Abstract
In the previous chapter, I have introduced an E-RULE approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. I have argued that this doxastic responsibility assessment is epistemically significant because it is governed by certain epistemic norms, namely the norms of reliable intellectual conduct. Moreover, I have argued that the performance of belief-influencing actions and omissions which are licensed by the norms of reliable intellectual conduct conduces to produce epistemic value. In this chapter, I want to put to work what has been said about the epistemic significance of the norms of reliable intellectual conduct and epistemic responsibility assessment. In what follows, I want to apply what has been said in the previous chapter to the debate about the epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement. In what follows EPD will refer to epistemic peer disagreement.
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Notes
- 1.
Note, one can strengthen this condition such that S 1 and S 2 are in a case of EPD with respect to p, only if they are indeed epistemic peers with respect to p. I suppose that Kelly (2005), Feldman (2006) and Kornblith (2010) have something like this in mind when they are talking about conditions of EPD. My arguments do not depend on whether we define cases of EPD with the weaker or the stronger condition of epistemic peerhood. However, if we define cases of epistemic peer disagreement with a weak peerhood condition, then we can have a case of epistemic peer disagreement in which two agents who (have good reasons to) take each other as epistemic peers regarding a proposition p, and disagree about p, are actually not epistemic peers. That is why, if we define cases of EPD with the weak instead of the strong peerhood condition, such cases do not necessarily involve opponents who are indeed epistemic peers but may involve opponents who are only apparent epistemic peers.
- 2.
There are other possibilities of incompatible doxastic attitudes, for example that one opponent suspends judgment about p and the other believes (or disbelieves) that p. We get even more different incompatible doxastic pairs if we treat doxastic attitudes quantitatively in terms of degrees of belief (cf. Kelly 2005, 2010; Christensen 2007). Moreover, we can get a different kind of disagreement if we assume that S 1 and S 2 form a belief toward two contrary propositions which belong to the same subject matter even though they have the same or equally qualified evidence. However, for simplicity I will focus on the simplest kind of epistemic peer disagreement, which consists in belief and disbelief toward a proposition p unless indicated otherwise. I assume that the following arguments apply not only to such simple cases of EPD, but also to the other cases which I have just described.
- 3.
This definition can easily be generalized to a group of epistemic agents which involves more than two agents.
- 4.
Note, the list of cognitive abilities is not supposed to be exhaustive. The cognitive abilities which I gave in the list are the cognitive abilities, which according to the literature, are important for determining the degree of epistemic competence of an agent. I hope that the list of cognitive abilities suffices to give the reader an intuitive impression of what is meant by epistemic competence.
- 5.
The notion of evidence, which is at stake in this condition should not be too narrow. Kelly (2008) distinguishes between a phenomenal and an objective notion of evidence. An objective notion of evidence is such that evidence consists in facts about the world (cf. Kelly 2008, p. 943). Since it is possible for two different epistemic agents to recognize the same facts about the world, presupposing this notion does not cause any problems for the assumption that the two epistemic agents possess the same evidence. A phenomenal conception of evidence consists in non-factive mental states such as perceptual experiences, memories or beliefs (cf. Kelly 2008, p. 943). If we presuppose a phenomenal notion of evidence, it should be mentioned that having the same evidence does not amount to having the same non-factive mental states, i.e., identical non-factive mental states, because otherwise the condition of two epistemic agents having the same evidence can hardly be ever satisfied by two different epistemic agents (cf. Feldman 2009, p. 295). That is why, having the same or equally qualified evidence refers to having the same or rather similar mental representations in approaches which presuppose a phenomenal notion of evidence. Having the same or similar mental representation amounts to having (different) mental states with the same (or similar) representational content.
- 6.
In what follows, I will speak interchangeably of epistemically justified doxastic attitudes and epistemically rational doxastic attitudes, unless indicated otherwise.
- 7.
