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A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics

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Games in Management Science

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 280))

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Abstract

This chapter reviews the existing experimental literature on the behavioral outcomes in dynamic common pool resource games. We categorize the contributions in three sections. The first group of contributions compares the observed behavior to different cooperative and noncooperative theoretical benchmarks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies. Both the first and second groups exclusively use a discrete time framework. Finally, we discuss the exceptions in this literature that study behavior in continuous time.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The possibility of myopic playing has been explicitly included in transboundary pollution differential games (see, e.g., Benchekroun and Martín-Herrán 2016).

  2. 2.

    A global Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy is defined over the whole state space. A local Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strategy is defined over an interval strictly included in the state space (Tasneem et al. 2017).

  3. 3.

    They implemented the discount rate by applying it to instantaneous payoffs every second. To implement infinite horizon each simulation of the game end with a continuation payoff for each player computed as the discounted sum of payoffs for the player out to infinity. This computation assumed that the extraction rate forever stayed the same as it was at the end of the simulation, and it took into account whether the stock level would ever go to zero.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

    Dina Tasneem

  2. McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Hassan Benchekroun

Authors
  1. Dina Tasneem
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  2. Hassan Benchekroun
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hassan Benchekroun .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Chair in Energy Sector Management, HEC Montréal Energy Sector Management, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Pierre-Olivier Pineau

  2. Faculty of Business, Athabasca University, Athabasca, AB, Canada

    Simon Sigué

  3. Department of Marketing, GERAD and HEC Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada

    Sihem Taboubi

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Tasneem, D., Benchekroun, H. (2020). A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics. In: Pineau, PO., Sigué, S., Taboubi, S. (eds) Games in Management Science. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 280. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_9

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