Abstract
This chapter opens a conversation between law and game theory on the personhood status of environmental entities. Specifically, we consider the granting of personhood status to a river that suffers from the production activity of a firm creating economic value, but also pollution emissions as a by-product. If no one lives downstream, for instance, traditional responses to the environmental problem are unsatisfactory. We show that environmental personhood can help achieve efficient bargaining solutions between polluters and environmental entities. We also report on various approaches that have been taken in some countries to endow environmental persons with means to protect their rights.
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Notes
- 1.
Using a representative player is equivalent to considering that the downstream residents agree to coordinate their mitigation decisions and seek a cooperative solution, which minimizes the total cost borne by the group. A noncooperative solution among n downstream residents can also be envisioned.
- 2.
Other policy instruments could be modeled similarly, for instance, subsidizing mitigation activities undertaken to reduce the environmental damage to the river.
- 3.
Animal personhood, a hot topic in the law of persons, is another possible avenue for addressing the problem under consideration.
- 4.
To simplify, we assume that downstream residents do not participate in the coordination process or in the mitigation effort.
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Breton, M., Zaccour, S. (2020). Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood. In: Pineau, PO., Sigué, S., Taboubi, S. (eds) Games in Management Science. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 280. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_13
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