I suppose that it is at least necessary but maybe also sufficient that all of the opponents who are involved in a situation of EPD have disclosed all the relevant evidence upon which they have formed their opinions about p to satisfy condition iii.
- 8.
In what follows, I will only consider the epistemic significance of being in a case of EPD for agents who have recognized that they are in a case of EPD.
- 9.
Note, I use the notions of epistemic rationality and epistemic justification interchangeably throughout this chapter, unless indicated otherwise.
- 10.
In the recent literature there are different names for approaches which I would like to characterize as Conformism, namely the Equal Weight View, Conciliatory Views and the Splitting the Difference View.
- 11.
Note, Kelly is not a proponent of Conformism himself.
- 12.
In what follows, I will most of the time treat doxastic attitudes categorically, meaning that the different types of doxastic attitudes that we are concerned with are belief, disbelief and suspension of judgment. Moreover, I will mainly focus on simple cases of epistemic peer disagreement in which one of the opponents believes a proposition p and the other opponent disbelieves that p. However, I assume that most of the arguments which I present in this chapter can be generalized in an easy way such that they apply to a quantitative treatment of beliefs and to cases of epistemic peer disagreement which are not simple cases.
- 13.
Note, to disbelieve that p means to believe that ¬p.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
I cannot go into a more detailed discussion of this topic in this chapter.
- 17.
This quotation stems from Kuhn (1970, p. 262).
- 18.
Lugg is referring to parts from the second chapter “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion” of Mill’s “On Liberty” (cf. Mill 2011, Ch. II).
- 19.
Note, Elga (2007) is not a proponent of the Extra Weight View.
- 20.
Note, Kepler has an epistemic advantage in a certain sense, but not in the sense of epistemic advantage that I have introduced above (see Sect. 4.1). If Kepler is justified in retaining his belief to a certain extent, then his total amount of evidence has to support his initial belief to a certain extent after he has recognized that he is in a case of EPD. It is plausible to assume that Brahe’s total amount of evidence does not support his initial belief anymore. So Keppler has an epistemic advantage in the sense that his total amount of evidence supports his initial belief that s, whereas Brahe’s total amount of evidence does not support his initial belief that ¬s after he has recognized that he is in a case of EPD about s. Keppler’s and Brahe’s initial beliefs differ with respect to their evidential support after they have recognized that they are in a case of EPD. Note, this evidential difference has nothing to do with a qualitative difference in Keppler’s and Brahe’s initial evidence and it does not amount to Kepler having an independent reason in Christensen’s sense. Moreover, it is not necessary for two epistemic agents who are in a case of EPD to be equally epistemically justified in their initial beliefs before they have recognized that they are in a case of EPD. Kelly (2010, p. 122f.) discusses an example which illustrates this point.
- 21.
I will not discuss Thune’s account of the epistemic significance of EPD and partial defeat in detail in this chapter. For a detailed description of the approach and a critical discussion, see Thune (2010).
- 22.
Norms of reliable intellectual conduct have been introduced in Sect. 3.3.2.
- 23.
I suppose that Conformism as well as Non-Conformism focus on the epistemic status of the initial doxastic attitude after one has recognized that one is in a case of EPD. To put it in different terms, Conformism as well as Non-Conformism are concerned with how an agent should revise her initial doxastic attitude (or her initial degree of belief) in response to her recognition that she is in a case of EPD. This is an immediate impact which the recognition that one is in a case of EPD has upon one’s initial doxastic attitude toward the disputed proposition.
- 24.
Note, in what follows I will refer to the doxastic dimension of EPD as the doxastic dimension for simplicity’s sake.
- 25.
Note, in what follows I will refer to the dimension of intellectual conduct of EPD as the dimension of intellectual conduct for simplicity’s sake.
- 26.
