilder (1969), p. 205.

  107. 107.

    McCorquodale (2014), p. 290.

  108. 108.

    Guzman (2010), p. 131.

  109. 109.

    These are generally considered the most relevant flexibility tools, Guzman (2010), p. 131.

  110. 110.

    Gamble (1980), p. 374.

  111. 111.

    Helfer (2005), pp. 1579 ff.

  112. 112.

    For the distinction between a State’s role as negotiator on the one hand and ratifier on the other see Galbraith (2013), p. 313.

  113. 113.

    Galbraith (2013), p. 313.

  114. 114.

    For the relevance of admissibility criteria with regard to the accessibility of a mechanism see Trindade (2011), p. 50.

  115. 115.

    Amerasinghe (2003), p. 309; Kolb (2013), p. 199.

  116. 116.

    Shelton (2006), p. 19; see also Lenzerini (2008), pp. 13 f.; Dwertmann (2010), p. 37.

  117. 117.

    Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland): Merits’ (Judgment of 13 September 1928) PCIJ Series A, No. 17, p. 47.

  118. 118.

    Shelton (2006), p. 9.

  119. 119.

    Amerashinghe labels this competence the “jurisdiction vis-à-vis remedies” which comprises the power to “decide what is to be done in terms of redress”, Amerasinghe (2003), p. 385.

  120. 120.

    Shany (2014), p. 122.

  121. 121.

    Shany argues that effectiveness of proceedings derives from “the contents of the judgment in question and the nature of the remedies it prescribes”, Shany (2014), p. 118.

  122. 122.

    Shelton (2019), para. 1.

  123. 123.

    Shelton (2006), p. 16.

  124. 124.

    Morgenthau defines legal positivism as follows: “The juridic positivist delimits the subject-matter of his research in a dual way. On the one hand, he proposes to deal exclusively with matters legal, and for this purpose strictly separates the legal sphere from ethics and mores as well as psychology and sociology. Hence, his legalism. On the other hand, he restricts his attention within the legal sphere to the legal rules enacted by the state, and excludes all law whose existence cannot be traced to the statute books or the decisions of the courts. […] This ‘positive’ law the positivist accepts as it is, without passing judgment upon its ethical value or questioning its practical appropriateness”, Morgenthau (1940), p. 261; for the distinction between the positive doctrines and other approaches see generally Koskenniemi (2019).

  125. 125.

    Romano, Alter and Shany use the term “adjudication”, however, with the same substantial connotation, Romano et al. (2014), p. 4.

  126. 126.

    Hafner-Burton (2013), p. 93.

  127. 127.

    In contrast, UN Human Rights treaties, which are universal, “constitute a kind of lowest common denominator between the Western and the Socialist concepts of human rights” and thus “contain extremely weak language”, Nowak et al. (2008), p. 722 para. 2 (Article 22).

  128. 128.

    Schwarzenberger states that the inductive method “presupposes the existence of a fair amount of case material from which plausible generalizations may be attempted”, Schwarzenberger (1947), p. 541.

  129. 129.

    Mill (1875), p. 454.

  130. 130.

    Dannemann (2006), p. 397; Brand (2007), pp. 436 and 438.

  131. 131.

    Mill (1875), p. 454.

  132. 132.

    Kelsen (1966), p. 232.

  133. 133.

    Francioni (2007), pp. 1 f. (emphasis added).

  134. 134.

    McCorquodale (2014), p. 288.

  135. 135.

    Keyzer et al. (2015), p. 7.

  136. 136.

    Article 1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [OP ICCPR], 999 UNTS 171; Article 1 (1) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [OP ICESCR], UN Doc. A/63/435; Article 14 CERD, 660 UNTS 195; Articles 1 and 2 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women [OP CEDAW] 2131 UNTS 83; Article 22 (1) CAT, 1465 UNTS 85; Articles 1 (1) and 5 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure [OP CRC], UN Doc. A/RES/66/138; Article 77 (1) CRWM, 2220 UNTS 3; Article 1 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [OP CRPD] 2518 UNTS 283; Article 31 (3) CED, 2716 UNTS 3.

  137. 137.

    Nowak et al. (2008), p. 722 para. 2 (Article 22).

  138. 138.

    999 UNTS 171.

  139. 139.

    993 UNTS 3.

  140. 140.

    The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on its website refers to these nine treaties as “the 9 core international human rights instruments”, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx.

  141. 141.

    1249 UNTS 13.

  142. 142.

    1577 UNTS 2.

  143. 143.

    2515 UNTS 3.

  144. 144.

    Article 2 CERD; Article 2 (1) and (2) ICCPR; Article 2 (1) and (2) ICESCR; Article 2 CEDAW; Article 2 CAT; Article 2 CRC; Articles 7 ff. CRWM; Article 1 CRPD; Article 1 CED.

  145. 145.

    The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights being the only exception. This Committee was not established by the ICESCR itself. Uncertainties about the precise scope of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR and the means of assessing compliance with the treaty prevented the creation of the Committee by the time of the ICESCR’s adoption in 1966. Instead, the UN Member States entrusted the existing Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] with this particular task. Later on, ECOSOC itself created the ICESCR Committee as a sub-organ (Economic and Social Council, ‘Review of the Composition, Organization and Administrative Arrangements of the Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (28 May 1985) ECOSOC Res. 1985/17). The adoption of the ICESCR’s Optional Protocol in 2013 officially mandated the Committee with the supervision of compliance.

