Abstract
The vaccination issue is a crucial problem nowadays. We see the presence of an anti-vaccination movement, which takes actions to spread the idea that vaccines are ineffective and even dangerous. We propose a model for this public health problem using the differential game framework and aspire to help understanding the effectiveness of communication policies. One player of the game is the health-care system, which aims to minimize the number of unvaccinated people at minimum cost. The second player is a pharmaceutical firm, which produces and sells a given type of vaccine, and wants to maximize its profit. To pursue their objectives, the two players run suitable vaccination advertising campaigns. We study the open-loop Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the two players and observe that the communication policy of the pharmaceutical firm helps the health-care system to decrease the number of unvaccinated people.
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank two anonymous referees for their interesting comments and suggestions. The third author wants to thank D. Bonandini for instructive talks on the vaccination problem in Italy.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof (Theorem 2)
Let u s(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T], be an admissible control of player S, which determines the state function x(t) > 0 , t ∈ [0, T). We recall that the function u f(t) is a known parameter in the present context.
Let us assume that
for some τ ∈ [0, T − 2h], h > 0, and let us define the spike variation
of the control u s(t), where α > 0. Let the admissible control \(u_{s}^\alpha (t)\), jointly with u f(t), determine the state function x α(t) , t ∈ [0, T], and assume that
Remark that
and
In order to compare the values of the objective functional J s associated with the control pairs (u s, u f) and \((u_{s}^\alpha , u_{f})\), let us define
and look for an upper bound of it. We observe that
because ΔJ s∣[0,τ) = 0, ΔJ s∣[τ+2h,T] ≤ 0, and because of the residual value function negative variation. The upper bound just obtained is strictly less than
because
The last upper bound is strictly less than
Now, the last expression is negative if and only if
which is true for suitably small α > 0, because the right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly positive. □
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Buratto, A., Grosset, L., Viscolani, B. (2020). A LQ Vaccine Communication Game. In: Pineau, PO., Sigué, S., Taboubi, S. (eds) Games in Management Science. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 280. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_19
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