The truth-goal refers to the goal of maximizing correct doxastic attitudes and minimizing incorrect doxastic attitudes. The goal of objective understanding refers to the goal of maximizing objective understanding of domains of interest. Note, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain the epistemic goal of objective understanding in further detail. To objectively understand a certain domain “[one needs] to have a significant body of [correct] beliefs about that domain, which fits together in a coherent way, and which involves beliefs about what would explain why things happen as they do in that domain” (Bondy 2015, square brackets A.R.).
- 27.
I did not present an example to show that the performance of weakly meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing actions and omissions promote the pursuit of epistemic goals. However, I take this assumption to be intuitively plausible. Let us assume that neither of the (apparent) epistemic peers who are involved in a case of EPD after full disclosure about whether a certain fluid is acidic, basic or neutral, knows how to apply a litmus test. The epistemic situation of both opponents with respect to the disputed topic would improve if both opponents were to learn how to apply a litmus test. To learn how to apply a litmus test is a weakly meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing action of the third category with respect to propositions which claim whether a certain fluid is acidic, neutral or basic. The performance of this action improves the epistemic situation of the two opponents with respect to the disputed topic and improves their pursuit of epistemic goals.
- 28.
Note, meta-reliable belief-influencing actions and omissions subsumes strong as well as weak meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing actions and omissions.
- 29.
For an example, see Kelly (2010, p. 143f.).
- 30.
The Extra Weight View is not a plausible approach to the epistemic significance of EPD, since it falls prey to Elga’s bootstrapping objection.
- 31.
I will assume that the expression of “to gain decisive evidence on p” and “to possess decisive evidence on p” are synonymous for cases in which an agent does not yet possess decisive evidence on p.
- 32.
A simple case of EPD about a proposition p is a case of epistemic peer disagreement between two opponents one of whom believes p and the other disbelieves p.
- 33.
Externalists and internalists agree that conforming to the norms of epistemic justification is a good means to pursue the truth-goal under normal, non-skeptical circumstances. This is obviously the case for externalism, since within such approaches a belief counts as justified only if it was formed in a truth-conducive way, for example if the belief was formed or sustained by a reliable belief-forming processes (cf. Alston 1988a, p. 285). For internalistic approaches which claim that norms of rationality are a means to pursue epistemic aims like the truth-goal, see Wedgwood (2002) and Feldman and Conee (1985).
- 34.
- 35.
Note, that Wedgwood treats suspension of judgment as a doxastic attitude. He argues that to suspend judgment “is different from simply neither believing nor disbelieving p” (Wedgwood 2002, p. 272), since to have this attitude toward a proposition p, it is necessary that the agent considers p (Wedgwood 2002, p. 272).
- 36.
One obvious objection to this argument is that instead of being an argument for the need to consider the dimension of intellectual conduct in cases of EPD, it can be taken as an argument for the claim that to pursue the truth-goal without also conforming to the rules of epistemic justification is of no epistemic worth on its own. Therefore, the argument might be taken as an argument for the claim that conforming to the norms of epistemic justification has priority over the pursuit of the truth-goal. However, adding considerations of the dimension of intellectual conduct to the epistemic significance of peer disagreement does not only help to explain why cases in which the pursuit of the truth-goal diverges from the compliance with the norms of epistemic justification require of the opponents to perform certain reliable, strongly meta-reliable or weakly meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing actions and omissions, it does also help to explain why the performance of such belief-influencing actions and omissions improves one’s pursuit of other epistemic goals like the goal of objective understanding. For example, let us assume that Keppler and Brahe suspended judgment on s, and omitted to search for more evidence as well as to reflect carefully about their epistemic situation with respect to s in response to the recognition that they are in a case of EPD about s. This way of dealing with the fact that one is in a case of EPD would have impaired Keppler’s and Brahe’s understanding of the topic at hand in significant ways. That is why I propose that the performance of reliable, strongly meta-reliable and weakly meta-reliable∗∗ belief-influencing actions and omissions in response to the recognition that one is in a case of EPD is a good means to pursue epistemic goals such as the truth-goal or the goal of understanding.
- 37.
