Abstract
In this chapter, I reconsider the discussion of the semantics/pragmatics debate and rejuvenate it by means of two important ideas: Grice’s circle (discussed by Levinson (Presumptive meanings, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000)) is apparent and certainly not pernicious; the fact that explicatures are not cancellable means that the pragmatics we consider in pragmatic intrusion has some features in common with truth-conditional semantics.
One of the topics I will be confronted with is whether explicatures (or at least the pragmatic components of explicatures) are cancellable or not. This topic is concatenated with the more heavily theoretical topic of Grice’s circle, a theoretical difficulty noted by Levinson (Presumptive meanings, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000), which can be summarized as follows. It is claimed that pragmatics takes input from semantics. However, the camp of contextualists have shown that (propositional) semantics cannot be independent of pragmatics, given that it is accepted that in numerous cases we must assume pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional meaning. Thus, it follows that not only is it the case that pragmatics takes input from semantics, but that semantics takes input from pragmatics. There may be two ways of breaking out of this circle. One is to argue, as I have done, that the circle is not pernicious given that explicatures (which are the engine of the semantics/pragmatics debate) are, in principle and in fact, not cancellable after all. Thus, the pragmatic contributions that intrude into semantics acquire some of the features of semantics (like entailments, they cannot be cancelled on pain of contradiction). The other is to reduce the circle and to state that there are indeed (many) cases of pragmatic intrusion; however we should not be so pessimistic as to claim that in all cases semantics needs to be augmented by pragmatics. There are sentences which can be fairly well understood even independently of pragmatics and, furthermore, there are sentences where limited amounts of pragmatic intrusion can occur and where such intrusions can be somehow ignored since the truth-conditional content of the sentence can be grasped by making abstract substitutions such as X did Y (for example, in the sentence, ‘He did this’).
I would like thank J. Mey, whose comments, encouragement and positive scholarly attitude have led me towards a greater intellectual maturity. Words are not suffice to express my gratitude for his continual encouragement: I will forever remember his invaluable contribution.
T. Williamson has commented on this chapter. His detailed comments have helped me to considerably improve the chapter. His comments have often been incorporated in the text and all mistakes are, obviously, my own.
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Notes
- 1.
If we imagine the distance as a straight line with a number of points in between the extremes, we may suppose (with a certain amount of idealization) that when she is walking she passes through each section of the line (each section must be thought of as being large enough to allow this idealization).
- 2.
This interesting objection was raised by one of the referees.
- 3.
An anonymous referee has summed up Levinson’s work in this way. I am inclined to agree with this referee’s opinion.
- 4.
Bach (personal communication) believes that this picture is not only oversimplified, but confused.
- 5.
From now on I shall discuss the phenomenon called ‘Grice’s circle’ with reference to Levinson’s view, while incorporating Carston’s suggestion to differentiate implicatures from explicatures.
- 6.
The notion of “explicature” was originally proposed by Sperber & Wilson (1986).
- 7.
General semantic discourse principle.
- 8.
A suggestion by an anonymous referee of the Journal of Pragmatics.
- 9.
This point was raised by an anonymous referee.
- 10.
This important example is by virtue of an anonymous referee.
- 11.
This objection was raised by a referee.
- 12.
This strategy is also apparently refuted by Recanati’s availability principle (Recanati (2002).
- 13.
It might be objected that, in this example, it is not so much the temporal dimension but the causal dimension that is at stake in the interpretation.
- 14.
Something similar might be said of Levinson’s (2000) ‘plates’ example. Matters such as reference must be resolved in context, as is well-known – but the sentence, without the explicature, still has a logical form that can be intelligibly understood and may provide the basis for further incrementations. My intention here is not to prove the relevance theorists or Levinson wrong. I have simply pointed out a different avenue of research, one that deprives Carston’s and Levinson’s ideas of their potential “explosiveness” (I use Levinson’s (2000) term by stressing the fact that such considerations are the natural consequence of some classical assumptions by Frege, Strawson and Stalnaker. Grice’s views were not necessarily different from their own).
- 15.
My own M.V.M. example is also more problematic than (15) and (16), as it introduces a kind of speaker-relativity that cannot only be dealt with in terms of an underdetermined logical form.
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Capone, A. (2019). On a Theory-Internal Problem in the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate: How to Resolve Grice’s Circle. In: Pragmatics and Philosophy. Connections and Ramifications. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19146-7_2
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