  146. 146.

    Article 8 (1) CERD; Article 28 ICCPR; Article 17 (1) CEDAW; Article 17 (1) CAT; Article 43 (1) CRC; Article 72 (1) (a) CRWM; Article 34 (1) CRPD; Article 26 (1) CED.

  147. 147.

    Article 9 (1) CERD; Article 40 (1) ICCPR; Article 16 (1) ICESCR; Article 18 (1) CEDAW; Article 19 (1) CAT; Article 44 (1) CRC; Article 73 (1) CRWM; Article 35 (1) CRPD; Article 29 (1) CED.

  148. 148.

    Article 11 (1) CERD; Article 41 (1) ICCPR; Article 10 (1) OP ICESCR; Article 29 (1) CEDAW; Article 21 CAT; Article 12 (1) OP CRC; Article 74 (1) CRMW; Article 32 CED.

  149. 149.

    Ando (2019), para. 41.

  150. 150.

    Article 9 (2) CERD; Article 40 (4) ICCPR; ECOSOC/Res/1987/5 paras. 1, 9; Article 21 (1) CEDAW; Article 19 (3) and (4) CAT; Article 45 (d) CRC; Article 74 (1) CRMW; Article 39 CRPD; Article 39 (3) CED.

  151. 151.

    Article 14 CERD; Article 1 OP ICCPR; Article 1 OP ICESCR; Articles 1 and 2 OP CEDAW; Articles 22 (1) CAT; Articles 1 (1) and 5 (1) OP CRC; Article 77 (1) CRMW; Article 1 (1) OP CRPD; Article 31 CED.

  152. 152.

    See below at Sect. 4.2 regarding the Legal Nature of Remedial Awards.

  153. 153.

    See below at Sect. 4.3 regarding the Enforcement of Remedial Awards.

  154. 154.

    Tomuschat (2019), p. 9; Nowak (2005), p. 668 para. 1 (Article 28).

  155. 155.

    Vattel (1758), p. 136.

  156. 156.

    Vattel (1758), p. 136.

  157. 157.

    International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries published in Report of the International Law Commission’ (2006) UN Doc. A/61/10 22.

  158. 158.

    Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection [DADP].

  159. 159.

    Vermeer-Künzli (2007), p. 31.

  160. 160.

    Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. the United Kingdom): Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court’ (Judgment of 30 August 1924) PCIJ Series A, No. 2, p. 12.

  161. 161.

    Articles 1 and 2 DADP.

  162. 162.

    Dugard op cit n 13 supra, p. 29 Article 1 para. 1.

  163. 163.

    International Law Commission op cit n 157 supra, p. 25 Article 1 para. 3.

  164. 164.

    Dugard op cit n 13 supra, p. 222 para. 68.

  165. 165.

    Parlett (2011), p. 87.

  166. 166.

    Dugard op cit n 13 supra, p. 215 para. 32.

  167. 167.

    International Court of Justice, ‘Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo): Preliminary Objections’ (Judgment of 24 May 2007) 2007 ICJ Reports 582, 599 para. 39.

  168. 168.

    Dinah Shelton (2013), p. 266.

  169. 169.

    See in this regard Pesch (2015), p. 66.

  170. 170.

    Evans (2012), p. 86.

  171. 171.

    Shelton (2006), p. 231; Schabas (2016), p. 1137 (Article 75).

  172. 172.

    David Donat-Cattin in Triffterer (2016), p. 1855 para. 6 (Article 75); Dwertmann (2010), p. 1.

  173. 173.

    David Donat-Cattin in Triffterer (2016), p. 1869 para. 31 (Article 75).

  174. 174.

    Kress and Sluiter (2002), p. 1832.

  175. 175.

    International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58 (annexed to Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr (24 February 2006))’ (10 February 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06, p. 60 para. 136 (emphasis added).

  176. 176.

    International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ‘The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (24 February 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, p. 60 para. 136.

  177. 177.

    Article 75 (1) Rome Statute.

  178. 178.

    International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, ‘Report of the Court on the Strategy in Relation to Victims’ (10 November 2009) ICC-ASP/8/45, p. 1 paras. 2 f.; see also International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Victim’s Participation’ (April 2010), p. 1.

  179. 179.

    Jorda and Hemptinne (2002), p. 1389.

  180. 180.

    International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor op cit n 178 supra, p. 1.

  181. 181.

    Rule 94 (1) RoP ICC; Ambos (2016), p. 198; Jorda and Hemptinne (2002), p. 1407; Dwertmann (2010), p. 196.

  182. 182.

    Dwertmann (2010), pp. 68 ff.

  183. 183.

    Article 13 Rome Statute.

  184. 184.

    de Gurmendi Férnandez (2002), p. 177.

  185. 185.

    See Article 15 (1) Rome Statute.

  186. 186.

    Article 68 (3) Rome Statute.

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  1. Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Katrin Fenrich

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Fenrich, K. (2019). Preliminary Remarks. In: The Evolving International Procedural Capacity of Individuals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19281-5_1

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