I have introduced and discussed these criteria in depth in Sect. 3.3.2.
- 38.
Note, in what follows I will neglect factual defeaters. The term “defeater” refers only to mental state defeaters and normative defeaters unless indicated otherwise.
- 39.
Bergmann distinguishes defeaters regarding their power in much further detail. However, at a more general level Bergmann assumes that a defeater can only do its work if what gets defeated had positive epistemic status right before the defeater becomes effective. To put it in another way, a mental state or a reason to have a mental state is a defeater for a certain belief only if the belief is prima facie epistemically justified. See Bergmann (2006), Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion.
- 40.
Note, what is said about defeaters for beliefs can be easily generalized to defeaters for doxastic attitudes or degrees of belief.
- 41.
Christensen (2007) criticizes non-conformist approaches for not being able to explain the intuition that cases of EPD provide the opponents with an opportunity for epistemic improvement.
- 42.
Note, it is necessary to treat beliefs or doxastic attitudes quantitatively for this example to work. That is why I speak of degrees of belief in the following example and in the discussion of it.
- 43.
Note, Kelly uses this example to raise doubts on the intuitive appeal of Conformism. I use his example in a slightly different way, namely to show that Conformism cannot explain satisfactorily that cases of recognized peer disagreement are an opportunity for epistemic improvement.
- 44.
One might doubt that this case is an actual case of disagreement, because after all both epistemic agents belief that p to a degree which is above 0.5. If we assume something like the uniqueness thesis, which claims that “[F]or any body of evidence E and proposition p, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude [or one degree of belief] toward p” (Matheson 2011, p. 360, square brackets A.R.), then it is a case of disagreement because there is just one right degree of belief given the evidence the two opponents possess. Kelly introduces and discusses this case as a case of EPD under the assumption that the uniqueness thesis holds (cf. Kelly 2010, p. 122). I will not discuss whether the uniqueness thesis holds in this chapter. However, if the truth of the uniqueness thesis is necessary for the example to be a case of disagreement, then I will assume the truth of the uniqueness thesis for the sake of argument. We can also modify the description of the case such that S 1 believes that ¬p to a degree of 0.3 whereas S 2 believes that p to a degree of 0.9. Both degrees of beliefs toward p are incompatible in the light of the evidence the agents possess.
- 45.
Note, the degree of epistemic justification for S 1’s initial doxastic attitude toward p is lowered because some belief-revision is required in response to S 1’s recognition that she is in a case of EPD. Because S 1 does not revise her initial doxastic attitude toward p, her doxastic attitude loses degrees of epistemic justification to a certain extent.
- 46.
Note, in Sect. 4.2.2 I have argued that the Extra Weight View is not a plausible non-conformist approach to the epistemic significance of EPD because it allows opponents who are involved in a case of EPD to disregard the opinion of their opponents for no good reason.
- 47.
For an argument as to why splitting the difference in response to the recognition that one is in a case of EPD entails the possibility of being distracted to pursue the truth-goal, see the previous Sect. 4.3.2.
- 48.
For the sake of simplicity, I omit the qualifications of strong meta-reliability and weak meta-reliability∗∗. In what follows, the term “meta-reliability” refers to strong meta-reliability and weak meta-reliability∗∗, unless indicated otherwise.
- 49.
- 50.
While it is common among supporters of conformist approaches to explain the epistemic significance of EPD in terms of defeaters (Feldman 2009; Christensen 2010; Grundmann 2013), it is not so common among proponents of non-conformist approaches. The fact that they can explain their assumptions about the epistemic significance of EPD also by referring to a certain kind of defeater, namely partial defeaters, is rather an advantage, if it turns out that part of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement has to be explained in terms of defeaters.
- 51.
Note, this point can be generalized to doxastic attitudes as well as to degrees of belief.
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Robitzsch, A. (2019). What Should We Do in the Face of Epistemic Peer Disagreement?. In: An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility. Synthese Library, vol 411. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4_4
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